The issues of inclusion and exclusion are closely connected with zero-sum logic, which tends to persist in social thought even as it loses ground in social reality. Extending accessibility and connectedness — both horizontally in space and vertically, hierarchically — makes the old understanding of mutual exclusiveness obsolete. The logic of win/lose was the common denominator of territorial expansionism, power politics, economic and cultural imperialism, the world core and periphery, "Americanisation," centralisation and decentralisation alike. This zero-sum logic is less and less able to explain current social change in European societies, which is better understood in terms of interpenetration, mixing, multi-level power-sharing, glocalisation, partnership, hybridisation, and multiple loyalties.

What is taking place is both a tendency towards the inclusion of territorial diversity that is compatible with (more) global combinations, and a tendency towards the exclusion of diversity that arose on the basis of territorial separation and is incompatible with the territorial extension of connectedness. In Europe we can observe both the empowerment of actors based on universalist criteria and the widening delegitimisation of territorially exclusionary criteria.

Research proceeds under the pressure of prevailing social values and policies that tend to protect traditionally understood territorial identities, particularly national ones. Much simplistic commitment exists to the continuity of the heritage of territorial cultures, without awareness of their exclusionary nature and of what this implies for other values — such as the autonomy and identity of the human personality — that are gaining in importance. Continuity cannot be absolutised; it should always be considered together, and in dialogue, with discontinuity. There is a general shift from identities based on territorial separation ("identity as island") to identities formed on the basis of selectivity and choice ("identity as crossroads"). What is not always distinguished is this: territorial diversity in the context of globalisation is actually declining insofar as it is based on frontal territorial separation, but it is simultaneously increasing insofar as it is based on the autonomy and selectivity of actors in the context of widening access to the world's variety. This remains a challenge for further examination.

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The Art of the Feud: The Developmental Logic of Globalisation

Henry Teune and Zdravko Mlinar

Introduction

Globalisation is integral to social development. It refers to processes that both integrate diversity and produce even more diversity. It is explained by theories of developmental change. Its driving, self-conflicting logic permeates differentiation and integration within the practical limits of the individual at the lowest level, at the one end, and the world as a whole at the highest, most encompassing level, at the other.

As a concept, globalisation must be distinguished from several related but different constructs. First, it differs from concepts that explain an intensification and expansion of international relations among states through diplomacy, organisation, and law — or through subversion, threat, and war: the very processes that encapsulated the whole world as a system of states. Second, it differs from transnational activities that, although conducted from within countries, traverse state boundaries through communication, commerce, and the circulation of people and ideas. Though often perceived as global, the structures of transnational activities are bilateral or multilateral at best — between and among entities across countries, be they universities, voluntary medical associations, or corporations. Third, it differs from the institutionalisation of supra-national entities, their organisations, and the norms held therein — be they the European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), or the World Trade Organisation (WTO). All of the latter comprise states that agree to subordinate their sovereignty to a common decision-making body of more or less federal character. And although most supra-national organisations are regional, the WTO provides an example of a supra-national organisation that happens to cover most of the world, even if unable to be global in its fundamental organisational principles.

Globalisation and universalism are different concepts. The first has temporal and spatial parameters; the second is a characteristic of principles that can be applied without regard to time and space. Universal principles are observably manifest only in a particular place or period. Globalisation, in contrast, extends the application of universal principles everywhere. Modern scientific knowledge started in a small Western European niche from which it spread globally. The growth of this type of knowledge, if not merely that, is a mainspring of contemporary global social development.

The spread of universal principles does not necessarily imply homogenisation — everything becoming the same everywhere. Rather, they appear locally in practically limitless, distinct, unique combinations and recombinations. As the science of materials advances and architectural variations improve and multiply, for example, they even help to preserve and recreate older designs.

Since globalisation is very often theoretically unclear, it has come to signify two separate domains: (1) one in which territorial diffusion of things, people, and ideas occurs; and (2) another in which different parts of the world gradually become interdependent. This is why globalisation can seem to indicate, contradictorily, that the world is simultaneously becoming bigger and smaller — connoted in references to "McDonaldisation," "Coca-Colonisation," "world football," and "Americanisation" (Featherstone, 1990). As powerful persuaders, these exemplifications convey both positively and negatively charged images that distort the underlying reality of contemporary change and warp the explanatory power of development as a general dynamic of global change.

The facile explanations of globalisation point to technologies — satellite communications, air transport, computer networks, and worldwide television programming — all of which substantially reduce the physical and social constraints of space and time, in some cases nearly to nothing. Yet what are the social forces that explain these technologies and their use? Each has more expensive and difficult alternatives; all are improvable and substitutable. The fax machine was available for years, providing wire photos for newspapers, long before that same technology became a recognised element of the bundle of technologies now reputed to be "causing" globalisation. Although technologies may be engaged to facilitate development, and may at certain critical periods even become the "necessity" that compels one invention or another, they remain subordinate to the developmental processes themselves.

Globalisation must be understood theoretically as a general social developmental process, or else it will be seen politically as a willy-nilly product of technologies, which can themselves be manipulated to control any unwanted consequences of change. The popular perception of globalisation at this moment in history is as an altogether benign force amply capable of accounting for our everyday observations of change and explaining the spread of the familiar everywhere, with good and bad consequences. To deal with the politics of globalisation, one needs to recognise and understand the winners, the losers, and their likely responses. It is not enough to anticipate globalisation as the bearer of the next golden age, to abhor its casualties, or to fear the reactions of its enemies. Yes, a different kind of society is likely to take shape; yes, factories may well close; and yes, fundamentalists will challenge. But globalisation will proceed. The political issues of journalistic relevance will continue to be about the consequences of the pretentious premise that governments can continue to deal with the problems emanating from globalisation — even though these are matters that have long since escaped the purview, let alone the reach, of their authority.

Surrogate references to globalisation as telecommunications, computer networks, electronic shopping, and high-speed transport are pseudo-explanations that invite familiar Luddite reactions of astonishment and resistance. Fundamentalist responses — aggressive assertions of ethnic and national character — are merely perturbations on these processes. They are typical of sectors and regions of the world that are the least socially diversified and differentiated, and that by definition constitute the world's new backward areas now impacted by ever-expanding globalisation.

National Development

Since the late eighteenth century, beginning with Adam Smith, both economic growth and development have been perceived as led by the formation of the nation state. The reasons for this are as transparent as they are, in some respects, obscure. States, compelled by the imperatives of defence or survival, built the infrastructures that integrated territory and brought together those within it, so as to encourage general exchange and production. The spread of norms through the extension of law made exchanges predictable. And technologies — those great inputs of growth that boosted production — helped to modernise transportation and accelerate communications, under the protection of "the state." Among the most evident general forces that created roads, canals, railroads, shipping services, patent offices, currencies, markets, and reliable banking services — but also legally enforceable contracts — were the momentous productive transformations: from animate to inanimate power, from coal-generated steam to electricity, from compound new industrial materials to fission and fusion in chemistry, among others.

The less obvious factors in the historic shift from sustainable survival to strategic surplus and to fast growth are discussed today in the context of the still poorly identified ingredients of innovation and the yet-to-be-understood basic constituents of success — all of which are so necessary in organising production for the markets of tomorrow.

Why some states came together and embarked on a path of autonomous growth, achieving "economic takeoff," whereas other early starters became targets of opportunity for ascendant states, constitutes one of the most important historical-theoretical puzzles still awaiting resolution. Argentina and Canada — both vast spans of land with sparse European populations implanted on top of scattered indigenous populations — shared similar prospects for growth and development in the early twentieth century, yet a large economic gap now separates them. Mexico and the United States, although "economically comparable" at the starting gate in the early nineteenth century, followed widely divergent paths in their economic growth and national integration only a few decades later.

The reasons advanced by evolving theoretical interpretations range from the imperatives of war to the happenstance of good government and the opportune

choices of political leaders. Aside from such explanations, autonomous national economic growth is known to have proceeded even without the obvious benefits of resource-rich territory, an invigorating climate, or cultural splendour. Comparisons of China and Japan, England and France, Prussia and Russia have opened paths of explanation touching on religion, politics, and the diffusion of innovations.

By the end of the 1970s it should have become apparent, and by the mid-1990s it was certainly obvious, that development was more than simple economic growth of nations. In reality, it was a feat embedded in the social advancements that had managed to slip through the cage bars and the traditional constraints imposed by states. Once, only those countries successful in harnessing their resources grew to lead the world; wars among the growth-driven states were of such magnitude that they were seen as "world wars." Today, even in countries unable to achieve much national economic success, populations can benefit from processes of social development and thereby experience the positive effects of economic growth. Such, too, is the outcome of global social development — itself the fruit of generalised social development, which, after nearly three centuries of very gradual internationalisation, now touches almost all parts of the planet with worldwide impact.

Globalisation as Social Development

Our theoretical perspective places globalisation centrally, as a core element indispensable to the explanation of the general processes of social development at a time when the world needs to come to terms with its ecological limits. First, so as to situate our theory of developmental change in context, we shall examine why sociology did not until recently recognise globalisation as the historical watershed it is; why so little progress has been made in grasping the concept; and what manifold consequences have ensued. Second, we shall propose a theory of development capable of conceptualising the process of globalisation — one intended to be general and comprehensive, and compatible with the traditions of the macrosociological theories of the nineteenth century that serve to explain the transformation commonly referred to today as "modernity." Third, we shall discuss some of the consequences of globalisation in an outline of a different kind of world order.

Sociology and Twentieth-Century World Systems

The role of social science in the development of the world during the twentieth century is a complicated story, yet to be told in full (Albrow & King, 1990). The general understanding is that the rise of the social sciences coincided with the emergence and expansion of a world of states. Scholars ascribed meaning to the concept of the nation state more out of idealistic aspiration than on grounds of

justifiable evidence. The study of human development quickly retreated from its nineteenth-century origins in Marx, Spencer, and Weber, distancing itself from their macrotheoretical interpretations of massive change and future directions. A world of peoples, empires, great religions, mores, and cultures became compressed into a planet of political cages — most of which were very confining; many also packed with mutually hostile occupants.

The end of the First World War transformed the nation state into a moral force for justice — an entity wholly capable of reconfiguring liberated human beings into organisations geared to production, but also one likely to use its newly demonstrated deadly capacities for war on an unprecedented scale. The main query for professional economists became the why of economic prosperity and the wherefore of inequality among nations; their quests would soon discover new paths in the orthodoxies of Keynesian national economic policies promising growth and justice. States erected barriers along their boundaries and prepared to defend — and possibly expand — them. The main questions for political scientists became those of war and peace, including the calculation of national interests and the materialisation of vast state bureaucracies for collective action. Sociology lost its way in these intellectual quests. Submitting to the dogma of the nation state as the principal agent of change for social justice, sociology dutifully searched for social order, addressing social problems in a variety of national settings. As a result, comparative research contrasted countries, political systems, societies, and economies, at the expense of scholarly work on self and space.

The emancipation of individuals inside liberal democratic states — through private ownership, citizens' rights, and public welfare — dissolved in the 1920s into the many communalisms of that period. Nationalism, fascism, and "national" communism gave way to violent conflicts and governmentally induced deaths; and already by the 1950s, their casualties would make of the twentieth century the bloodiest yet in human history (Rummel, 1997). During that period of ascendant communalisms, and well into the end of the century, sociologists became apologists, exiles, or marginalised critics, most of them abandoning their nineteenth-century traditions of global theories of change.

Political scientists and economists embraced the new world order of competitive and conflicting states. The internationally dominant theoretical paradigm for political scientists became the "zero-sum game"; for economists, the name of that deadly rivalry was "competition" — zero-sum with all its theoretical corollaries. The former developed a major field of study and research in both international relations and world politics; the latter excelled in international and world economics. A few studies of "cultural" and social influences among nations aside, sociologists remained mostly commentators on the sidelines. A somewhat late exception was *The Modern World-System* (Wallerstein, 1974). But even that work was primarily an analysis of economic relations between core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral states — a quest to bridge Marxist and

capitalist interpretations of global change with ideas derived from mercantilism, imperialism, and the history of the West. Although a field of international sociology did not thereby emerge, a comparative cross-national sociology did somehow come into focus.

Nonetheless, the second half of the twentieth century witnessed much more than high-profile trade and power politics, or the mere construction of institutions to bring nations together in a world of prosperity without wars. Less visible, but deep changes in values and in relations among groups engaged in economic production and distribution did create the conditions for two of the most important institutional and structural changes of the century's end. The first secured the institutions for the European Union; the second managed the transformation of nationalist communist states from closed to open, if not wholly democratic, systems. Each appeared to have taken place independently — the first through the special relationship between the political leaders of Germany and France; the second, owing to Gorbachev's leadership. Yet both were part of the developmental processes of globalisation, as were NAFTA, the WTO, the fast rise of international derivative markets, and the growth of certain Asian economies. The Maastricht Treaty, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the opening up of countries worldwide, and even the responses to the wars in the Balkans and inside Russia are all integral to the processes of world development on a global scale.

Only a development theory of change — capable of articulating the transformation of an international system made of states and nations, yet still able to explain the processes of an emerging world system of individuals — can provide the sound theoretical foundation for a global sociology whose deep grasp and broad reach neither comparative sociology nor international sociology could ever hope to achieve.

A Sociological Theory of Globalisation

For sociology to make a theoretical contribution to the study of global processes of change, it has to acquire something like the comparative advantage theory in economics or iterative game theory in political science. What sociology can draw upon is a tradition of theories of social development, once instrumental in explaining the massive changes that led to the modern era — the days of large nation states, emerging cities and markets, and nascent science. What can sociology do to free itself from the limitations of that earlier historical period, in order to meet more aptly the challenges of the century ahead?

Our book *The Developmental Logic of Social Systems* (Teune & Mlinar, 1978) defined "development" as integrated diversity. Our general theory was presented as characteristic of certain societies — indeed, of the human race as a single system. In our view, the Roman Empire was developmental: it integrated diversity, as did also smaller societies — early Athens being an example — that

were not dominated by the expansionist imperatives of empires, yet left many lasting legacies for human development.

For a variety of reasons, certain nation-state systems found themselves linked to developmental processes sometime in the mid-seventeenth century. They used the benefits of their scale to absorb some societies still stuck in reproducing themselves through adaptations to their environments — including their own neighbours — and much of it involved warfare. Those ecological human systems depended heavily on production, trade, and war for their sustenance and defence. Developmental systems, in contrast, generate change autonomously; they integrate it and create even more change. A few of these dynamics and processes of development need to be discussed to show why the world's human system is becoming globally developmental in character and tenor.

Integration has three dimensions: strength, inclusiveness, and extensiveness. Strength depends on the interdependence of the components, whereby a change in one element leads to a change in others as well as in the first, owing to feedback with variable probability. The average of these probabilities across components is the overall strength of integration: maximum integration obtains where a change in one component determines a change in all others; dissolution, where change becomes a random process. Inclusiveness refers to the equiprobability that a change in one component will lead to change in the others: notwithstanding the strength of the relationships among the components of a system, the components' overall deviation from the average constitutes a measure of the inclusiveness of the system's integration. Extensiveness, finally, is the proportion of each component's properties affected by the system, regardless of the total number of properties those components may possess. A component is thus said to be partially or fully integrated into the system, depending on how much of what it has is engaged in system-related behaviour.

Toward a World System

Diversity is the other essential element of development. It is the sum total of differences in the properties of all the components of a system — all combinations of such properties included. Every single component has both similarities with, and differences from, every other. The important dynamic of diversity is that as each component acquires more properties, the probability of its having properties both similar to and different from those of the other components increases — growing exponentially when combinations of properties are at play. Thus, everybody can have shoes; but some will have shoes and automobiles; others, shoes, automobiles, and houses; and so on, as basics are diffused and novelties trickle down.

The questions raised here are: why development, and why does the scale of a system increase? Beyond economic growth and modernity — the central

preoccupation of macrosocial science — what does a system's scale imply? There are three basic types of systems: co-action systems, interaction systems, and transaction systems. Co-action refers to variety among "traditional" societies and to similarities within them; integration here is based on shared characteristics within the society and common differences from outsiders. Interaction relies on similarities and differences within and among societies, giving rise to exchange and conflict. Transaction is composed primarily of differences in a system where integration is based on flows of activities and ideas.

The great transformation of the nineteenth century — explained by Marx and others through processes of differentiation and integration — was from co-action (small-scale and self-reproductive) systems to interaction (exchange/conflict) systems, in which competition and discontent constitute the core dynamics of change. Developing systems create differences and cleavages — between urban and rural, between central and peripheral, between wealthy and poor. They intensify conflicts, not only among themselves but among groups with different cultures and religions, by bringing them into contact. The twentieth-century state communalisms can be interpreted as short-term, successful reactions against changes that threatened disintegration. The concepts of winners and losers and zero-sum games aptly captured the dynamics of change from co-action communities to exchange-oriented, capitalist societies.

The transformation from exchange/conflict systems — especially those organised as states — to transaction systems constitutes the main process of globalisation: differences are encompassed in networks; territorial boundaries become fuzzy; goods and services flow instead of being pushed or dragged across conflict-intensive exchange organisations; and, unlike the variety of communalisms that would rather embrace group uniformity, democratic ideologies very much respect individuals and celebrate their differences.

Our developmental theory is not one of nation states, nor of corporations, let alone of communities to be explained by ecological theories of growth and human settlements. Rather, it is an articulation of the significance of the evolving levels of territorial social organisation — from villages, towns, cities, and regions to the supra-national. Here, conflicts among these entities — whether over the emergence of newer levels or about the weakening and restructuring of older ones — are manifestations of those processes of deep transformation that ultimately succeed in converting the world from a territorially organised system into a globally reconfigured entity, for which new maps are needed.

The weakening of states by new claimants of autonomy, on the one hand, and the birth of supra-national regions and the emergence of transnational networks, on the other, are both integral to the developmental process. What we are witnessing today is a turning away from the nation state as the coordinating centre of human activity — in economic development, cultural achievements, and emancipation from group restraints, among other domains. In addition to conflicts fuelled by established nationalist and ethnic groups, there are those

arising among newer kinds of groups animated by an ever-expanding range of issues and interests, some in evident opposition to territorial political systems. Many among these groups transcend national boundaries in the nature of their membership, the range of issues addressed, and their linkages to others. There exist also global political movements, interests in free trade, resurgent universalistic religious creeds, knowledge-based associations, understandings among local officials, regional arrangements, and international organisations linked to sub-national ones, among other configurations.

Territorial groups fighting for autonomy in South Asia, Europe, Central Asia, or Africa never quite achieved their liberation in the great wave of newly independent states during the first half of the twentieth century. The coveted promise of self-determination in a world of independent states — at once protective of group interests and supportive of others' rights — never came to be a reality for them (Etzioni, 1994). Yet even as these groups acquire their independent states — with more than ten new states now recognised in Europe alone, in the space of a few years — they will be losing control not only to a globalising system but also to increasingly independent localities, minority groups, organisations, and the individuals within them (Pietraś, 1991). Their own autonomy can thus be assured only through linkages to broader systems.

With globalisation, entities below the level of the nation state that acquire sufficient autonomy are not only being freed from state control but also enabled to bypass the state and deal directly with its neighbours and with the global system as a whole (Mlinar, 1992a). The state cannot continue to function as a monopolistic intermediary when groups and persons seek to gain comparable "standing" under international law. Where global norms are not yet available, international laws are most likely to continue to serve as guidelines for localities, persons, and organisations in lieu of the internal rules formerly imposed exclusively by the state.

Once, developmental processes led to the weakening of localities in favour of the nation state and to the liberation of individuals from the grip of local communities, tribes, and religious groups. Today, such processes are giving rise to new regions, thereby nurturing — both intra- and trans-nationally — the preconditions for supra-national associations and organisations. Simultaneously, they have softened the strictly competitive nature of conflicts among states, localities, and the organisations that control state trade, the use of the military, and the exchange of skilled workers and technologies.

A global system is characterised by the interdependence of its groups, organisations, and individuals on a world scale, such that a change in one will have some probability of producing changes in the others. As these changes spread, the familiar in one part of the world becomes recognisable as not dissimilar to what is known in others. And the wider diffusion of the world's social variety assures a given locality's integration into a world system, and its diversification from within, through permutations and combinations of the local and the global.

Among the attributes of global systemness, one may mention: shared norms of behaviour, as in the treatment of minorities; identifiable elements, such as multinational businesses; world institutions, such as world banks; common languages for instant communication, such as computer software; and universal privileges and obligations, including human rights.

Dynamics of Globalisation

The developmental processes conducive to a world system are marked by increased differentiation at all levels of human aggregation, with further differentiation by sector. The levels are mixed: a region for trade can be more encompassing in size than a space specific to political cooperation on immigration or tourism. Levels may become fluid or fuzzy across sectors. Lags among sectors will become noticeable if one sector's integration leads to the integration of one but to the collapse of another. Some parts of universities — business education and cognitive science, to mention two — will tend to become global, if only by integrating with communications corporations; even as others — remedial education, for example — may languish if only one's own tongue is used for reading and writing.

The unfolding of levels — imparting ever-greater autonomy, from the lowest levels, ultimately to the one with the greatest possible scale, the world as a whole — will continue to be driven by the very processes of integrating diversity. The integration of the world is currently at a low level of systemic cohesiveness compared to most countries and regions, yet it constitutes the potential target of the global system. Enriched by the largest amount of diversity, an integrated world would provide the greatest quantity of novel variety and the highest rates of increase in comparison to any of its components. An integrated world would be far more innovative as a whole than any one of its nationally definable centres of innovation — as is already evident from the numerous breakthroughs accomplished in physics, genetics, and medicine.

As systems develop through augmentation in the diversity of their components and in the level of their integration to the whole, the relevance of intermediate structures diminishes. At relatively low levels of development, countries have weak central authorities; as they achieve some level of development, central controls expand rapidly in transportation, capital markets, and education. As even higher levels of development are attained, governments begin to decentralise and to divest themselves of initial controls, as their countries and their components become increasingly integrated into greater encompassing systems.

For totalitarian governments, the choice is between control and development: to develop, they must open; to open to the world, they must relinquish control. Countries may channel penetrations by the global, but there is little choice about whether or not to be open. In the long run, closure breeds poverty and social regression.

Conflicts in the Globalisation Processes

The world may be a global system, but its components are far from attaining high integration. Its institutions are incipient; some of its groups and parts are not well incorporated; the younger political levels — the regions — are in conflict with the longer-established state interests; new local systems and political movements conflict with national governments, often in alliance with global organisations. And some established groups, with a determination to recapture a past that never existed, can even transform confrontations into conflicts conducive to violence.

The two main structural conflicts in developmental processes are across levels and across time, and both are generated by new variety. No matter where it occurs, new variety tends to "migrate upwards," to more encompassing levels of aggregation, where it is only one more item in a large pool and hence more easily absorbed. Immigrants to a country settle more easily in a large city than in a small town. Once established at more encompassing levels — say, at a centre — variety can offer access to itself at lower levels, providing a basis for hierarchies, especially territorial ones. The centre will always have more variety than localities; it can control access to its space and use such selectivity to dominate. One outcome is direct conflict between centres and localities; another, conflict among centres claiming control over localities.

There are, however, limits to the amount and kind of variety that any level in a hierarchy can hold, which explains a tendency to off-load downward. In today's language, such off-loadings appear as restructurings, downsizings, or decentralisations. When this happens, clashes occur between the new and the old: localities and older organisations tend to have fixed structures, often deeply embedded in physical ecologies — buildings, roads, established land uses. At least initially, locals are likely to resist. Yet ultimately, they may "trade up," giving up some older kind of variety for a new one.

Cross-level shifting of variety is a necessary part of the dynamics of development in most settings. In the years ahead, the local as an autonomous unit will, itself, eventually lose out to those among its own groups and individuals who maintain an intimate link to the world at large (Mlinar, 1995a).

The first to adopt new items of variety in any locality will continue to constitute the "elites" who can bypass local structures and deal directly with the world as a system. Time interacts with conflicts across levels: new items continue to enter the evolving system at a discrete point in time, thereby disturbing it. As it begins to be distributed, variety becomes diversity and uses linear time for requisite system-wide adaptation and integration.

Globalisation also intensifies conflicts when two or more ethnic groups are entrapped within a locality under a single political system. If one group is more developed or globalised — having acquired variety from the "outside" — it will seek access to even more variety and make greater efforts to open the system's

boundaries. If another, less developed group controls the political system, it will seek to keep boundaries as closely under control as possible. This puts the two groups in direct conflict — as in the case of the former Yugoslavia, in the conflicts pitting rich and poor republics and their respective nationalities against each other over national policies concerning Europe and openness.

"Civil" wars have increased since the cessation of external infusions of control resources once sent to political centres in support of the Soviet–US confrontation. These are fought in the relatively less developed peripheries of the world: southern Europe, Central Asia, South Asia, and Africa. Almost no violent conflicts in the years since the end of the Cold War have taken place between states; most are between groups within recognised countries or inside neighbouring ones. The peacekeeping mechanisms of regional compacts and the United Nations were, however, designed for conflicts among nation states within an international system of states. A global system would make such institutions obsolete on grounds of their inability to deal with conflicts that are not strictly between warring state governments. The temporary absence of transnational institutions capable of mediating intra-national group conflicts may increase the probability of national and international violence.

Implications for a Future World Order

The foregoing holds serious implications for the structures of a world system in the coming years. Detractors argue that current conditions are temporary; some have even concluded that, in the long run, another group of countries will become ascendant — that great powers and empires will ensue (Modelski, 1987). A contrary view holds that the world will break up into a thousand or more conflicting tribes before varied "peaces" can be established (Snyder, 1982).

The perspective offered here is that of a world transforming into a different kind of system. The rate of such changes depends on technology and on human will and purpose — the "know how" and the "know what" of the human condition. Technologies and human choice can, of course, end up in catastrophes; but in the future, such setbacks are likely to be remedied in years, not decades: a global system would have both greater capacities for response and far faster responses than any single country or locality could afford. We see at least six dimensions of change in the altered and evolving landscape.

1. *The flow of goods, services, and ideas will accelerate on a global basis*, for two main reasons: reductions in the traditional territorial restraints on movement across the selectively more permeable political boundaries of nation states; and the weakening of the power and purview of intermediate groups that exact tolls on exchanges and transmissions.
2. *The units of human activity, including production, will get smaller.* The more encompassing the world becomes as a global system, the more viable its smaller unit components can afford to be — including new forms of human organisation in production groups, research teams, neighbourhood associations, and lifestyle groups. Smaller, however, will come to require being linked to what is far larger, even to the point of becoming part of the largest-scale system.
3. *The individual will gain autonomy.* Not only will smaller units become more viable in a global system, but individuals will also be able to find their place as diversity is opened to them. The lead sector in the processes of globalisation will be that of information, which follows from rationalisation and standardisation — necessary, if insufficient, conditions for integrating diversity.
4. *The territorial imperative in human aggregation and societal organisation will become fuzzy and fluid.* Not only will there be many more territorial units, but most will be penetrated by elements of other systems, especially by exponentially expanding numbers of non-territorial organisations. The corporation can already jump territorial boundaries easily.
5. *The variety present in the world will be distributed to almost all localities and organisations.* In the language of space, that which is located in one place will be accessible in every place. One consequence: destroying anything anywhere will destroy something of the destroyer as well — if only stock ownership, customers, future contributors, or potential use. Zero-sum situations will acquire fuzzy payoffs.
6. *The world's centres will become nodes in global flows rather than control points.* Instead of just a few world centres, there will be hundreds, perhaps thousands. These nodes will be specialised — in trade, banking, fashion, science. A polycentric world will be made up of switching or clearing points, useful in reducing uncertainty, not designed to control or dominate. It will be a world without empires.

Our sketch of this "future conditional" scenario should not be mistaken for a linear progression into a world system. First, most of the violent situations being faced today are consequences of change in national political systems and the state's diminishing reach within its borders — what now encourages groups to seek long-suppressed recognition. Second, local incursions by global activities may well compromise the aesthetics of micro-environments. Third, the wanderings of the masses in search of their share of profit from a globalising political economy will probably disrupt human relations. Fourth, the unleashing of certain elements from established norms will lead to crime.

Establishing new, integrative norms is a far slower process than the delegitimisation of existing regulations. There is need to encourage novel approaches to theory-making that are attentive to the negative as well as the positive consequences of globalisation. Without new mentalities and newer mind-sets, futures may be pasts.

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Globalisation, Individualisation and Territorial Identities

The relative recency of sociological interest in globalisation, combined with the exceptional breadth and complexity of the concept, explains at least in part why it remains so poorly defined. Despite the great — almost fashionable — attention devoted to globalisation over the past decade by researchers, by various actors in the process itself, and by the general public, the mere announcement of a discussion of the topic rarely indicates what it is actually about. Enumerating illustrative examples — satellite telecommunications links, multinational corporations, financial flows, and the like — can never be expected to cover the full meaning of the concept and the actual subject matter. I therefore raise here certain questions as challenges and signposts on the road from exemplification to a theoretically grounded conceptualisation and research of the process of globalisation and the related individualisation.

Is It Really a Predictable Developmental Process?

Is there any justification for speaking of globalisation as a process with certain regularities and predictability, in the context of flexible, fluid, and even chaotic postmodern society? Albrow (1996) maintains that today we no longer have processes or various "-ations" — like industrialisation or urbanisation — as in the past, but rather "an open-ended transformation," a social transformation in an unpredictable direction, marking "the end of the Grand Narratives." I cannot, however, accept this conclusion.

High complexity raises the question of our ability to recognise the regularity of social change more than it negates it. The expansion of computerisation very strikingly confirms the theoretically anticipated path of developmental change in the direction of individualisation and globalisation — the era of mainframes, then personal computers, then computer networks follows exactly the predicted pattern. Similarly, the long-term trend of individualisation in the developed world over the past two centuries is evidenced in a rise in the number and a decline in the size of households, and now in a rise in the number and decline in the size of enterprises. The present integration processes in Europe, North America, and South-East Asia are part of the long-term stream towards globalisation.

The empirical data sets certain theoretical challenges before us. We have the general idea that globalisation is evidenced in intensified connections and