CONTRIBUTIONS AND CHALLENGES OF SOCIOLOGY | 4

LIMITS TO GROWTH

BEYOND GLOBALISATION AND INDIVIDUALISATION



Zdravko Mlinar

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LIMITS TO GROWTH:
BEYOND GLOBALISATION AND INDIVIDUALISATION
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The Art of the Feud: The Developmental Logic of Globalisation
Development and Participation

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The book before you was not completed in a single effort. Rather than that, it is a synthesis of Academician Zdravko Mlinar's research opus, created over several decades. Individual chapters rest on texts published over different periods and in various scientific publications, with only the introductory and concluding chapters written for this volume exclusively.

For this monograph, the selected texts were reviewed, arranged and copyedited, adapted and abbreviated where required, all with the purpose of minimizing repetition and accentuating the intrinsic cohesion of the entire book. The central ideas and arguments of the original texts remained unaltered.

It is therefore best for the reader to approach this volume as a conceptually cohesive monograph in which individual chapters are mutually supportive and jointly contribute to the formation of the author's focal research questions concerning globalisation, individualisation, deterritorialisation and the changing spatial organization of modern societies.

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Foreword by the President of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts

In this volume, sociologist and academician Zdravko Mlinar analyses changes in society related to the processes of globalisation and individualisation — topics of major contemporary interest and a subject of lively discussion, both in academic circles and among politicians and decision-makers.

The concept of "limits to growth" challenges the long-standing assumption that economic and social expansion can continue indefinitely. In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, globalisation and individualisation became dominant forces shaping societies. Globalisation intensified interconnectedness through trade, technology, and cultural exchange, while individualisation emphasised personal freedom, choice, and self-realisation. However, both trends have revealed inherent limits, prompting a reconsideration of future development paths.

Globalisation has delivered significant benefits, including economic growth and access to resources, but it has also contributed to environmental degradation and uneven wealth distribution. The increasing strain on natural resources — fossil fuels, water, biodiversity — illustrates that the planet's ecological capacity is finite. Climate change, in particular, exposes the unsustainability of continuous global expansion driven by ever-increasing consumption. As production and supply chains span continents, the environmental costs are often displaced and obscured, making them harder to manage collectively.

At the same time, individualisation has reshaped social structures by prioritising personal autonomy over collective responsibility. While this has empowered individuals, it has also weakened social cohesion and increased pressure on social systems. Consumer culture, fuelled by individual aspiration, has intensified demand for goods and services and so accelerated resource use. The pursuit of personal success and material well-being often overshadows long-term ecological and societal considerations.

Moving beyond globalisation and individualisation does not mean rejecting them outright, but redefining their roles. A sustainable future requires balancing global cooperation with local resilience, and individual freedom with collective responsibility. Concepts such as circular economies, degrowth, and community-based governance point towards alternative models that respect ecological boundaries while sustaining social well-being.

The author analyses these processes from many different viewpoints, as he has observed and studied them over a long period of time. His overall conclusion is that the limits to growth highlight the need for a paradigm shift. Recognising planetary boundaries and rethinking the values underlying

globalisation and individualisation are essential steps. Only by integrating environmental sustainability with social equity can societies move towards a more balanced and enduring model of development.

As the author explains in his preface, the two outer chapters were written specifically for this book, while the remaining chapters were previously published in professional journals, several in collaboration with co-authors who are acknowledged in the individual texts. Among them, the author particularly highlights his collaboration with Henry Teune, with whom he maintained a fruitful partnership over several decades. The whole volume has been carefully edited to read as a uniform and eminently readable text of considerable current interest.

Franc Forstnerič
Ljubljana, 2 June 2026

Preface

In this book, I present analyses of changes in society relating to the processes of globalisation and individualisation, as I have observed them over an extended period. In doing so, I have drawn on the contributions and collaboration of colleagues, already acknowledged in the individual texts collected here. They include many sociologists, social scientists, and other researchers whom I cannot once again name individually. The chapters "Introduction" and "Concluding Thoughts" were written specifically for this volume; the others were previously published in various professional journals (see the review at the end of the book).

Two chapters in this book were co-authored with the late Henry Teune, with whom I maintained a fruitful collaboration over several decades. That collaboration grew out of an international comparative study of the values of local leaders and citizens participation in the United States, Yugoslavia, Poland, and India. It was further affirmed by the fact that Henry Teune also became a member of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts.

Some contributions in this volume stem from my involvement in various research committees, sections, and bodies of the International Sociological Association (ISA), within these, together with Henry Teune and Krzysztof Ostrowski, I also succeeded in establishing a dedicated organizational unit focused specifically on the relationship between the local and the global (Sociology of Local–Global Relations), which continues to operate to this day.

My contributions to this book relate, directly or indirectly, to activities within the ISA's Research Committee on Urban and Regional Development (RC21) and Research Committee on Environment and Society (RC24).

During the preparation of this book I received valuable comments from my colleagues Drago Kos, Pavle Gantar and Marjan Hočevar, while Aleksej Dujunov assisted in collecting the source materials.

Over many years I have received institutional support from the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts, which accepted my proposal to publish this book under its auspices.

I would also like to thank Mihaela Vavken for her assistance with text refinement and Mojca Mlinar Strgar for formatting the references.

This volume was again designed by Leon Beton.

Many thanks to all of them.

I.

Introduction

In this volume, I present a selection of my work produced over many years, work that I believe remains relevant to readers concerned with both the global and the local scale.

If I were to number my books in sequence, this would be my fifth (the second of which comprised two volumes), representing Volume 4 in the *Contributions and Challenges of Sociology* series. Here I trace how I have followed the expansion of people's connections from local frameworks into ever wider spatial contexts, particularly the global. From a pedagogical standpoint, my primary academic responsibility was the "sociology of local communities." That already meant moving beyond the limited, separate treatment of urban and rural sociology — something I saw as one of my tasks from the very beginning.

Although I devoted considerable attention to pressing issues specific to rural areas — the marginalisation of farmers and rural communities within ideologically Marxist orientations focused on the working class, the proletariat, and urban environments — I came to recognise that social interconnectedness far exceeds local boundaries. This led me to see the need for a broader, more open perspective, and I reflected that shift by redefining my main field of teaching, which I termed "spatial sociology."

In doing so, I expanded the analytical framework to consider local, national, and supranational — that is, global — connections and interdependencies together. This implied a multi-level approach, with particular emphasis on how local interdependence is transcended through increasing integration into global processes. The broadest societal context thus found its expression in analyses of globalisation and the multiple levels of territorial organisation of society.

However, expanding connections on a global scale is only one side of contemporary social change. As connections extended beyond narrower territorial frameworks, the role of the individual changed too. Individuals became more autonomous, able to choose from a growing range of opportunities arising from movement across local, national, and continental contexts. They became, correspondingly, less dependent on the people, goods, and ideas of their immediate surroundings. The expansion of spatial interconnectedness and interdependence thus simultaneously reduced dependence and subordination within narrower frameworks.

Unexpectedly, in recent years it has become increasingly evident that globalisation is not itself a final solution for humanity. Attention is shifting instead towards the advantages of proximity and self-sufficiency, or autarky. Spatial distance, and the extent to which it can be replaced by what is available locally, is being given greater weight. Critical perspectives have emerged that point to the limits and obsolescence of globalisation as the central process of contemporary social change, though interpretations of current developments vary.



Source: World Bank (2026)

Globalisation in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries has likewise been presented through various analytical frameworks, as the table below illustrates.



Source: McKinsey Global Institute (2016)

This could also be put as follows: *The de-globalisation era is well and truly upon us* (International Banker, 2026).

The literature suggests that globalisation peaked during the 1990s and early 2000s and declined most sharply after 2021. Even so, the prevailing assessment is that globalisation "is not dead but undergoing profound transformation."

Previous Warnings

Over the past half-century, both expert and general publics have emphasised three major problem areas. The first was raised by Meadows et al. (1972) in their report for the Club of Rome, *The Limits to Growth*, which warned in essence, that humanity cannot continue on its current path and still survive on a planet of finite size.

Half a century later, Ugo Bardi and Carlos Alvarez Pereira (2022) edited *Limits and Beyond*, examining what has been learned since and what lies ahead. As they note in their preface, humanity has lost more than fifty years of precious time. The original report stands as a warning that humanity must respect real planetary limits rather than remain obsessed with economic growth at any cost — while also recognising that human beings are capable of adaptation and of mobilising enormous creative potential.

One of the Club of Rome's leading authors, Aurelio Peccei, wrote in 1974: "What we all need at this point in human history is to learn what we should have learned — and to learn it."

Ugo Bardi adds a complementary insight: "Collapse is the result of each individual acting rationally to increase economic returns. Each herder does what is best to maximise their own utility. This is rational at the individual level, but disastrous at the collective level."

In the Name of the United Nations

From a global perspective, a key warning came from UN Secretary-General António Guterres, during his 2020 speech *The State of the Planet* at Columbia University, New York. He argued that humanity is engaged in a suicidal conflict with nature — and that nature is increasingly striking back.

Biodiversity is declining, with millions of species at risk of extinction. Deserts are expanding, wetlands are disappearing, and roughly ten million hectares of forest are lost every year. Oceans are losing fish stocks and accumulating plastic waste. Air and water pollution cause around nine million deaths annually.

Drawing on reports from the World Meteorological Organisation and the United Nations Environment Programme, Guterres warned that humanity is approaching environmental catastrophe: the past decade has been the hottest in human history.

Even so, he sees paths forward — for instance through the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement — concluding: "Only through solidarity can we expect to survive."

Today's Changes Bear Out the Warnings (from very different sources)

Extreme heat, with dangerously high daytime and overnight temperatures, is affecting millions of people worldwide, which underscores the importance of early warning systems and heat-health action plans (World Meteorological Organization [WMO], 2025).

Dangerously high temperatures, often exceeding 40–45°C, are increasingly common and threaten human life through heat exhaustion and heatstroke (World Health Organization [WHO], 2026).

Across the globe, hot days are growing hotter and more frequent. 2024 was the hottest year on record, with global average temperatures more than 1.5°C above the 1850–1900 baseline; the decade from 2015 to 2024 was the hottest on record.

Extreme heat — periods of unusually high temperature that threaten human health, ecosystems, and infrastructure — is becoming more frequent and intense as the climate warms (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions [C2ES], 2026).

High humidity combined with elevated night-time temperatures is a key driver of heat-related illness and death, particularly in low-income communities (C2ES, 2026).

Extreme heat is a rapidly growing health crisis, causing an estimated 489,000 heat-related deaths annually between 2000 and 2019 (WMO).

"Heat domes" and related atmospheric events have almost tripled in strength and duration since the 1950s, as tens of millions of people endured "dangerous heat" across the US and Europe (Global Heat Health Information Network [GHHIN]).

2025 ranks as the third-warmest year on record, after the unprecedented temperatures of 2023 and 2024; January 2025 was the warmest January on record (Copernicus Climate Change Service, 2026).

Europe is the fastest-warming continent on Earth. The European Environment Agency has warned that the continent is warming roughly twice as fast as the global average. Copernicus data show that rising temperatures are accelerating the loss of snow and ice, alongside more frequent and severe extremes — heatwaves, drought, record temperatures from the Arctic to the Mediterranean (European Commission 2026; Copernicus Climate Change Service, 2026).

The area of Europe experiencing winter days with freezing temperatures is shrinking. Above-average temperatures and below-average precipitation have brought a marked reduction in snow and ice cover. Burnt area from wildfires in Europe reached a record level in 2025, and summer temperatures were above average across much of the continent, with several heatwaves (Copernicus Climate Change Service, 2026).

Growth Is Not Synonymous with Progress

On a global scale, the work of Matthias Schmelzer (2022) stands out for its systematic historical critique of growth. He approaches the issue not only from an ecological standpoint but through a broader critique of growth itself.

Infinite growth is not possible on a finite planet. Ecological critiques stress that economic growth is neither sustainable nor capable of becoming so. Socio-economic critiques challenge the assumption that growth equals progress — that growth at the level of the economy necessarily reflects an improvement in human well-being.

The question of progress without economic growth, already raised by Tim Jackson (2016), remains insufficiently addressed. Some perspectives go further still, suggesting that future growth may run counter to human progress. At the same time, it is worth considering the emergence of trans-economic concepts of progress and globalisation — for instance, the integration of humanity into a cohesive community capable of managing global processes democratically.

Globalisation Is Not Simply Ending

"After decades of being both hero and villain, globalisation is said to be on the retreat. There is a common perception that companies are diversifying supply chains [and] relocating business closer to home. So, are we heading towards deglobalisation?" (Di Sano et al., 2023)

Texts such as John Miller's *Globalisation in Crisis* (2022) suggest decline, but the prevailing conclusion is that globalisation is not ending, nor necessarily diminishing in importance — rather, its role is changing.

Excessive emphasis on self-sufficiency should be avoided. A more realistic assessment is that the future of globalisation is uncertain without implying its disappearance. Anti-globalisation perspectives have therefore not been entirely correct, even as new possibilities emerge for trans-capitalist, or trans-economic, understandings of development.

Trade is no longer growing as fast as its global effects might suggest, yet over the six and a half decades following the Second World War (1950–2016), per capita outcomes rose in all but eight countries. As Miller concludes, globalisation is slowing and its effectiveness is being questioned, but most critics do not predict its end — only its transformation into a more just, democratic, and environmentally sustainable form.

In thinking about the limits of growth and globalisation together, particular attention is owed to Jason Hickel's *Less Is More* (2020), which identifies a fundamental flaw in the capitalist system: its need for continuous expansion and growth to sustain profit. In pursuit of profit, businesses externalise costs — through pollution, for example — and rely on energy sources such as coal, contributing to global warming and ecological crisis. Hickel's concept of

"degrowth" rejects endless economic growth as society's central goal, calling instead for the Earth to be recognised not merely as a source of resources but as a shared home.

Agricultural land and potable water are becoming increasingly scarce in the twenty-first century. Hunger is spreading globally, and a third of the world's population lacks adequate access to clean water. Conditions are worsening as climate change brings more extreme droughts and floods, and some authors warn there may simply not be enough food for the world's population.

Globalisation has long created an illusion of abundance. Yet food imported from distant regions generates high emissions and energy consumption, and its quality and safety can be questionable compared with locally produced food. At the same time, a positive trend is emerging: growing awareness of the value of local production.

I began this chapter by arguing that the limits of growth, of globalisation, and of self-sufficiency need to be considered together. I have tried to show how these issues are connected both historically and substantively. Recent developments, in particular, point to a growing need for individuals and communities within narrower territorial frameworks to rely more on themselves — treating global processes as a complement to local and national systems rather than a replacement for them.

Prosperity Without Growth?

In *Prosperity Without Growth* (2017), Tim Jackson argues that prosperity is about more than material concerns, and that beyond a certain point, growth no longer increases human well-being. He calls for "prosperity" to be redefined in light of the evidence on what actually contributes to people's well-being, arguing that the pursuit of endless GDP growth is unsustainable, damaging to the planet, and unnecessary for human flourishing. He advocates a post-growth economy focused on ecological stability, reduced inequality, and a better quality of life. (This question is widely discussed — for example in the *Sussex Development Lectures*, under the heading *Well-being without growth?*, (Institute of Development Studies, 2023.))

Degrowth policies should be considered as part of the fight against climate breakdown and biodiversity loss. This would mean:

1. reducing less necessary production;
2. improving public services;
3. introducing a green jobs guarantee;
4. taxing ecologically damaging industries, such as air travel and meat production, alongside wealth taxes;
5. prioritising public or cooperative housing as a basic need rather than an opportunity for profit.

Answering the question of how to prosper without growth will require the mobilisation of researchers across every discipline. Growth has delivered dramatic improvements in living standards, but at a terrible cost to the environment.

Degrowth and green growth offer competing answers to the question of what we are prepared to give up. Two further questions follow: Can well-being be achieved at lower levels of resource use than those that characterise high-income countries today? And if so, would this allow humanity as a whole to remain within planetary boundaries?

II.
SOME GENERAL SOCIOLOGICAL ISSUES

Sociological Research of Spatial Social Structure and Developmental Change

Introductory Note

After several decades of empirical and theoretical research in Slovenia, in the former Yugoslavia, and internationally, I present here, in condensed form, nine epistemological trends. They are drawn from decades of work across different research topics and summarised in the pages that follow.

Epistemological Findings and Experience

From colloquial terminology and undefined concepts to theoretical meaning and operationalisation

Many concepts in urban sociology are borrowed from various theoretical traditions or from everyday usage. Terms such as "community," "humanisation of residential areas," "in accordance with human scale," and "dehumanisation of urban settlements" are frequently used without precise definition. The result is inconsistency, both in how we understand these phenomena and in planning practice: knowledge cannot accumulate, and no rigorous application of what we learn is possible.

Conceptual vagueness can sustain only impressionistic discussion. Many concepts were formed in a more or less distant past, so that their content no longer matches actual socio-spatial change. At least some concepts have served as instruments of the "subjective forces" that shape future socio-spatial development, and on this basis we can anticipate three possible outcomes: (a) the conceptual construct initiates or corrects the actual development process; (b) it acts as a brake on socio-spatial development; or (c) it remains marginal and becomes irrelevant to further social change.

Some research practice treats conceptual categories as self-sufficient, using actual conditions merely as a screen against which to recognise previously defined patterns — by analogy with "pattern recognition." Some researchers seem inclined simply to adopt categories straight from textbooks.

Here the problem is not how to explain the determinants of given processes, but how to "revive" abstract conceptual constructions. This may work as a didactic illustration in a concrete setting, but it does not explain the determinants of the dynamics themselves.

From description to explanation

Sociological research — of cities, of urbanisation — can change existing conditions only to a limited degree if it stops at describing what already exists. Only an account of the causal structure of socio-spatial processes gives the "subjective forces" real insight into how alternative goals might be reached.

Today, most research projects describe individual phenomena or changes in space and time, treating problems shaped by a mix of spontaneous and planned factors. Broadly, we can distinguish four cases: (a) studies that describe individual phenomena without attempting to explain their determinants; (b) studies that expose apparent connections between socio-spatial processes; (c) studies that, through analysis, reveal real but only fragmentary causal relations among selected variables, neglecting the broader social context; and (d) studies that grasp the socio-spatial system of determinants as a whole — no longer monocausal explanation, but a "theory of factors."

From the concrete to the general, and from the general to the empirical

Research in its early stages tends to cover only the surface of selected phenomena — whatever is most obvious at first sight — leaving any underlying regularities hidden. Concrete phenomena should either be translated onto a common footing, or else we should establish precisely what makes them distinct rather than equivalent. Unique occurrences are, on their own, of little use to anyone beyond those directly involved, except as an incentive for further research. Otherwise we are left presenting mere curiosities, or politely tiring an audience with information of no real value to it.

From apparent harmony to (class) interest, and beyond (class) structure to actual community

The illusion of social harmony rests on several characteristic grounds: (a) the persistence of the idea of "traditional community," not yet penetrated by class differentiation; (b) the outward appearance of small, densely and compactly settled communities, which allows physical proximity to be mistaken for social closeness; and (c) an atomised, fragmented mode of analysis that cannot identify underlying contradictions and conflicts.

A conscious choice of a particular level of generality can itself become a basis for manipulation, whether in planning or in political decision-making. Generality can be a way of concealing conditions, avoiding the struggle between conflicting interests, or defending the privileged positions of bureaucracy and technocracy.

We can all agree with the critique of technocracy and bureaucracy as obstacles to the emancipation of workers from their subordinate position. Yet general discussion of class struggle — drawing on the experience of the former Yugoslavia — has had no real effect on existing conditions; it remains comfortably radical only on paper.

Here lies a certain opportunistic duplicity: the most critical sociology tends to be the most abstract, while the most concrete, empirical sociology tends to be the least critical.

From common sense to a scientific discipline, and beyond it

Treating a discipline's boundaries as given is itself usually accompanied by an awareness that those boundaries are too narrow, and that they need to be transcended.

The settlement, as a purely spatio-physical structure, cannot on its own explain the striking dynamics of change within it. Manuals of urban sociology, which gather together the most varied themes, often have little in common beyond the fact that their subjects happen to occupy the same settlement as a "spatial aggregate."

Sociological research has shown a tendency towards physical reductionism, especially in its early phase. Not only geography but sociology too has often set aside fundamental developmental processes, limiting itself to the simplest forms of movement — changes of position in space, spatial mobility, migration.

From separate "territorial" and "functional" forms of association to an integrated view of the whole reproduction cycle

Sociological research on cities and local communities has taken as its specific subject, above all, the spatial and territorial dimension, while production processes and the "functional association" of work and working environment have been relegated to second place, if not left aside altogether.

Given the division of labour, this produces a characteristic distortion: territorial, spatial association loses its explanatory basis, and what is visible from the outside — the distribution, concentration, or dispersion of population in space — comes to be understood as if it had no connection to its economic foundation.

The split between the "sociology of work" and "urban sociology" reinforces this segmentation, artificially separating the spheres of production and consumption by confining the sociology of work too narrowly to working groups. In the long term, there is a well-founded case for an integrated treatment of the "territorial" and the "functional."

From the timeless and the chronological to developmental explanation

The time dimension — its theoretical, empirical, and practical organisational aspects — generally remains in the background. Urbanisation has indeed been studied as a changing spatial distribution of population over time, but within cities, most phenomena have been examined at a single point in time, which makes it impossible to indicate the direction of change or to formulate the kind of prognostic statements that planning requires.

Excluding the time dimension from the sociological study of cities and broader territorial units also shaped how such studies have been interpreted. The issue is not simply one of adding time points in chronological order; it is rather a matter of revealing the specific "life cycles" of individual processes in time and space.

From monographs to comparative international research

In its early stages, sociological research on socio-spatial processes — and on the city and urbanisation in particular — had to rely on historical monographs.

The problem is that different themes are added together in a more or less mechanical way, without clearly defined common theoretical foundations, on the implicit assumption that accumulating partial findings will eventually reveal more general laws.

Monographic, or case, studies retain a certain auxiliary role, particularly at the exploratory stage of research, where the priority is general understanding and the search for relevant influences rather than the exact verification of specific hypotheses.

Comparative research, rather than an undifferentiated, "frontal" engagement with every question present in a given setting, points us towards a strategy for directing further research — one that concentrates on identifying what is genuinely specific to a particular environment. A glance at the literature is enough to show how pointless it is to repeat the same sociological themes, addressing essentially the same socio-spatial processes, again and again without any cross-fertilisation from results already obtained.

From justifying to changing and surpassing existing conditions

Sociology risks turning into pure political agitation when it limits itself to criticism and action without also fulfilling its cognitive and theoretical role. The more sociology withdraws into a closed circle, the more it contributes to social stagnation — both because its ideas fail to reach a wider public, and because institutions can then content themselves with routine work and the perpetuation of existing conditions.

Social scientists working mainly in general theory or philosophy tend to regard empirical research as merely apologetic. Yet empirical research can itself be an incentive to move beyond existing conditions, even though we should not expect every empirical finding to carry mobilising implications. Some studies engage mainly with socio-psychological issues that have to be resolved at the individual level; others, which reveal the unequal distribution of political power and influence, speak directly to normative and programmatic assumptions.

This confirms our view that the choice of research topic matters most of all: in choosing, we decide, to a significant degree, whether we remain within the existing frame or work to move beyond it. If we pass from analysis to mere criticism, we risk demobilising rather than changing anything. Cheap criticism

— criticism that points to no real alternative — can alienate potential agents of change and end up reinforcing a stereotyped, negative view of our own activity.

A more robust sociology should be able to direct public attention to the causes and the actors genuinely responsible for unsatisfactory outcomes. Its critical role can also be expressed by continually exposing new aspects of unsuitable practice in the construction of human settlements and the organisation of space.

Sociologists who become directly involved in the teamwork of planners and planning institutions come to know the real issues far more closely, and grow nearer to other professionals. But they also risk diluting sharp criticism of actual practice and subordinating themselves to the prevailing routine. Keeping some "reserve" secures greater independence, but raises its own question of responsibility — or irresponsibility.

What is needed, above all, is a thorough analysis of how socio-spatial development is shaped — not the partial, superficial criticism of separate failings, especially when those same failings have been repeated for decades. Critical knowledge of this kind was not acquired only recently: on the contrary, despite wide-ranging criticism, the situation has remained largely unchanged for a long time. Criticism, in this sense, tends to arrive only after the fact — as retarded knowledge, in the role of a fire brigade.

This chapter is based on:
Mlinar, Z. (1984). Theoretical and methodological trends in sociological research of spatial social structure and developmental processes. In W. Mirowski & Z. Mlinar (Eds.), *Urban social processes in Poland and Yugoslavia* (pp. 15–56). Polish Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology.

From Confrontation to Interpenetration: Territorial Conflicts in Retrospect and Prospect

Introduction

The present situation can be read in the context of a socio-spatial restructuring built on the unity of two opposing processes: the autonomisation, or diversification, of subgroups and individuals, and supranational integration, or homogenisation. Both processes tend to erode the exclusivist, expansionist nature of nation states as relatively closed territorial systems — the "billiard balls" model. The multiplication and autonomisation (empowerment) of subnational actors is conditioned by their growing participation in supranational networks. This implies a sharing of power across multiple levels, and a relativisation of the national level's former monopoly and discretionary power over decision-making.

Autonomisation is accompanied by ethnic heterogenisation, and together the two form a structural basis that, in the long run, makes frontal territorial confrontation less likely. The shift from confrontation to interpenetration is also visible in the way border dynamics are turned inward: increasing openness of borders brings less hierarchical, and at least transitionally more conflictual, relations between national centre and periphery, while also carrying the potential for new cross-border dominance, which can in turn obstruct further interpenetration. Global influences, more than direct bilateral relationships, increasingly account for what neighbouring states have in common.

As Goertz and Diehl (1992, p. 12) observe, in "earlier eras, imperial colonial powers were the primary combatants in the quest for territorial control. Since World War II, however, it is predominantly the smaller states that have been involved in territorial issues and conflict in general. All but a few wars in the last 45 years have involved at least one minor state…"

A Retrospective

National exclusivity, territorial expansionism, and confrontation

In the past, both the structural characteristics and the prevailing ideologies of national societies favoured exclusionism and bellicosity. They were marked by sharp dichotomies, frontal territorial divisions, high internal homogeneity, and clear differences between states. As relatively closed and internally homogeneous territorial systems, nation states behaved like "billiard balls" — a metaphor often used in international relations theory. Their conflicts were typically

frontal collisions, without any real inward penetration; the outcome usually reflected the relative power of the states involved more than the ethnic composition of the contested territory, and that relative power was in turn shaped largely by the size of national territory. In pre-industrial times especially, territorial expansion was a more important source of power than economic growth.

According to Gellner (as cited in Iivonen, 1993, p. 28), the agrarian ethos prevalent before 1945 — which he calls "aristocratic-peasant thinking" — tied glory and power directly to territory; survival depended on territory as a source of resources and defence.

For centuries, European history was a record of shifting power and shifting borders, played out as a zero-sum game in which one side's gain was the other's loss. Expansionist ambitions were, to some extent, bound up with nationalist movements committed to uniting all of one's kin within a single state.[1] Such ambitions spread East and West alike — Greater Poland, Greater Serbia, Greater Croatia, Greater Bulgaria, Greater Albania, Greater Italy, and so on. The high point of this logic in Europe — for a long time assumed to be its endpoint too — came with Nazism and Fascism, symbolised by Hitler's "Lebensraum"[2] and Mussolini's "irredenta." Irredentism, "advocating the acquisition of a region included in another country by reason of cultural, historical, ethnic, racial, or other ties," was characteristic of this zigzagging, zero-sum politics. Revanchism, similarly, was "the policy of a state intent on regaining areas of its original territory that had been lost to other states as a result of war" (Webster).

After the Second World War, several border areas could potentially have become the focus of such claims — for example, between Germany and Poland, Germany and Czechoslovakia, Germany and France, or Italy and Yugoslavia. Eventually, however, a general agreement was reached within the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (the Helsinki Accords, 1975) that borders could no longer be changed by force.

1 "All the important unifications of numerous states, except for that of the thirteen English colonies in North America, were achieved through the use of force. Although the majority of Italians and Germans hoped to be unified, the decisive result was obtained by Piedmontese and Prussian conquest. Now, however, a unified Europe achieved through the power of one state actor is desired by none of the individual European states" (Duroselle, 1988).

2 "His genocidal campaign against Jews and Gypsies, together with his intention of exterminating Slavs standing in the way of German Lebensraum, aroused intense horror and repulsion…" (McNeill, 1986, p. 71). McNeill (1986) argues the effect in the post-war decades was twofold: "On the one hand, it tainted advocacy of the ideal of ethnic unity within an existing state, since such sentiments smacked too much of Nazi doctrines. On the other, Jews in particular and other ethnic minorities subsequently began to abandon the ideal of assimilation to locally prevailing national groups" (p. 71).

Inter-ethnic tolerance and armed conflict?

The common claim that the wars in the former Yugoslavia stemmed from long-suppressed ethnic hatred should be rejected. Empirical evidence from areas along the front lines between Serbian and Croatian, Serbian and Bosnian Muslim, or Croatian and Bosnian Muslim forces shows no sign of latent tension between members of these groups at the local level before the conflict: they had lived together as neighbours, co-workers, and schoolmates, and had intermarried.

This is borne out by the study *National Tolerance in the Former Yugoslavia* (data collected in winter 1989–90). Hodson et al. (1994, p. 1554) found, if anything, higher tolerance in more heterogeneous settings; paradoxically, "Bosnia enjoyed the highest level of tolerance of any Yugoslav republic," yet it suffered the most brutal and prolonged conflict of all. As the authors put it, "in heterogeneous settings national groupings can provide an organizational basis for mobilisation. Elites may find such situations conducive to mobilising efforts in pursuit of ends that come to be defined in national terms… These mobilised national groups may pursue these ends through armed conflicts, attacking even those against whom they initially bear only limited animosities. Conversely, homogeneity appears to lead to greater intolerance but a lower likelihood of open conflict" (Hodson et al., 1994, p. 1555).

The harder question, then, is how violent, armed conflict can arise between parties who are, by most measures, tolerant of one another. Answering it requires extending the analysis to the macro–micro dynamics and shifting relationships both within and between states.

Mobilisation of collective memory

Reconstructed ethno-national histories were used to legitimise confrontation with neighbours over territorial claims. Even where such claims drew on the local presence of ethnic kin, the underlying argument was usually that a group had once controlled a given territory and so possessed a historical right to it. Because the same claims were typically made by more than one side, they collided — for at least three reasons: each party tends to invoke the period of its own historical peak of expansion; the present ethnic composition of a territory is generally quite different from what it was in the past; and the same party may invoke different criteria for different cases — Serbia, for instance, pointing to current ethnic composition in Croatia while invoking historical possession in the case of Kosovo.

The actions of extremists on one side were, in turn, treated by the other as documented proof of expansionist intent (Čović, 1991).[3] The "sufferings and

3 Much of what happened after 1991 echoed the expansionist claims of Serbian and Croatian extremists during the Second World War. The maps drawn by each side largely overlapped with those of the other, "annihilating the existing borders, claiming and

historical losses" of one's own nation can always be presented at length as evidence against "the enemy."[4] This is one reason why nationalist movements — whatever emancipatory potential they may carry — tend to look backwards rather than forwards: when long-term developmental change is read as a shift from exclusivist territorial confrontation towards greater interpenetration, looking back almost automatically reopens old conflicts with neighbouring states or groups.

The custodians of historical memory thus bear considerable responsibility, since it is above all the intellectual elite who define the platform for nationalist political mobilisation, and who shape how conflicting interests are presented, treated, and resolved.[5] As noted above, the largely peaceful coexistence of ethno-national groups in mixed or neighbouring localities counted for less than the narratives disseminated from the national centre — the cultural, religious, political, and media institutions that preserve historical memory and national identity. What happened in Vukovar, a town that was destroyed and whose people were massacred or expelled, did not grow out of hatred between Croats and Serbs living there. Both groups suffered for strategies and decisions made in Belgrade.[6]

For decades, the idea of finding oneself on one side of a conflict, rather than part of the "brotherhood and unity" that had been propagated — and to a real extent practised[7] — for nearly half a century, was an alien one. It

appropriating population and territories" (Janjić, 1992, p. 19). The 1941 maps of "Greater Serbia" encroached on the territory of every neighbouring state and ethno-national group — Croatia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Albania — and assumed that Croats would leave the future Serbia and vice versa, calling for the obligatory purging of minorities and "non-national" elements across the whole territory (Janjić, 1992, p. 19). Analogous sources exist on the Croatian side: maps of "Greater Croatia," based on "historical criteria," include areas that once belonged to Croatian rulers, extending to the borders of Bulgaria and Albania. The Ustaše position on its Serb neighbours (Budak, 1942) was that "a part of Serbs will be killed, others will be displaced and the rest of them will be turned into Catholics and absorbed by the Croats" (Budak, 1942; documentary sources on Greater Serbian expansionist claims are presented in Čović, 1991).

4 Hitler's rise in Nazi Germany relied heavily on precisely this kind of justification for political mobilisation.

5 Particularly relevant here is the "Memorandum" presented by a group of academicians in the name of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts in 1989, which set out a platform on "current social issues in our country."

6 A more recent example, one that did not involve violence or armed conflict, concerns Istria. Croats and Italians live together in the Croatian part of Istria without signs of tension. There are, however, recurrent strains between the regional Istrian government and the national government in Zagreb, as well as between Zagreb and the Italian government.

7 For several decades, former Slovene refugees from the Second World War and their wartime hosts in Serbia exchanged annual visits. These ceased only once communication between Serbia and Slovenia broke down and tensions flared.

turned out that, given enough digging, history always offers up something that can be used against the other side, even where the "proof" is taken entirely out of context.[8]

Had the political and intellectual elite mobilised the population behind a "New Europe" project instead of reopening the past, this would have relativised and weakened the zero-sum confrontations within the narrower federal framework.[9]

The lack and loss of "soft power resources"

Toynbee's theory of cultural aggression holds that "when two civilizations meet, the one endowed with greater expanding power triggers a radical change in the mimetic attitude of the other. The 'inferior' civilisation begins to imitate the alien way of life, either because it is fascinated by it or because it is the easiest way to escape its humiliating condition of inferiority and thus avoid the threat of being degraded to the rank of a colony" (Pellicani, 1991, p. 128; Toynbee, 1946). This sheds some light on the divisions and conflicts not only between civilizations, but between ethno-national groups, their cultures, and their states in the Balkans. Slovenes and Croats were not "fascinated" by the Serbian way of life, nor was Serbia's "greater expanding power" reinforced by any "mimetic attitude" on their part: they did not regard their own cultures or economies as inferior — if anything, they tended to think the opposite.[10] What had been attractive, at the time Yugoslavia was formed, was Serbia's political status and military strength against the expansionist threats from Italy and Austria.

In this context, the centre of the new state — the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, later Yugoslavia — had to rely heavily on coercion rather than on "soft power resources," or "co-optive power" in Nye's (1990) sense.[11] After the Second World War, the most important such resource available to the centre was the promise of a specific communist ideology. As that ideology eroded, the country's political unity was fundamentally undermined, with no substitute in prospect.

8 For Slovenes, it was striking when hostile graffiti such as "Srbe na vrbe" ("Hang Serbs from the willows") began to appear. The slogan in fact dates back to the First World War and the conflict between Austria — when Slovenia was still part of it — and Serbia.

9 This would, of course, also depend on the European Community's receptiveness.

10 This was evident in the plebiscite among Carinthian Slovenes at the end of the First World War, on whether to join the "backward, Serb-dominated Balkans," as Austrian posters put it, or remain with the German majority in a more developed Austria (then governed by the Social Democrats). The majority voted to stay, leaving a lasting mark on Slovene historical memory.

11 By comparison, the United States could draw heavily on its own co-optive power, thanks to its technological and cultural strength — popular culture among other things — and its broader attractiveness to others.

The Prospects of Deterritorialisation and Interpenetration

Subnational autonomisation (heterogenisation) and supranational integration (harmonisation) are two interdependent processes — "the unity of opposites" — that can serve as a common denominator for the broader transformation of territorial social organisation. The aim here is to identify the structural basis of the shift from territorial confrontation, or expansionism, to interpenetration; the other changes discussed in this chapter all relate to that same underlying pattern.

These two processes are eroding the "billiard ball" character of closed territorial systems — nation states — and so are reducing the possibility of frontal confrontation between them. This does not mean the end of conflict, but it does mean the end of war between nation states as an instrument of territorial expansion.

At low levels of development, greater autonomy tends to come with less integration — more autarky — and vice versa, with integration typically taking the form of centralisation or hegemony. Growing autonomy among territorial subsystems therefore implies disintegration from, or dissociation from, the wider state or empire. Only after the Second World War did hegemony and conquest give way, for the first time in history, to integration based on mutual agreement and consensus (Duroselle, 1988). Territorial expansion by conquest has been replaced by states queuing to join an expanding space of free movement of people, goods, and ideas — the "New Europe," the "frontier-less Europe." This openness can only be pursued to the extent that subnational autonomisation and diversification are themselves made possible by selective cross-border linkages and global networks — carrying the prospect of interpenetration in place of the familiar frontal clashes between nation states.

The same shift can be expressed in terms of the logic of sets: relatively closed territorial systems, marked by high internal homogeneity and sharp external differences, are being transformed into more internally heterogeneous systems with growing similarities between them — as in cross-national "harmonisation" within the EU.

Mixing of populations

One long-term structural change relevant to whether territorial conflicts between nation states occur is the shifting ethnic composition of those states. The traditional model — homogeneity within, difference between — corresponds less and less to actual reality, as demographic statistics confirm, with the relative share of the autochthonous population declining (a trend especially marked in the former Yugoslavia after the Second World War). Strong theoretical and empirical grounds suggest this restructuring will continue. The resulting ethnic diversification is simply the demographic expression of a wider process of autonomisation, in which people become less willing to accept that their

place in space, and their membership of a particular territorial community or state, should be predetermined by their place of birth. There is a growing scope for reflexivity and choice in how people locate themselves, spatially and temporally, within a global rather than merely national context.

Data for ten European OECD member states show rising numbers of foreign-born residents across the board. Yet this is not, on its own, sufficient evidence: data for the European Community show that only 38 per cent of its eight million foreign residents came from other EC member states, with the majority arriving from Turkey, North Africa, Yugoslavia, and elsewhere (Noin & Woods 1993, pp. 188, 173). This does not contradict the underlying theoretical prediction. Although spatial mobility within the EC has been declining since the early 1970s, it is really only one type of migration that has fallen away — the migration of low-skilled workers from Europe's periphery, such as Italy or Ireland. The future of migration is less likely to be driven by economic necessity than by mobility as an expression of growing individualisation — the mobility of professionals, students, and managers, already well established in the United States and increasingly common in the EU.

For the purposes of this chapter, this is enough to outline the growing heterogenisation and interpenetration of ethno-national societies. The implication can be stated directly: territorial confrontations between nation states, like wars, are becoming less likely, because these states increasingly share populations, making such confrontations progressively more illogical as national populations become harder to tell apart.[12]

From billiard balls to overlapping networks

The "billiard balls," or "hard shells," metaphor common in international relations theory (Herz, 1964) — picturing nation states as closed territorial systems — fits the reality of nation states less and less well. It implies that states meet only at the surface, and that even collisions leave their internal structures largely untouched. As national borders open, or at least grow more porous, such superficial contact between undifferentiated territorial communities is giving way to increasingly diverse and autonomous actors — territorial and non-territorial alike — operating through transnational networks.

While this is part of the long-term developmental logic of social systems, attention currently focuses on its relationship to advances in information and communication technology. As one observer puts it, "the combined information/communication revolution is helping to diffuse power throughout society, from hierarchical structures to small groups, and increasing the

[12] This connects to the ongoing debate between "cosmopolitan individualists" and "communitarians." Cosmopolitans question the nation state's claim to a closed territory, arguing that an entirely homogeneous state is neither possible nor defensible, and that growing heterogeneity and international connectedness "has dealt a mortal blow to the aspirations of the nation-state" (Brown, 1994, p. 228).

ability of dispersed groups to communicate and coordinate with one another" (Rabinowitch, 1994, p. 4). This opens the way for network-linked groups within the non-governmental community that underpins global civil society — visible in the rapid growth, in both number and scope, of non-governmental international organizations, which is now outpacing the growth of intergovernmental ones (Union of International Associations, 1993–94).

Correspondingly, the traditional hierarchical role of national governments is declining, and non-governmental organizations are increasingly representing groups that would otherwise have no voice. The UN, as Rabinowitch (1994) notes, faces the challenge of sharing the global stage with these new actors or risking irrelevance. The issue connects directly to war and peace: "… the UN would be a much more effective tool for peace, not by strengthening its military capabilities, but by transforming itself from an organisation composed solely of nation-states to one that represents non-state actors as well" (Rabinowitch, 1994, p. 10).

Overlapping, crosscutting subnational and transnational networks of increasingly diverse, autonomous actors are blurring the boundaries between national states and so eroding the basis for frontal territorial confrontation between them. Like Simmel's "web of social affiliations" (*Kreuzung sozialer Kreise*), these networks give actors a structural basis for autonomy while preventing the formation of a single cleavage, or dominant axis, around which sentiment and conflict could intensify. The result is, instead, a multiplication of conflicts of declining intensity within an increasingly deterritorialised context.

Multilevel power-sharing and polyarchy

Both subnational autonomisation and supranational integration extend the range of levels at which territorial decisions are made. Relations between these levels are shifting from a hierarchical, zero-sum logic towards cross-level power-sharing: supranational, national, and regional levels are not mutually exclusive alternatives but are simultaneously engaged with particular issues (Goldsmith, 1993). Power is dispersed across several levels at once, with the nation state correspondingly more constrained. This "vertical dispersal of sovereignty" works as a check on the discretionary power national governments once held: as an EU member state, for instance, a national government can no longer independently wage war against a neighbour or any other state. Greater regional autonomy brings greater diversity, a more polyphonic expression of interests, and a degree of political fragmentation that itself cannot serve as a basis for frontal inter-state confrontation.

In conflicts with national governments, subnational units increasingly seek support at the supranational level. Istria, for example, sought and won support from the Council of Europe in its dispute with the Croatian national government over regional autonomy, and has continued to threaten "further internationalisation." Ethnic minorities, too, act as increasingly autonomous players within the polyphonic polity of the nation state, further blurring the lines between neighbouring states — though they may, of course, still serve as a real or invented pretext for conflict between them, generally where autonomisation and integration both remain at a low level.

Multilevel power-sharing is itself an expression of territorial dehierarchisation, and reinforces the trend towards a positive-sum, "win–win" logic — providing a further structural basis that works against frontal inter-state confrontation.

Adjacent states and global impacts

Within the broader context of supranational and global integration, the importance and intensity of conflict between adjacent states tends to decline. This is part of a wider transformation of territorial and cultural systems, which increasingly share continental and global commonalities. What neighbouring states have in common, or what divides them, owes less and less to proximity and direct bilateral relations, and increasingly to their shared exposure to the global core. The technological and political empowerment of smaller states, in particular, increases their capacity for more selective engagement with the wider world — implying both a declining significance of contiguity and a declining vulnerability to one's immediate neighbours.

This might seem to contradict the empirical evidence on cross-border cooperation, whose expansion has become one of the symbols of the emerging "new Europe." But the understanding of that cooperation is often oversimplified, and several qualifications should be added: cross-border cooperation is currently prominent as part of the move towards a "Europe without borders," correcting for the artificial separation of many neighbouring areas — though its relative importance may decline over the longer term;[13] it is also one expression of growing subsystem autonomy, especially for border regions; more open borders can temporarily reactivate tensions, as centres reassert dominance and peripheries are newly subordinated on either side of the border; the model of "cross-border cooperation" may, for one or both parties, be understood not as part of supranational or global integration but as an opportunity for, or threat of, traditional expansionism within bilateral relations; and the collective memory of past zero-sum relationships between states or groups remains a latent source of distrust, which can resurface when the weaker side perceives any unbalanced advance by its neighbour.

Such frictions and conflicts show that reality is considerably more complicated than popular accounts of European cross-border cooperation suggest. Still, as borders generally become more permeable, the old grievances around

[13] More open borders between Slovenia and Italy, in terms of reduced restrictions and duties, led not to an increase but to a decline in Slovene shopping trips to Trieste and Gorizia.

territorial expansionism tend to lose their force. The more diverse the sources of external influence — rather than influence flowing from a single neighbouring country — the further matters depart from the traditional pattern of territorial expansionism. "Global intrusions" tend to be more tolerable, or even welcome, compared with intrusions of the same magnitude from a neighbouring state.[14] The first carries no territorial connotation and so seems less threatening to a small state's national identity; the second carries the implication of a possible first step towards territorial expansion by that neighbour.

Instead of a Conclusion

This chapter has tried to identify what underlies the seemingly paradoxical coexistence of war and peace in Europe today. Both belong to the same long-term transformation of territorial organisation, within which we can trace a shift away from territorial expansionism and violent, frontal confrontation between nation states, and towards the more peaceful — if still sometimes collaborative and conflictive — interpenetration of societies participating in sub-national, international, and global networks.

Several basic structural characteristics have been identified here, along with how they interact with the ideological orientations that shape the appearance, nature, and intensity of territorial conflict. Although the underlying structural conditions are powerful, understanding them still gives us choices — choices that can help us avoid the violence to which such conflicts so often lead.

This chapter is based on:
Mlinar, Z. (1997). From confrontation to interpenetration: Territorial conflicts in retrospect and in perspective. In J. Rotblat & M. Konuma (Eds.), *Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world* (pp. 608–619). World Scientific.

[14] Tolerance for the use of Serbo-Croatian in Slovenia, or of Serbian in Croatia, was lower than tolerance for English.

III.

CONCEPT AND RESEARCH OF GLOBALISATION

Conceptualising the Process of Globalisation

Introduction

Issues of inclusion and exclusion tend to be discussed as if they were changes within a fixed, usually national, context. Globalisation challenges us to examine the same issues as part of a transformation of territorial social organisation encompassing the full range of units and levels, from the local to the global. This can enrich our understanding of inclusion and exclusion along both the geographical (horizontal) and hierarchical (vertical) dimension, even though globalisation itself still needs to be conceptualised and theoretically embedded. It has been shown (Mlinar, 1995a) that growing accessibility entails both "expanding territories" and "flattening hierarchies."

Europe is undergoing a radical transformation. National societies are opening up and recognising, with increasing consistency, the declining legitimacy of territorially exclusive criteria. Even "Fortress Europe" is only a moving target. Globalisation implies a trend towards maximising territorial inclusiveness; staying out — de-linking, de-coupling — or excluding outsiders is no longer a viable option.

In the Simmelian sense, expanding territories widen the circle of actors upon whom one depends, while diminishing dependence on any single one of them. This erodes the hierarchical order and the mutual exclusivity of different levels of territorial organisation — something still poorly understood in both theory and policy. The "Europe of Regions," for example, is often treated as an alternative to the "Europe of Nation States" rather than its complement, and is considered separately from the "Europe of Citizens."

The aim here is therefore to identify regularities in cross-level dynamics, particularly in terms of the shift from domination and subordination to multi-level power-sharing. Does global inclusion entail local exclusion in some sense? This is not merely a matter of policy and values, as EU figures such as Jean Monnet and Jacques Delors have suggested — it may be largely independent of intentions and policy. Delors (1996) argued that "people need gradually to become *world citizens* without losing their roots and while continuing to play an active part in the life of their *national* and *local* community" (p. 17, emphases added). What is actually happening today remains, nonetheless, a real challenge for researchers.

The most common notion in discussions of globalisation is that the growing interconnectedness and interdependence of people across increasing distances, beyond national and continental frameworks, is conducive to an emergent world society. Although this is already something of a truism, many questions immediately arise that remain unanswered, are answered in contradictory ways, or are so poorly posed that no proper answer is possible.

An illustration of the last case is the question of whether territorial diversity decreases or increases in the process of globalisation. It will be shown that this question can be answered either way.[15] However easily we may speak of globalisation, the empirical evidence from countries around the world indicates that the primary bond for people in the "global age" remains that of the local — or at most national — community, and that hardly anyone identifies with the world as a whole (Jacob et al., 1993; Mlinar, 1994a).

The movement of people is still predominantly limited to local–national frameworks, and the movement of goods largely to supra-national regions. Even with open borders, migration between EU countries is relatively limited. Why did intra-EU trade grow in the preceding decade while trade with the rest of the world declined relatively (Park, 1994)?

Much of the evidence (for example Clark & Hoffmann-Martinot, 1998) points to a historically significant transformation of society towards the empowerment of sub-national actors: regions, minorities, and individuals. For the first time in history, individuals can exercise rights at the supra-national level — for example at the European Court. National sovereignty, expressed through the state's right to non-interference in internal affairs, is becoming less important than the protection of universal human rights and the rights of minorities. Yet how is the following incongruity to be explained: the proscription of discrimination on grounds of territorial origin is becoming a civilisational norm within Europe at precisely the same time as "Fortress Europe" is being constructed?

These are only some of the challenges in the European context that require more systematic research and a more comprehensive sociological interpretation, pursued from the standpoint of possible regularities in a wider temporal and spatial frame.

One promising approach is to conceptualise socio-spatial changes from the standpoint of the unity of opposites of individualisation (autonomisation, diversification) and globalisation (interconnectedness, homogenisation). The difficulty of grasping the dialectic — the opposition and interdependence of these two processes — is one of the main reasons for perplexity and disorientation in both theory and practice.

Sociologists are faced with the co-presence of two world orders: one built from above, through an expansionist drive based on power and force; another emerging from below, in the form of emancipatory strivings. The first tends to

[15] Depending on whether we have in mind differences that arose through the isolation of primordial communities, or differences that stem precisely from greater connectedness and the combination of foreign and indigenous elements.

be weakening; the second, strengthening. What the prospects of each are in the short and the long run is a question that remains open — and the dominant paradigm of today may not be that of tomorrow.

Globalisation and Sociology

From exemplification to sociological conceptualisation

Sociology is one of the last of the social sciences — with some exceptions, such as world-system theory and certain classical traditions — to take up the subject of the globalisation of society, even though, given the inclusive nature of its subject matter, it could have been the first. As a general and generalising social science encompassing all spheres of social life across all periods of time, and as such belonging to the nomothetic rather than idiographic sciences,[16] it offers the most appropriate starting-point for the study of an emerging world society at the highest ever level of complexity. To date, sociological study of social change has mainly remained within the national-state framework[17] and has not advanced as far as political science with its "international relations" and then "world politics," or economics with its "integrated global political economy" (Gill & Law, 1988).

The literature on globalisation is dominated by exemplificatory and fragmentary descriptions of supposedly indicative changes. Yet it is precisely at the highest level of complexity that it becomes evident that we will not arrive at a sense of the whole merely by listing and adding innumerable particularities or fragments.[18] Even the most widely accepted World-Systems Theory — which, however, did not venture beyond its sectoral (economic) bounds — is more a perspective encompassing large blocks of aggregated particularities than a framework for achieving a high degree of organised complexity in the cognitive process. What is needed is not simply an extension to the world as a whole — to a world system with a crude internal structure (core, semi-periphery, periphery), as in Wallerstein (1979), which cannot account for much of its internal complexity. What is needed rather is the simultaneous use of both more holistic and more individualistic analytical approaches, together with a study of the changing relationships between these two encompassed spheres.

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16 The features of postmodernity require a different understanding of sociology as well — more in terms of oscillation between the two. For a broader discussion of nomothetic and idiographic sciences, see the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences (1996); the Commission was chaired by the sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein.

17 Apart from inertia, some sociologists have also been critical of the rather loose debate on global social problems that has been characteristic of certain international organisations.

18 This is evident from discussions of "the New Europe" and is only magnified when the world as a whole is concerned. Insofar as research in the tradition of Area Studies is involved, the treatment is again descriptive, with a great aggregation of superfluous data.

It is becoming clear that globalisation is not an "out there" phenomenon "far removed from the concerns of everyday life" that "might appear as another field of study … globalisation is an 'in here' matter which affects or rather is dialectically related to even the most intimate aspects of our lives" (Giddens, 1994, p. 95). This also presents a challenge to established (sub)disciplinary fields to reinterpret their subject matter from the standpoint of the newly emerging society, and to enrich sociology through analysis from a cross-level perspective.

Globalisation as déjà vu?

One reason for the current theoretical void is the prevailing attitude towards the past. Is globalisation really so new that we must start from the beginning? Whichever of the many explanations of its origins we adopt, sociology still has to reassess its own heritage from this new standpoint. Globalisation cannot be discussed in isolation; it must be placed in the context of sociology's tradition of grand theories, which wrestled with the questions of long-term developmental processes and their regularities (Mlinar, 2001).

There is often a sense of déjà vu, even though the new terminology creates an impression of discontinuity. Ideological swings and simplifications are producing a certain distance from the past, making it seem inappropriate, for example, to invoke Marxist interpretations of "societalisation" on a world scale, since praxis in the former "socialist states" failed to confirm them.

Yet Marx had already pointed to the global tendencies of the capitalist system (Fiamengo, 1959; Marx & Engels, 1980). Local and national self-sufficiency and limitation are giving way to all-round transport connections and the interdependence of nations, along with a declining role for nations themselves. Capital and goods know no borders, homeland, or nation and presuppose a growing role for the world market. A world literature is arising from the plurality of national and local literatures. Marx saw human emancipation in "societalised mankind," as a pan-human community in which people become citizens of the world, no longer bound by class, nation, or state.

The paradox is that at the very moment when Marxism is being discarded, at least in the formerly socialist countries, some of the rejected ideas are only now attaining their proper significance in the emerging situation. One example is the idea of the withering away of the nation state, which has become a central preoccupation. Another is "societalisation" (*Vergesellschaftung*), which in the "socialist" countries was reduced to and equated with nationalisation, but which is only now being realised on a world scale through the process of globalisation.

Consequently, globalisation raises a whole series of issues that classical sociological theory had already posed in connection with the long-term development of society: its antinomies, developmental stages, "driving forces," and the relations between the micro and macro spheres. Today's changes are, to a great extent, already implied in Spencer's interpretation of the differentiation of the

homogeneous and the assimilation of the heterogeneous (Spencer, 1975). Even in his overlooked work in rural sociology between the world wars, Sorokin pointed to a transition from territorial, "cumulative communities" to the networked interlinking of actors ("functional associations") — a model that today is becoming the fundamental form of interconnectedness on a world scale (Sorokin et al., 1930). Much of this has since been transcended; but it may still help, at least as a challenge, in identifying more easily what constitutes the *differentia specifica* of the globalisation process.

Globalisation as a process or epoch?

Albrow (1996) raises the question of whether globalisation constitutes a continuation of social evolution or whether a new type of society is emerging, which he labels the "Global Age."[19] But even if it represents a qualitatively different kind of society, the emerging global society need not lie beyond the explanatory reach of theories of social development — it may be that what they have in common must be sought at a more general level of analysis.[20]

Related to this, a debate that has been evolving for several decades — and which continues in various forms today — concerns neoevolutionism (Nisbet, 1969; Lenski, 1976; Becker, 1979). The objection to neoevolutionism is that it leaves too little room for the multitude of essentially indeterminate developments: "random events," "unique occurrences," "the purely fortuitous," the "wilful," and the "adventitious" (Nisbet, 1969, p. 171).[21] Lenski argued that in sociology, evolutionary theory has moved from deterministic to probabilistic interpretations, thereby rebutting both the thesis that future events are necessary and predictable and the thesis that no predictions are possible. The probabilistic standpoint holds that not all possible future developments are equally probable.

[19] In relation to this, Bretherton and Poulton (1996, cited in Clark, 1997, pp. 18–19) take the view that globalisation is qualitatively distinct from earlier integrations in international relations.

[20] Henry Teune and I attempted this in the book *Developmental Logic of Social Systems* (1978), from the standpoint of the dynamics of the interdependence of growing diversity and integration. A logically grounded sequence of three types of social systems is presented: coaction, interaction, and transaction systems. The transaction system, as a conceptual–logical construct of a particular stage in development, includes certain basic features which are today taken as the distinguishing features of the emerging global information society.

[21] Nisbet (1969) critically examined what he considered the fundamental premise of the classical theory of social evolution: that change is normal, directional, immanent, continuous and cumulative, necessary, and proceeds from unitary causes. Lenski (1976) rebutted his argument and concluded the debate with "a plea for an end to the quarrel between humanistic historians, with their focus on unique events and unique personalities, and evolutionists, with their focus on the regularities and patterned trends which emerge from the study of the historical record. There is need for both in today's world. Humanistic history is a valuable antidote to fatalism, just as evolutionism is a check on utopianism."

What is overlooked here, however, is that the answer differs depending on the level of development — particularly in terms of the autonomisation of subsystems and individuals, to which I return below.

Albrow objects to treating globalisation as a process in the way that urbanisation and other "-isation" terms associated with modernity have been treated for decades: "using the term 'process' for historical change elides the difference between open-ended transformations and repeatable, predictable sequences." He therefore introduces the concept of the "Global Age" as an age of globality — a new level of organisation "to which any agent can relate, but which has no organising agent … Yet the lack of central organisation is not disintegration" (Albrow, 1996, p. 121).

It must be borne in mind that not all processes share the same time span: emancipation, or individualisation, for example, is not confined to any particular historical epoch, and the empirical evidence shows its continuation in the Global Age (leaving aside ecological finites for the moment). The "end of grand narratives" does not mean the end of the meaningfulness of seeking regularities in general — understanding why disorder arises may itself be related to the process of individualisation in the context of globalisation.

One of the main reasons for the numerous misunderstandings and a certain disorientation among sociologists is that "developmental logic" is not clearly distinguished from concrete experiential reality, which in some parts of the world displays the most varied "admixtures" of different stages of social development. The assumption underlying ideal types is precisely that they are never fully realised; but this does not diminish their heuristic value.

Generalising past experience

The foregoing raises the question: to what extent can we draw on the wealth of available experience from changes within national societies, given all the dilemmas and the wide divergence in interpretations of what the outcome of present world-scale changes will be? Will national homogenisation at the expense of local particularities — such as the adoption of a standardised literary language alongside the extinction of dialects — be the pattern repeated at the level of national languages and the "global language" that English is now becoming? Or are circumstances now different, making such generalisations impermissible? These questions call, above all, for a general explication of the relationships between levels of territorial organisation of society, to be taken up below.

In principle, the greater complexity of society at the global level also constitutes a greater capacity to absorb territorial particularities already established at "lower" levels.[22] The most popular metaphor, "the global village" (McLuhan,

[22] In connection with globalisation as an "emergent reality," the literature contains only a warning for caution in "ascribing to it forms which have characterised previous societies" and an injunction to "draw attention to its historically specific features" (Shaw, 1994, p. 18).

1962), illustrates how misleading and sociologically unfounded mechanical comparisons between global society and traditional local communities can be (see Mlinar, 1997b, p. 6).

If the "global village" metaphor was intended to contribute to understanding the emerging world-scale society through the familiar image of the village community, it has to be noted that this analogy actually does the opposite: in many respects it conceals essential differences (Mlinar, 1997b), as illustrated in the following table. Inasmuch as "global village" or "global neighbourhood" (The Commission on Global Governance, 1995) is used to stress primarily the drawing-together achieved through "time–space compression," it neglects the fundamental structural transformation taking place — from a community based on relative internal homogeneity and the subordination of the individual, to a global society that can only arise through the autonomous interlinking of a great diversity of groups and individuals.[23]

Some Conceptual and Theoretical Dimensions

Two analytical dimensions

To move from exemplification towards a sociological conceptualisation of globalisation, and to understand the socio-spatial context of inclusion and exclusion, two general analytical dimensions must be introduced. Changes in both are interpreted in light of the contradictory relationship between globalisation and individualisation.

The first dimension concerns the distribution of people, goods, and ideas worldwide — including the comparison of their attributes (similarities and differences). The second concerns their interconnectedness on a world scale, in terms of the growing probability that a change in one unit will produce changes in others. The first dimension is relevant to the contested questions of homogenisation and diversification; the second, dealing with interconnectedness, relates to the issues of autonomy and dependency. Both dimensions simultaneously constitute dimensions of individualisation — implying the strengthening of autonomous and unique actors (world citizens) in the context of the emerging world society. But as we shall see, uniqueness and autonomy are not alternatives to uniformity and dependency, and individualisation is not an alternative to globalisation. They constitute a unity of opposites in the course of socio-spatial change.

[23] This is not an attempt to describe the actual situation today, but rather the developmental logic which holds insofar as ecological constraints are abstracted at least for analytical purposes.

Unity of opposites

While today's preoccupations with globalisation remain predominantly one-sided, there are also attempts to address the contradictory yet simultaneously interdependent changes — such as the strengthening of both ever-larger and ever-smaller units (as in Naisbitt's popular *Global Paradox*, 1994), or globalisation and fragmentation (Clark, 1997), or the tension between sub-national autonomy and supra-national integration.

Homogenisation of the world appears at first to contradict diversification, but is in fact a condition for it. To understand this, two kinds of diversity must be distinguished:

A. diversity based on exclusion (separation); and
B. diversity based on inclusion (communication).

Territorial diversity formed through exclusion or separation — such as different dialects — contradicts increasing connectedness and diminishes insofar as it limits the free flow of people, goods, and ideas. That free flow requires a certain underlying homogenisation or harmonisation, as is evident both within Europe and worldwide (Mlinar, 1992a). Greater connectedness, on the other hand, entails wider access to variety and the creation of new combinations, thus contributing to diversification. The result is simultaneously more standardisation (or harmonisation) and an increasing number of unique phenomena.[24]

This helps to make sense of the great variety of apparently discrete, "peacefully coexisting" observations of opposite trends of change — such as "community decline" and "new localism," "the destruction of regional cultures" and "the revival of regionalism," "the loss of national identity" and "new nationalism" (Mlinar, 1992b). Old identities took shape on the basis of isolation; new ones are formed on the basis of selective communication.

Diversity that arose in the form of territorial exclusivities, as a result of limited communication, is declining — but at the same time it is being deliberately and selectively incorporated into global society as an enrichment of the total fund of diversity.[25]

Regarding interconnectedness: both the autonomy and the dependency of actors and individuals are simultaneously increasing. There is no simple shift from autonomy to dependency (as implied by "dependistas" in Latin America) or vice versa — the two are not alternatives. Globalisation implies both increasing autonomy of actors, in terms of an expanding range of choice, and increasing dependency on society as a whole. The autonomy of actors increases as

[24] Standardisation, and uniformity generally, tend to be viewed negatively, and have received little attention from sociologists.

[25] Paradoxically, the results of humanity's past incapacity to overcome spatial barriers have themselves become a value — a particular territorial culture — now threatened by the increased capacity of people as technology provides wider accessibility in space.

their independence decreases. In other words, globalisation implies a transition from autonomy with exclusion (autarky) to autonomy with inclusion.[26] The zero-sum logic that applied well to empires, great powers, power politics, economic and cultural imperialism, and the ideal of the "independent state"[27] is losing its explanatory power.

In today's globalising world, political decisions based on frontal separation — secession — are becoming less and less significant and increasingly illusory. Discretionary power in this sense is ever more constrained,[28] as is discretion in matters of universal human rights.

Globalisation and internationalisation

There is considerable confusion and inconsistency in the use of the terms "globalisation" and "internationalisation." In the disciplinary field of international relations especially, we witness a highly redundant rehearsal of the debate between the advocates of "realist" and "idealist" schools, with a long line of critics attempting to dismantle both. The former reflect the hitherto — and the latter the prospective, and declining — role of the nation state (see, for example, Shaw, 1994; Clark, 1997). A possible rapprochement of the two is suggested by the observation that the strengthening of the global does not entail the simple demise of the nation state but rather its changing role. It is also becoming clear that it is not only relations between nations that are involved: a growing diversity of territorial and non-territorial actors — regions, cities, municipalities, economic actors — have become autonomous and are linking up on a world scale. It is therefore quite mistaken to assume that internationalisation preserves the internally homogeneous structure of society, as exemplified by the "billiard ball" metaphor in international relations theory. Internationalisation rests on relations between nations and therefore assumes a lower level of differentiation and individualisation than globalisation.

Globalisation and universalism

While the concept of globalisation has temporal and spatial parameters, universalism is a characteristic of principles applicable regardless of time and place. Universal principles are, however, manifested and observable only in concretely defined times and places. "Globalisation is an extension of the application of universal principles everywhere … But the spread of universal principles does not mean homogenisation, everything the same everywhere. Rather, they can appear in practically limitless unique combinations" (Teune & Mlinar, 2000).

[26] See also Jan Makarovič's discussion of the "logic of sets, networks and systems" (1995b).

[27] The "socialist" states pretended to eliminate the contradictions of social development by simply ignoring or suppressing the autonomy of (sub)groups and individuals.

[28] Dependency theory saw the solution to dependency on the world core in self-sufficiency — de-linking, de-coupling — and disengagement from the world capitalist system. However, such exclusion from the world system is no longer a matter of choice.

Consequently, calls for "abandoning universalism for true indigenisation" (Park, 1981, p. 161) rest on a misunderstanding — one that incorrectly presupposes universalism and indigenisation to be alternatives, mutually exclusive states. What is actually at issue is the difference in approach between nomothetic and idiographic sciences. The more pertinent question is how far a given generalisation rests on limited evidence from the developed world — how far, in other words, it is "Eurocentric."

Territorial inclusiveness and selectiveness of actors: a question of scale

"Local" and "global" are typically synonyms for the small and the large — but this parallel holds only in terms of geographical, territorial inclusiveness. It typically overlooks the fact that expanding accessibility both necessitates and enables increasing selectivity, resulting in the formation of various groups, organisations, or networks comprising a small number of actors. These groups have no necessary territorial base and do not discriminate on the basis of territorial provenance.

The size of a group — its number of members — is therefore not necessarily an indicator of the advance of the globalisation process. Even the territorial dimension has to be understood more as potential world accessibility than as actual, complete territorial "coverage." Before us is not only a society with ever-larger groupings, as the territorial expansion of integration processes (EU, NAFTA, and similar) might suggest, but also a society made up of increasingly smaller or more diverse groups and individuals, linked up on a world scale.

"Globalisation" by sectors and beyond

A convenient way of presenting the issues of globalisation is by sectors or issue areas. A large part of the sociological discussion focuses either on individual sectors — Wallerstein (1979) on the economy, Robertson (1992) on culture — or on several simultaneously (Sklair, 1991: economy, polity, culture–ideology).

While this may serve more pragmatic or short-term preoccupations, it bypasses the basic long-term restructuring and "de-structuring" resulting from individualisation and globalisation. The sectoral approach assumes structure to be constant and focuses on changes within it. This is inconsistent both conceptually, with the holistic nature of globalisation, and empirically, with the evidence on "melting structures" (Lash & Urry, 1994, p. 94, p. 97; Delors, 1996; Castells, 1985). The sectoral model will increasingly tend to conceal rather than reveal the actual process of globalisation. The trends towards high diversity and unique actors operating in a "space of flows" are increasingly departing from the notion of a segmentalised society.

Cross-Level Dynamics

Many of the unresolved issues of globalisation — particularly those of inclusion and exclusion of territorial and non-territorial, and of collective and individual actors — may be clarified by placing them in the context of interdependencies and interaction between levels of societal territorial organisation. This opens up a much-neglected sphere of sociological inquiry that has hardly been explored beyond the simplified debate on the micro–macro division.

The range of levels and their relationships

A crude distinction between micro and macro cannot suffice for identifying possible regularities in cross-level dynamics. Only a more finely differentiated scale of levels of territorial organisation can begin to reveal any such regularities. Here it must be noted that the situation is changing both in society and in the social sciences. In society, the system of states — which constituted an important barrier between the local and the global — is now weakening. In the social sciences, the establishment of several (sub)disciplinary fields has brought a division of labour in which each still concentrates on just one level of territorial organisation (Alger & Mendlowitz, 1985; Alger, 1988, p. 336).

Beyond the question of the existence and inclusivity of the full range of levels, the interrelationships between them and their changes over time must also be considered. A divergent set of viewpoints is found in the literature. One possible systematisation is as follows.

1. The argument that there is a kind of "peaceful coexistence" of social reality at different levels, each having its niche without interfering with the others (Solar, 1987).
2. The argument that a *complementary* relationship obtains, with levels interlinking to mutual benefit on a win/win model. Jean Monnet showed that national sovereignty diminishes when it is locked in obsolescent forms and only isolated "pockets" attempt to assert it. In order to be efficient, it has to be translated to broader spheres where it can blend with the sovereignty of others. "No-one loses in this process; on the contrary, all gain new powers" (Monnet, as cited in Fontaine, 1988, p. 31, emphasis added).
3. The argument that mutual competition or even incompatibility obtains, fitting the zero-sum game model. This is more common among Marxist writers, who tend to see a zero-sum relationship between levels of territorial organisation, analogous to social classes. Wallerstein argues that the world level is not merely one of the levels but the fundamental, decisive one, which then in some sense replaces the national level.[29]

[29] Dahl and Tufte (1973) also stress that smaller, local units yield their autonomy to the next larger units in a kind of sequence, so that upon joining a supra-national organisation the sovereignty of the nation state also begins to diminish – leading, in the future, to the nation state becoming a kind of "local government."

Each of these arguments rests on particular elements of reality. But their main flaw is that they are static: they do not explain how relationships between levels change over time, nor how much those relationships differ depending on the levels involved.

In general, there appears to be a paradox: the range of levels is expanding on the one hand (alongside the national, there are now supra-national and global levels), while on the other hand there is a convergence between levels.

The regularities of inter-level relationships

The following regularities of inter-level relationships can be hypothetically specified.

1. *First proposition:* relations between levels vary according to their positions on the full scale from local (or, if non-territorial units are included, from the individual) to the global, and vary according to their proximity or distance on that scale. The closer two levels are, the more competitive their interrelationships; the further apart they are, the more complementary and mutually supportive. Thus, relations between the national and supra-national levels are more competitive, while there is greater mutuality between the regional and the supra-national.[30]
2. *Second proposition:* relations between levels change over time, but these changes are neither (a) coincidental nor (b) linear. Empirically, as linkages at the supra-national regional level (Europe) have strengthened, trade flows at the global scale declined for a decade (Park, 1994). This may be interpreted as reflecting the need for a higher degree of diversity in an expanded territorial framework to go through a period of integration before the process can continue again at a higher level. Some newly formed states have reduced their previous external links while simultaneously reducing the autonomy of their sub-national units, though indications suggest this is only temporary.
3. *Third proposition:* there is a general tendency for a unit at a given level to seek interlinking (integration) with units at the same or higher levels without simultaneously allowing internal differentiation and autonomisation. This implies a deviation from the general trend of "the penetration of differentiation into the substructures" (Blau, 1977) and cannot endure for long. This is a striking contradiction in the European context, where nation states typically join broader continental frameworks as relatively homogeneous units.[31]
4. *Fourth proposition:* with the increase in accessibility (interlinking) between levels, their mutually exclusive character and hierarchical nature diminishes.

[30] The European Union, for example, gives direct support to the transnational interlinking of regions through numerous programmes, yet this interlinking is typically curbed at the national level by various means, because it reduces the latter's control (Bučar, 1993).

[31] Some French statesmen have stood up for France's "right to be different" in the face of strong trends towards Americanisation — but not for analogous rights inside France.

Instead of the alternatives of centralisation or decentralisation, relations become increasingly partnerships with multi-level power-sharing in dealing with particular matters. A typical example is the Phare programmes of the European Union, the design and implementation of which require cooperation across supra-national, national, and regional or local levels. The same is true of certain UNESCO programmes at the world scale.

5. *Fifth proposition:* as interlinking at a higher level intensifies, there is a rising trend towards homogenisation — for example, the 300 harmonisation measures of the European Union — which reduces the mutual exclusivity of territorial units at a lower level. This applies not only to technical standards but also to pressures from above for cooperativeness in resolving conflicting territorial claims. The resulting heightened accessibility becomes a basis for possible increases in diversity. This is no longer, however, the diversity that stems from frontal territorial separation; it stems instead from more selective interlinkings.

All of the above must be considered in the broader context of expanding territories and flattening hierarchies (Mlinar, 1995b) and of tendencies towards deterritorialisation. This involves a local–global convergence: the strengthening of direct linkages and the weakening of intermediaries.

These propositions about cross-level dynamics as a whole are intended to provide a conceptual and theoretical reorientation, as well as a specification of regularities that have not previously been considered in research. They directly or indirectly bear on the issues of inclusion and exclusion, and present a challenge for operationalisation and more focused empirical research — tasks beyond the scope of this text.

A Return to a Closed-System Paradigm

In conclusion, it must be noted that globalisation as a process is a very different "narrative" from global society. It entails expansion in space — both in economic and corporate forms and as an emancipatory drive — and involves the enlargement of scale as well as the freeing of actors from predetermined structures within narrow territorial units. Yet the more rapidly this expansion beyond traditional spatial boundedness proceeds, the closer it approaches its opposite: the ecological finites of the world. Ultimately, limits to growth are limits to freedom.

The highest level of territorial inclusiveness socially implies the loss of the outside world, and thus a shift from an open to a closed-system paradigm. The world is becoming socially a total system — without "exit" and thus with less efficient "voice," in Hirschman's (1970) terminology. There will be no external alternatives either to free oneself from this totality or to escape responsibility (as the middle class escapes downtown). Nor will it be possible to transfer

undesirable effects — ecological ones, for example — to others without being affected oneself. A widening divergence between living in physically constraining and informationally expanding space will grow in importance.

While inclusion expands in the virtual space of the global information society, the finites of the physical world will necessarily require a return of zero-sum logic. This will mean more restrictions on the autonomy of actors in space, more control, and more conflicts.

Conclusion and Challenges for the Research Agenda

The foregoing discussion has tried to expose both some conceptual dimensions of the process of globalisation and their relevance for understanding inclusion and exclusion — particularly from the standpoint of the ongoing socio-spatial transformation, both horizontally and vertically. Globalisation represents a maximisation of territorial (geographic) inclusiveness, which — in the long run, though not linearly — provides an extending range of choice. At the same time, it means losing the option of exclusion from the world as a "total system."

Globalisation involves changes that have to be studied simultaneously in terms of multi-level analysis and cross-level dynamics — along both the dimension of autonomy and dependency and that of homogenisation and diversification. The vision of a global society includes actors who share a great deal in common, while each simultaneously represents a unique combination of characteristics drawn from various territorial origins.

The interpretation offered here departs from those claiming a general decline in territorial diversity and autonomy, and equally from those arguing simply for the continuation of existing territorial structures and identities.

Globalisation is often understood — as by Wallerstein, and in a different sense by Dahl — as a succession in which the "higher" level replaces the power of lower ones: global inclusion is read as the suppression or exclusion of national and sub-national powers. Rather than following such one-sided interpretations of globalisation as the successive replacement of lower by higher levels, so that the world level becomes ultimately decisive, I outline here a more dialectically conceived understanding of socio-spatial change — one that considers the empowerment of ever-smaller units within an ever-larger territorial context. This is an emancipatory vision of the freeing of actors from predetermined, rigid structures within narrower territorial units and their participation (inclusion) in an ever-larger context.

In general, inclusion in global society less and less implies exclusion from "lower" levels. But these relationships are still far from clear and deserve a prominent place on the research agenda. These relationships are not linear or unidirectional; globalisation is one side of the oscillatory dynamics of the unity of opposites of globalisation and autonomisation/diversification.

The issues of inclusion and exclusion are closely connected with zero-sum logic, which tends to persist in social thought even as it loses ground in social reality. Extending accessibility and connectedness — both horizontally in space and vertically, hierarchically — makes the old understanding of mutual exclusiveness obsolete. The logic of win/lose was the common denominator of territorial expansionism, power politics, economic and cultural imperialism, the world core and periphery, "Americanisation," centralisation and decentralisation alike. This zero-sum logic is less and less able to explain current social change in European societies, which is better understood in terms of interpenetration, mixing, multi-level power-sharing, glocalisation, partnership, hybridisation, and multiple loyalties.

What is taking place is both a tendency towards the inclusion of territorial diversity that is compatible with (more) global combinations, and a tendency towards the exclusion of diversity that arose on the basis of territorial separation and is incompatible with the territorial extension of connectedness. In Europe we can observe both the empowerment of actors based on universalist criteria and the widening delegitimisation of territorially exclusionary criteria.

Research proceeds under the pressure of prevailing social values and policies that tend to protect traditionally understood territorial identities, particularly national ones. Much simplistic commitment exists to the continuity of the heritage of territorial cultures, without awareness of their exclusionary nature and of what this implies for other values — such as the autonomy and identity of the human personality — that are gaining in importance. Continuity cannot be absolutised; it should always be considered together, and in dialogue, with discontinuity. There is a general shift from identities based on territorial separation ("identity as island") to identities formed on the basis of selectivity and choice ("identity as crossroads"). What is not always distinguished is this: territorial diversity in the context of globalisation is actually declining insofar as it is based on frontal territorial separation, but it is simultaneously increasing insofar as it is based on the autonomy and selectivity of actors in the context of widening access to the world's variety. This remains a challenge for further examination.

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The Art of the Feud: The Developmental Logic of Globalisation

Henry Teune and Zdravko Mlinar

Introduction

Globalisation is integral to social development. It refers to processes that both integrate diversity and produce even more diversity. It is explained by theories of developmental change. Its driving, self-conflicting logic permeates differentiation and integration within the practical limits of the individual at the lowest level, at the one end, and the world as a whole at the highest, most encompassing level, at the other.

As a concept, globalisation must be distinguished from several related but different constructs. First, it differs from concepts that explain an intensification and expansion of international relations among states through diplomacy, organisation, and law — or through subversion, threat, and war: the very processes that encapsulated the whole world as a system of states. Second, it differs from transnational activities that, although conducted from within countries, traverse state boundaries through communication, commerce, and the circulation of people and ideas. Though often perceived as global, the structures of transnational activities are bilateral or multilateral at best — between and among entities across countries, be they universities, voluntary medical associations, or corporations. Third, it differs from the institutionalisation of supra-national entities, their organisations, and the norms held therein — be they the European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), or the World Trade Organisation (WTO). All of the latter comprise states that agree to subordinate their sovereignty to a common decision-making body of more or less federal character. And although most supra-national organisations are regional, the WTO provides an example of a supra-national organisation that happens to cover most of the world, even if unable to be global in its fundamental organisational principles.

Globalisation and universalism are different concepts. The first has temporal and spatial parameters; the second is a characteristic of principles that can be applied without regard to time and space. Universal principles are observably manifest only in a particular place or period. Globalisation, in contrast, extends the application of universal principles everywhere. Modern scientific knowledge started in a small Western European niche from which it spread globally. The growth of this type of knowledge, if not merely that, is a mainspring of contemporary global social development.

The spread of universal principles does not necessarily imply homogenisation — everything becoming the same everywhere. Rather, they appear locally in practically limitless, distinct, unique combinations and recombinations. As the science of materials advances and architectural variations improve and multiply, for example, they even help to preserve and recreate older designs.

Since globalisation is very often theoretically unclear, it has come to signify two separate domains: (1) one in which territorial diffusion of things, people, and ideas occurs; and (2) another in which different parts of the world gradually become interdependent. This is why globalisation can seem to indicate, contradictorily, that the world is simultaneously becoming bigger and smaller — connoted in references to "McDonaldisation," "Coca-Colonisation," "world football," and "Americanisation" (Featherstone, 1990). As powerful persuaders, these exemplifications convey both positively and negatively charged images that distort the underlying reality of contemporary change and warp the explanatory power of development as a general dynamic of global change.

The facile explanations of globalisation point to technologies — satellite communications, air transport, computer networks, and worldwide television programming — all of which substantially reduce the physical and social constraints of space and time, in some cases nearly to nothing. Yet what are the social forces that explain these technologies and their use? Each has more expensive and difficult alternatives; all are improvable and substitutable. The fax machine was available for years, providing wire photos for newspapers, long before that same technology became a recognised element of the bundle of technologies now reputed to be "causing" globalisation. Although technologies may be engaged to facilitate development, and may at certain critical periods even become the "necessity" that compels one invention or another, they remain subordinate to the developmental processes themselves.

Globalisation must be understood theoretically as a general social developmental process, or else it will be seen politically as a willy-nilly product of technologies, which can themselves be manipulated to control any unwanted consequences of change. The popular perception of globalisation at this moment in history is as an altogether benign force amply capable of accounting for our everyday observations of change and explaining the spread of the familiar everywhere, with good and bad consequences. To deal with the politics of globalisation, one needs to recognise and understand the winners, the losers, and their likely responses. It is not enough to anticipate globalisation as the bearer of the next golden age, to abhor its casualties, or to fear the reactions of its enemies. Yes, a different kind of society is likely to take shape; yes, factories may well close; and yes, fundamentalists will challenge. But globalisation will proceed. The political issues of journalistic relevance will continue to be about the consequences of the pretentious premise that governments can continue to deal with the problems emanating from globalisation — even though these are matters that have long since escaped the purview, let alone the reach, of their authority.

Surrogate references to globalisation as telecommunications, computer networks, electronic shopping, and high-speed transport are pseudo-explanations that invite familiar Luddite reactions of astonishment and resistance. Fundamentalist responses — aggressive assertions of ethnic and national character — are merely perturbations on these processes. They are typical of sectors and regions of the world that are the least socially diversified and differentiated, and that by definition constitute the world's new backward areas now impacted by ever-expanding globalisation.

National Development

Since the late eighteenth century, beginning with Adam Smith, both economic growth and development have been perceived as led by the formation of the nation state. The reasons for this are as transparent as they are, in some respects, obscure. States, compelled by the imperatives of defence or survival, built the infrastructures that integrated territory and brought together those within it, so as to encourage general exchange and production. The spread of norms through the extension of law made exchanges predictable. And technologies — those great inputs of growth that boosted production — helped to modernise transportation and accelerate communications, under the protection of "the state." Among the most evident general forces that created roads, canals, railroads, shipping services, patent offices, currencies, markets, and reliable banking services — but also legally enforceable contracts — were the momentous productive transformations: from animate to inanimate power, from coal-generated steam to electricity, from compound new industrial materials to fission and fusion in chemistry, among others.

The less obvious factors in the historic shift from sustainable survival to strategic surplus and to fast growth are discussed today in the context of the still poorly identified ingredients of innovation and the yet-to-be-understood basic constituents of success — all of which are so necessary in organising production for the markets of tomorrow.

Why some states came together and embarked on a path of autonomous growth, achieving "economic takeoff," whereas other early starters became targets of opportunity for ascendant states, constitutes one of the most important historical-theoretical puzzles still awaiting resolution. Argentina and Canada — both vast spans of land with sparse European populations implanted on top of scattered indigenous populations — shared similar prospects for growth and development in the early twentieth century, yet a large economic gap now separates them. Mexico and the United States, although "economically comparable" at the starting gate in the early nineteenth century, followed widely divergent paths in their economic growth and national integration only a few decades later.

The reasons advanced by evolving theoretical interpretations range from the imperatives of war to the happenstance of good government and the opportune

choices of political leaders. Aside from such explanations, autonomous national economic growth is known to have proceeded even without the obvious benefits of resource-rich territory, an invigorating climate, or cultural splendour. Comparisons of China and Japan, England and France, Prussia and Russia have opened paths of explanation touching on religion, politics, and the diffusion of innovations.

By the end of the 1970s it should have become apparent, and by the mid-1990s it was certainly obvious, that development was more than simple economic growth of nations. In reality, it was a feat embedded in the social advancements that had managed to slip through the cage bars and the traditional constraints imposed by states. Once, only those countries successful in harnessing their resources grew to lead the world; wars among the growth-driven states were of such magnitude that they were seen as "world wars." Today, even in countries unable to achieve much national economic success, populations can benefit from processes of social development and thereby experience the positive effects of economic growth. Such, too, is the outcome of global social development — itself the fruit of generalised social development, which, after nearly three centuries of very gradual internationalisation, now touches almost all parts of the planet with worldwide impact.

Globalisation as Social Development

Our theoretical perspective places globalisation centrally, as a core element indispensable to the explanation of the general processes of social development at a time when the world needs to come to terms with its ecological limits. First, so as to situate our theory of developmental change in context, we shall examine why sociology did not until recently recognise globalisation as the historical watershed it is; why so little progress has been made in grasping the concept; and what manifold consequences have ensued. Second, we shall propose a theory of development capable of conceptualising the process of globalisation — one intended to be general and comprehensive, and compatible with the traditions of the macrosociological theories of the nineteenth century that serve to explain the transformation commonly referred to today as "modernity." Third, we shall discuss some of the consequences of globalisation in an outline of a different kind of world order.

Sociology and Twentieth-Century World Systems

The role of social science in the development of the world during the twentieth century is a complicated story, yet to be told in full (Albrow & King, 1990). The general understanding is that the rise of the social sciences coincided with the emergence and expansion of a world of states. Scholars ascribed meaning to the concept of the nation state more out of idealistic aspiration than on grounds of

justifiable evidence. The study of human development quickly retreated from its nineteenth-century origins in Marx, Spencer, and Weber, distancing itself from their macrotheoretical interpretations of massive change and future directions. A world of peoples, empires, great religions, mores, and cultures became compressed into a planet of political cages — most of which were very confining; many also packed with mutually hostile occupants.

The end of the First World War transformed the nation state into a moral force for justice — an entity wholly capable of reconfiguring liberated human beings into organisations geared to production, but also one likely to use its newly demonstrated deadly capacities for war on an unprecedented scale. The main query for professional economists became the why of economic prosperity and the wherefore of inequality among nations; their quests would soon discover new paths in the orthodoxies of Keynesian national economic policies promising growth and justice. States erected barriers along their boundaries and prepared to defend — and possibly expand — them. The main questions for political scientists became those of war and peace, including the calculation of national interests and the materialisation of vast state bureaucracies for collective action. Sociology lost its way in these intellectual quests. Submitting to the dogma of the nation state as the principal agent of change for social justice, sociology dutifully searched for social order, addressing social problems in a variety of national settings. As a result, comparative research contrasted countries, political systems, societies, and economies, at the expense of scholarly work on self and space.

The emancipation of individuals inside liberal democratic states — through private ownership, citizens' rights, and public welfare — dissolved in the 1920s into the many communalisms of that period. Nationalism, fascism, and "national" communism gave way to violent conflicts and governmentally induced deaths; and already by the 1950s, their casualties would make of the twentieth century the bloodiest yet in human history (Rummel, 1997). During that period of ascendant communalisms, and well into the end of the century, sociologists became apologists, exiles, or marginalised critics, most of them abandoning their nineteenth-century traditions of global theories of change.

Political scientists and economists embraced the new world order of competitive and conflicting states. The internationally dominant theoretical paradigm for political scientists became the "zero-sum game"; for economists, the name of that deadly rivalry was "competition" — zero-sum with all its theoretical corollaries. The former developed a major field of study and research in both international relations and world politics; the latter excelled in international and world economics. A few studies of "cultural" and social influences among nations aside, sociologists remained mostly commentators on the sidelines. A somewhat late exception was *The Modern World-System* (Wallerstein, 1974). But even that work was primarily an analysis of economic relations between core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral states — a quest to bridge Marxist and

capitalist interpretations of global change with ideas derived from mercantilism, imperialism, and the history of the West. Although a field of international sociology did not thereby emerge, a comparative cross-national sociology did somehow come into focus.

Nonetheless, the second half of the twentieth century witnessed much more than high-profile trade and power politics, or the mere construction of institutions to bring nations together in a world of prosperity without wars. Less visible, but deep changes in values and in relations among groups engaged in economic production and distribution did create the conditions for two of the most important institutional and structural changes of the century's end. The first secured the institutions for the European Union; the second managed the transformation of nationalist communist states from closed to open, if not wholly democratic, systems. Each appeared to have taken place independently — the first through the special relationship between the political leaders of Germany and France; the second, owing to Gorbachev's leadership. Yet both were part of the developmental processes of globalisation, as were NAFTA, the WTO, the fast rise of international derivative markets, and the growth of certain Asian economies. The Maastricht Treaty, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the opening up of countries worldwide, and even the responses to the wars in the Balkans and inside Russia are all integral to the processes of world development on a global scale.

Only a development theory of change — capable of articulating the transformation of an international system made of states and nations, yet still able to explain the processes of an emerging world system of individuals — can provide the sound theoretical foundation for a global sociology whose deep grasp and broad reach neither comparative sociology nor international sociology could ever hope to achieve.

A Sociological Theory of Globalisation

For sociology to make a theoretical contribution to the study of global processes of change, it has to acquire something like the comparative advantage theory in economics or iterative game theory in political science. What sociology can draw upon is a tradition of theories of social development, once instrumental in explaining the massive changes that led to the modern era — the days of large nation states, emerging cities and markets, and nascent science. What can sociology do to free itself from the limitations of that earlier historical period, in order to meet more aptly the challenges of the century ahead?

Our book *The Developmental Logic of Social Systems* (Teune & Mlinar, 1978) defined "development" as integrated diversity. Our general theory was presented as characteristic of certain societies — indeed, of the human race as a single system. In our view, the Roman Empire was developmental: it integrated diversity, as did also smaller societies — early Athens being an example — that

were not dominated by the expansionist imperatives of empires, yet left many lasting legacies for human development.

For a variety of reasons, certain nation-state systems found themselves linked to developmental processes sometime in the mid-seventeenth century. They used the benefits of their scale to absorb some societies still stuck in reproducing themselves through adaptations to their environments — including their own neighbours — and much of it involved warfare. Those ecological human systems depended heavily on production, trade, and war for their sustenance and defence. Developmental systems, in contrast, generate change autonomously; they integrate it and create even more change. A few of these dynamics and processes of development need to be discussed to show why the world's human system is becoming globally developmental in character and tenor.

Integration has three dimensions: strength, inclusiveness, and extensiveness. Strength depends on the interdependence of the components, whereby a change in one element leads to a change in others as well as in the first, owing to feedback with variable probability. The average of these probabilities across components is the overall strength of integration: maximum integration obtains where a change in one component determines a change in all others; dissolution, where change becomes a random process. Inclusiveness refers to the equiprobability that a change in one component will lead to change in the others: notwithstanding the strength of the relationships among the components of a system, the components' overall deviation from the average constitutes a measure of the inclusiveness of the system's integration. Extensiveness, finally, is the proportion of each component's properties affected by the system, regardless of the total number of properties those components may possess. A component is thus said to be partially or fully integrated into the system, depending on how much of what it has is engaged in system-related behaviour.

Toward a World System

Diversity is the other essential element of development. It is the sum total of differences in the properties of all the components of a system — all combinations of such properties included. Every single component has both similarities with, and differences from, every other. The important dynamic of diversity is that as each component acquires more properties, the probability of its having properties both similar to and different from those of the other components increases — growing exponentially when combinations of properties are at play. Thus, everybody can have shoes; but some will have shoes and automobiles; others, shoes, automobiles, and houses; and so on, as basics are diffused and novelties trickle down.

The questions raised here are: why development, and why does the scale of a system increase? Beyond economic growth and modernity — the central

preoccupation of macrosocial science — what does a system's scale imply? There are three basic types of systems: co-action systems, interaction systems, and transaction systems. Co-action refers to variety among "traditional" societies and to similarities within them; integration here is based on shared characteristics within the society and common differences from outsiders. Interaction relies on similarities and differences within and among societies, giving rise to exchange and conflict. Transaction is composed primarily of differences in a system where integration is based on flows of activities and ideas.

The great transformation of the nineteenth century — explained by Marx and others through processes of differentiation and integration — was from co-action (small-scale and self-reproductive) systems to interaction (exchange/conflict) systems, in which competition and discontent constitute the core dynamics of change. Developing systems create differences and cleavages — between urban and rural, between central and peripheral, between wealthy and poor. They intensify conflicts, not only among themselves but among groups with different cultures and religions, by bringing them into contact. The twentieth-century state communalisms can be interpreted as short-term, successful reactions against changes that threatened disintegration. The concepts of winners and losers and zero-sum games aptly captured the dynamics of change from co-action communities to exchange-oriented, capitalist societies.

The transformation from exchange/conflict systems — especially those organised as states — to transaction systems constitutes the main process of globalisation: differences are encompassed in networks; territorial boundaries become fuzzy; goods and services flow instead of being pushed or dragged across conflict-intensive exchange organisations; and, unlike the variety of communalisms that would rather embrace group uniformity, democratic ideologies very much respect individuals and celebrate their differences.

Our developmental theory is not one of nation states, nor of corporations, let alone of communities to be explained by ecological theories of growth and human settlements. Rather, it is an articulation of the significance of the evolving levels of territorial social organisation — from villages, towns, cities, and regions to the supra-national. Here, conflicts among these entities — whether over the emergence of newer levels or about the weakening and restructuring of older ones — are manifestations of those processes of deep transformation that ultimately succeed in converting the world from a territorially organised system into a globally reconfigured entity, for which new maps are needed.

The weakening of states by new claimants of autonomy, on the one hand, and the birth of supra-national regions and the emergence of transnational networks, on the other, are both integral to the developmental process. What we are witnessing today is a turning away from the nation state as the coordinating centre of human activity — in economic development, cultural achievements, and emancipation from group restraints, among other domains. In addition to conflicts fuelled by established nationalist and ethnic groups, there are those

arising among newer kinds of groups animated by an ever-expanding range of issues and interests, some in evident opposition to territorial political systems. Many among these groups transcend national boundaries in the nature of their membership, the range of issues addressed, and their linkages to others. There exist also global political movements, interests in free trade, resurgent universalistic religious creeds, knowledge-based associations, understandings among local officials, regional arrangements, and international organisations linked to sub-national ones, among other configurations.

Territorial groups fighting for autonomy in South Asia, Europe, Central Asia, or Africa never quite achieved their liberation in the great wave of newly independent states during the first half of the twentieth century. The coveted promise of self-determination in a world of independent states — at once protective of group interests and supportive of others' rights — never came to be a reality for them (Etzioni, 1994). Yet even as these groups acquire their independent states — with more than ten new states now recognised in Europe alone, in the space of a few years — they will be losing control not only to a globalising system but also to increasingly independent localities, minority groups, organisations, and the individuals within them (Pietraś, 1991). Their own autonomy can thus be assured only through linkages to broader systems.

With globalisation, entities below the level of the nation state that acquire sufficient autonomy are not only being freed from state control but also enabled to bypass the state and deal directly with its neighbours and with the global system as a whole (Mlinar, 1992a). The state cannot continue to function as a monopolistic intermediary when groups and persons seek to gain comparable "standing" under international law. Where global norms are not yet available, international laws are most likely to continue to serve as guidelines for localities, persons, and organisations in lieu of the internal rules formerly imposed exclusively by the state.

Once, developmental processes led to the weakening of localities in favour of the nation state and to the liberation of individuals from the grip of local communities, tribes, and religious groups. Today, such processes are giving rise to new regions, thereby nurturing — both intra- and trans-nationally — the preconditions for supra-national associations and organisations. Simultaneously, they have softened the strictly competitive nature of conflicts among states, localities, and the organisations that control state trade, the use of the military, and the exchange of skilled workers and technologies.

A global system is characterised by the interdependence of its groups, organisations, and individuals on a world scale, such that a change in one will have some probability of producing changes in the others. As these changes spread, the familiar in one part of the world becomes recognisable as not dissimilar to what is known in others. And the wider diffusion of the world's social variety assures a given locality's integration into a world system, and its diversification from within, through permutations and combinations of the local and the global.

Among the attributes of global systemness, one may mention: shared norms of behaviour, as in the treatment of minorities; identifiable elements, such as multinational businesses; world institutions, such as world banks; common languages for instant communication, such as computer software; and universal privileges and obligations, including human rights.

Dynamics of Globalisation

The developmental processes conducive to a world system are marked by increased differentiation at all levels of human aggregation, with further differentiation by sector. The levels are mixed: a region for trade can be more encompassing in size than a space specific to political cooperation on immigration or tourism. Levels may become fluid or fuzzy across sectors. Lags among sectors will become noticeable if one sector's integration leads to the integration of one but to the collapse of another. Some parts of universities — business education and cognitive science, to mention two — will tend to become global, if only by integrating with communications corporations; even as others — remedial education, for example — may languish if only one's own tongue is used for reading and writing.

The unfolding of levels — imparting ever-greater autonomy, from the lowest levels, ultimately to the one with the greatest possible scale, the world as a whole — will continue to be driven by the very processes of integrating diversity. The integration of the world is currently at a low level of systemic cohesiveness compared to most countries and regions, yet it constitutes the potential target of the global system. Enriched by the largest amount of diversity, an integrated world would provide the greatest quantity of novel variety and the highest rates of increase in comparison to any of its components. An integrated world would be far more innovative as a whole than any one of its nationally definable centres of innovation — as is already evident from the numerous breakthroughs accomplished in physics, genetics, and medicine.

As systems develop through augmentation in the diversity of their components and in the level of their integration to the whole, the relevance of intermediate structures diminishes. At relatively low levels of development, countries have weak central authorities; as they achieve some level of development, central controls expand rapidly in transportation, capital markets, and education. As even higher levels of development are attained, governments begin to decentralise and to divest themselves of initial controls, as their countries and their components become increasingly integrated into greater encompassing systems.

For totalitarian governments, the choice is between control and development: to develop, they must open; to open to the world, they must relinquish control. Countries may channel penetrations by the global, but there is little choice about whether or not to be open. In the long run, closure breeds poverty and social regression.

Conflicts in the Globalisation Processes

The world may be a global system, but its components are far from attaining high integration. Its institutions are incipient; some of its groups and parts are not well incorporated; the younger political levels — the regions — are in conflict with the longer-established state interests; new local systems and political movements conflict with national governments, often in alliance with global organisations. And some established groups, with a determination to recapture a past that never existed, can even transform confrontations into conflicts conducive to violence.

The two main structural conflicts in developmental processes are across levels and across time, and both are generated by new variety. No matter where it occurs, new variety tends to "migrate upwards," to more encompassing levels of aggregation, where it is only one more item in a large pool and hence more easily absorbed. Immigrants to a country settle more easily in a large city than in a small town. Once established at more encompassing levels — say, at a centre — variety can offer access to itself at lower levels, providing a basis for hierarchies, especially territorial ones. The centre will always have more variety than localities; it can control access to its space and use such selectivity to dominate. One outcome is direct conflict between centres and localities; another, conflict among centres claiming control over localities.

There are, however, limits to the amount and kind of variety that any level in a hierarchy can hold, which explains a tendency to off-load downward. In today's language, such off-loadings appear as restructurings, downsizings, or decentralisations. When this happens, clashes occur between the new and the old: localities and older organisations tend to have fixed structures, often deeply embedded in physical ecologies — buildings, roads, established land uses. At least initially, locals are likely to resist. Yet ultimately, they may "trade up," giving up some older kind of variety for a new one.

Cross-level shifting of variety is a necessary part of the dynamics of development in most settings. In the years ahead, the local as an autonomous unit will, itself, eventually lose out to those among its own groups and individuals who maintain an intimate link to the world at large (Mlinar, 1995a).

The first to adopt new items of variety in any locality will continue to constitute the "elites" who can bypass local structures and deal directly with the world as a system. Time interacts with conflicts across levels: new items continue to enter the evolving system at a discrete point in time, thereby disturbing it. As it begins to be distributed, variety becomes diversity and uses linear time for requisite system-wide adaptation and integration.

Globalisation also intensifies conflicts when two or more ethnic groups are entrapped within a locality under a single political system. If one group is more developed or globalised — having acquired variety from the "outside" — it will seek access to even more variety and make greater efforts to open the system's

boundaries. If another, less developed group controls the political system, it will seek to keep boundaries as closely under control as possible. This puts the two groups in direct conflict — as in the case of the former Yugoslavia, in the conflicts pitting rich and poor republics and their respective nationalities against each other over national policies concerning Europe and openness.

"Civil" wars have increased since the cessation of external infusions of control resources once sent to political centres in support of the Soviet–US confrontation. These are fought in the relatively less developed peripheries of the world: southern Europe, Central Asia, South Asia, and Africa. Almost no violent conflicts in the years since the end of the Cold War have taken place between states; most are between groups within recognised countries or inside neighbouring ones. The peacekeeping mechanisms of regional compacts and the United Nations were, however, designed for conflicts among nation states within an international system of states. A global system would make such institutions obsolete on grounds of their inability to deal with conflicts that are not strictly between warring state governments. The temporary absence of transnational institutions capable of mediating intra-national group conflicts may increase the probability of national and international violence.

Implications for a Future World Order

The foregoing holds serious implications for the structures of a world system in the coming years. Detractors argue that current conditions are temporary; some have even concluded that, in the long run, another group of countries will become ascendant — that great powers and empires will ensue (Modelski, 1987). A contrary view holds that the world will break up into a thousand or more conflicting tribes before varied "peaces" can be established (Snyder, 1982).

The perspective offered here is that of a world transforming into a different kind of system. The rate of such changes depends on technology and on human will and purpose — the "know how" and the "know what" of the human condition. Technologies and human choice can, of course, end up in catastrophes; but in the future, such setbacks are likely to be remedied in years, not decades: a global system would have both greater capacities for response and far faster responses than any single country or locality could afford. We see at least six dimensions of change in the altered and evolving landscape.

1. *The flow of goods, services, and ideas will accelerate on a global basis*, for two main reasons: reductions in the traditional territorial restraints on movement across the selectively more permeable political boundaries of nation states; and the weakening of the power and purview of intermediate groups that exact tolls on exchanges and transmissions.
2. *The units of human activity, including production, will get smaller.* The more encompassing the world becomes as a global system, the more viable its smaller unit components can afford to be — including new forms of human organisation in production groups, research teams, neighbourhood associations, and lifestyle groups. Smaller, however, will come to require being linked to what is far larger, even to the point of becoming part of the largest-scale system.
3. *The individual will gain autonomy.* Not only will smaller units become more viable in a global system, but individuals will also be able to find their place as diversity is opened to them. The lead sector in the processes of globalisation will be that of information, which follows from rationalisation and standardisation — necessary, if insufficient, conditions for integrating diversity.
4. *The territorial imperative in human aggregation and societal organisation will become fuzzy and fluid.* Not only will there be many more territorial units, but most will be penetrated by elements of other systems, especially by exponentially expanding numbers of non-territorial organisations. The corporation can already jump territorial boundaries easily.
5. *The variety present in the world will be distributed to almost all localities and organisations.* In the language of space, that which is located in one place will be accessible in every place. One consequence: destroying anything anywhere will destroy something of the destroyer as well — if only stock ownership, customers, future contributors, or potential use. Zero-sum situations will acquire fuzzy payoffs.
6. *The world's centres will become nodes in global flows rather than control points.* Instead of just a few world centres, there will be hundreds, perhaps thousands. These nodes will be specialised — in trade, banking, fashion, science. A polycentric world will be made up of switching or clearing points, useful in reducing uncertainty, not designed to control or dominate. It will be a world without empires.

Our sketch of this "future conditional" scenario should not be mistaken for a linear progression into a world system. First, most of the violent situations being faced today are consequences of change in national political systems and the state's diminishing reach within its borders — what now encourages groups to seek long-suppressed recognition. Second, local incursions by global activities may well compromise the aesthetics of micro-environments. Third, the wanderings of the masses in search of their share of profit from a globalising political economy will probably disrupt human relations. Fourth, the unleashing of certain elements from established norms will lead to crime.

Establishing new, integrative norms is a far slower process than the delegitimisation of existing regulations. There is need to encourage novel approaches to theory-making that are attentive to the negative as well as the positive consequences of globalisation. Without new mentalities and newer mind-sets, futures may be pasts.

This chapter is based on:
Teune, H., & Mlinar, Z. (2000). The developmental logic of globalization. In J. V. Ciprut (Ed.), *The art of the feud* (pp. 105–122). Praeger.

Globalisation, Individualisation and Territorial Identities

The relative recency of sociological interest in globalisation, combined with the exceptional breadth and complexity of the concept, explains at least in part why it remains so poorly defined. Despite the great — almost fashionable — attention devoted to globalisation over the past decade by researchers, by various actors in the process itself, and by the general public, the mere announcement of a discussion of the topic rarely indicates what it is actually about. Enumerating illustrative examples — satellite telecommunications links, multinational corporations, financial flows, and the like — can never be expected to cover the full meaning of the concept and the actual subject matter. I therefore raise here certain questions as challenges and signposts on the road from exemplification to a theoretically grounded conceptualisation and research of the process of globalisation and the related individualisation.

Is It Really a Predictable Developmental Process?

Is there any justification for speaking of globalisation as a process with certain regularities and predictability, in the context of flexible, fluid, and even chaotic postmodern society? Albrow (1996) maintains that today we no longer have processes or various "-ations" — like industrialisation or urbanisation — as in the past, but rather "an open-ended transformation," a social transformation in an unpredictable direction, marking "the end of the Grand Narratives." I cannot, however, accept this conclusion.

High complexity raises the question of our ability to recognise the regularity of social change more than it negates it. The expansion of computerisation very strikingly confirms the theoretically anticipated path of developmental change in the direction of individualisation and globalisation — the era of mainframes, then personal computers, then computer networks follows exactly the predicted pattern. Similarly, the long-term trend of individualisation in the developed world over the past two centuries is evidenced in a rise in the number and a decline in the size of households, and now in a rise in the number and decline in the size of enterprises. The present integration processes in Europe, North America, and South-East Asia are part of the long-term stream towards globalisation.

The empirical data sets certain theoretical challenges before us. We have the general idea that globalisation is evidenced in intensified connections and

dependencies between people over increasing distances, across national and continental confines, and that this forms the basis of an emerging world society. At the same time, research at home and abroad points to certain major deviations:

1. With regard to personal identification in relation to different territorial levels, local attachment predominates markedly; national identification is considerably lower; and identification in any broader context is practically non-existent (Mlinar, 1997c). Models of technological–economic rationality clearly do not suffice to explain emotional or social identification.
2. Whereas information flows — in science, banking, popular culture — are genuinely global in character, flows of goods and trade are largely confined within continental borders; the mobility (migration) of people is predominantly restricted to a local–national context (Park, 1994).
3. Data showing that over the past decade trading within the EU has risen while EU trade with the rest of the world has actually fallen present another challenge to notions of globalisation. Some economists see in this a growth of supra-national regionalism at the expense of globalisation. This once again calls for a general theoretical explanation of regularities in relations between individual levels of the territorial organisation of society. Plainly, globalisation is not unfolding as a simple linear process — though non-linearity does not necessarily imply the absence of regularity.

Uneven Territorial Opening Up:

Mobility of people, flows of goods and ideas



From Popular Metaphors to Analytical Conceptual Dimensions of Globalisation

From a sociological standpoint, it is a paradox that some of the most popular metaphors about globalisation actually contribute to misunderstanding of the social transformation taking place. A case in point is McLuhan's description of society as a "global village" — a metaphor with "global neighbourhood" as its variant (The Commission on Global Governance, 1995). This fails to recognise that the village community and global society are quite different structurally, as the following table indicates.

Differences in structural features

VILLAGE COMMUNITY	GLOBAL SOCIETY
Compactness	Dispersion
Homogeneity within	Heterogeneity and homogeneity
Pre-determination	Choice
Undiscriminating socialising	Selective interlinking
Single prevailing loyalty	Multiple loyalties
Rigidity, immobility	Fluidity, mobility

Sociological definitions of globalisation are also unsatisfactory, because they are too loose. Giddens (1990, p. 64) captures the general idea of interconnection and interdependence when he writes that globalisation constitutes "the intensification of world-wide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa." However, the meaning of "many miles away" in physical, geographical terms — whether intra- or inter-continental — and the socio-spatial structure remain undefined.[32]

The shortcoming of such definitions is that they indicate only one-directional changes — from the narrow to the broad, from the local and national to the global — and do not encompass, in the sense of a dialectic of the unity of opposites, opposing changes as well. The notion of deterritorialisation — transcending the borders of territorial communities — is present, but not the idea of re-territorialisation of the global and the reaffirmation of territorial identity (no longer on the basis of frontal separation and isolation, but precisely on the basis of selective global interconnectedness).[33]

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[32] The social anthropologist Hannerz (1996, p. 17) also focuses primarily on distance without including a structural characterisation of the emerging world-scale society: "Globalisation is a matter of increasing long-distance interconnectedness at least across national boundaries, preferably between continents as well."

[33] In the small Upper Carniolan town of Žiri, the disappearance of the local dialect — which originally formed because of physical isolation and limited inter-local communication — is evident at the same time as the local ski-boot maker Alpina is establishing itself on the world market by building on distinctive local traditions.

Globalisation cannot be taken as a process by itself but only in interdependency and interaction with opposing trends towards differentiation and individualisation. At the same time, sub-national groups and individuals are being strengthened through supra-national interlinking. Peter Blau (1977) has described analogous changes inside narrow territorial confines: there is a "penetration of differentiation into the substructures," and simultaneously an integration of independent units into broader territorial frameworks.

Distinguishing between two different analytical approaches may allow greater systematisation and understanding. These involve studying globalisation:

1. From the standpoint of the spread of particular phenomena, people, goods, and ideas on a world scale, through a comparative analysis of their attributive characteristics (in the sense of the "logic of sets").
2. From the standpoint of the interlinking of actors and the interdependence of units around the world, and the rising probability that — even irrespective of distance — changes in one unit will produce changes in another (Makarovič, 1995a).

The former deals with the processes of homogenisation and diversification; the latter with the interlinking and individualisation (autonomisation) of actors in various networks.

Growing Homogenisation and/or Diversification?

Among the first criticisms to arise in connection with globalisation concerned the erasing of differences between territorial communities — the extinction of local dialects, regional architecture, folk music — and "Coca-Cola-isation," "McDonaldisation," "Americanisation," "Westernisation," and the like. For some, these were signs of a pan-world homogenisation. However, closer study showed that diminishing differences between territorial units (with respect to food, cars, and the like) may also entail increasing diversity and a wider range of choice within them. Whereas the "melting pot" was the basic explanatory model in the past, today it is being overtaken by "pluralism," "multiculturalism," and "interculturalism," which point to greater diversification. At the same time, inter-breeding, hybridisation, and creolisation are taking place.

To explain this, a distinction needs to be drawn between:

(a) diversity that arises over a long period from frontal separation and isolation; and

(b) diversity that arises from selective interlinking.

Territorial diversity shaped by isolation or separation from others — such as various dialects — comes into conflict with growing interlinking and declines with the through-flow of people, goods, and ideas, which imposes a certain

subordination to world homogenisation (or harmonisation within the EU). At the same time, growing interlinking broadens access to diversity and increases the formation of new combinations of available elements. Thus greater standardisation (or harmonisation) is taking place in parallel with a rise in the number of "unique" phenomena or subjects (Mlinar, 1997c).

It follows that on a world scale, actors or units are gaining more and more in common while simultaneously differing more and more from each other as unique combinations of these elements (Teune & Mlinar, 1978).

Is Global Telecommunication Abrogating the "Melting Pot" Model?

With regard to information technology, the trends towards homogenisation (assimilation) and diversification raise the following question: do more intensive telecommunication links heighten the likelihood that members of particular nations and other territorial communities will preserve their national (territorial) identities despite their dispersion around the world? In view of the long-term process of individualisation and migration research to date, it can be expected that in the coming decades the trend towards dispersion across national borders will continue. At the same time, dispersion (remoteness) will lose its adverse implications for the preservation of national identity, because of the intensification of "distance-insensitive communications."

Satellite television, the internet, mobile phones, and the like are bridging the former divide between home and abroad, laying a firm foundation for transcending the difference between presence and absence. The political and institutional foundations for interlinking national members throughout the world — the Slovene World Congress, the Office for Slovenes Abroad, giving émigrés voting rights, and the like — could come fully to life in a similar way.

The members of large nations, and most of all Americans, have advantages in this regard at present. But the global information society foreshadows a fundamental transformation in which deterritorialisation will imply not denationalisation — in the sense of extinguishing nations — but the globalisation of nations. Linkages will no longer be automatic and predetermined but reflexive and voluntary: the nation as an "elective identity."

Towards a "World Government" or Global Civil Society?

So far, government at the global level has been understood as a matter of cooperation between states, which has excluded NGOs, civil movements, multinational or transnational corporations, and the like. However, the number of actors gaining a voice and becoming influential at the global level is growing, which is increasingly at odds with the firmly established system of nation states as reflected in the United Nations.

In contrast to earlier anticipations of a gradual movement towards world government, more recently expectations have shifted towards global civil society. A major factor in this is precisely new information-communication technology, and particularly the growth in the number of its users and a shift in communication patterns — away from the one-to-many model towards the many-to-many. This implies a process of territorial dehierarchisation.

Parallel with the exceptional dynamics of internet growth, there has been a crucial expansion of the scope for civil self-organisation and the formation and action of more and more sub-groups and social movements. As Cairncross (1997, p. 257) observes, it is more likely that the powers of government authorities will weaken: the "death of distance" will shift power downwards towards the individual and will transform and strengthen democracy.

Model of Political Communications



Source: O'Sullivan (1995)

As new forms of communication spread, the individual's scope for joining in and participating at the national level — as well as for "over-reaching" this level of decision-making — will grow. People living under repressive regimes are strengthened by new technologies that give them new ways to have their voice heard around the world.

Is the "Illusion" of the Individual as a Direct World Citizen Becoming a Reality?

Some philosophers (Kant) and sociologists have envisaged individuals linking up directly to form a world, pan-human community; others have critically rejected these notions as illusions (Fiamengo) or ideological manipulation (Rupel, Calhoun). Forty years ago, Ante Fiamengo (1959, p. 162) wrote about the illusions of the direct interlinking of individuals into a *Cosmopolis* without certain intermediary structures. For him, the nation or state constitutes one

such necessary intermediary; and on the Marxist view of the withering away of the state, the commune above all. This is the foundation of a federalist conception of the integration of mankind. Denial of this intermediary link, "which is usually an expression of hegemonistic aspirations to annul the sovereignty of independent nation state formations … necessarily leads to a hegemonistic-unitarian concept of mankind's integration" (Fiamengo, 1959, p. 166).

Regardless of these or other conceptions, the rapid expansion of new information-communication technologies — the internet above all — has plainly increased the scope for direct interlinking of individuals on a world scale. There has also been a shift in the notion of sovereignty, which had often served as a counterweight to "interference in internal affairs" and a rationale for controlling transnational communications that promote the assertion of human rights movements. The internet, however, eludes control at all levels of territorial organisation.

What was in the past an exception — the Jewish diaspora, for example — is becoming an increasingly relevant pattern of the globalisation of territorial identity in the context of heightened mobility and global telecommunications. With the shift from a populist to a pluralist model of communication, on the basis of technological and political developments, the individual is entering the world arena directly — not as a monad, but through involvement in various networks and networks of networks. It is notable that the number of international NGOs is growing faster than the number of member states, and that the number of individuals linking up through the internet is growing incomparably faster still.

Instead of a Conclusion

The argument (for example, Albrow, 1996) that we cannot speak of globalisation as a predictable process in the context of postmodern society — which supposedly involves only "open-ended transformations" — is here refuted. Globalisation is truly not a linear and unidirectional process; but non-linearity, such as when trade within supra-national regions rises while it declines between them, does not necessarily signal the end of all regularity — only greater complexity and difficulty in identifying it. Change is not taking place randomly in every direction: regularity may be perceived in the sense of the dialectical unity of opposites, globalisation and individualisation.

These opposites may be studied using two analytical dimensions — the attributes of the units under observation, and their connectedness:

(a) *Attributes* reveal trends towards homogenisation and/or diversification. Whereas initially the world was found to be homogenising ("Coca-Colaisation"), the realisation is gradually growing that diversification is involved at the same time. Some differences between territorial units are diminishing

— local dialects, vernacular architectures — while others, based on unique combinations of actors, goods, and ideas within or beyond them, are growing.

(b) *Connectedness* and its transnational expansion are expressed in the transformation from an areal to a network organisation of society. As an actor's dependency on others multiplies and spreads, his or her autonomy in relation to each of them rises. The territorial hierarchy flattens in parallel with the spatial expansion of networking.

The rights and roles of the individual and of minorities are becoming more important than national sovereignty with regard to non-interference in the internal affairs of states. As autonomisation and heterogenisation increase, territorial representatives are losing their representativeness — in the case of both nation states and the entire United Nations system. Instead, the circle of subjects eligible to directly express their authentic interests at the global level is widening. The scope for an elective identity is growing in place of a priori determination of membership.

Empirical research shows that in the main people identify with their local community, less so with their national community, and hardly at all with any broader community. The territorial framework of social identification is thus considerably narrower than that of technological-economic integration. Globalisation presents a challenge to the fragmentary perception of the changes taking place in the European context, where a "Europe of Nations," a "Europe of Regions," and a "Europe of Citizens" are treated separately, as if they had nothing in common. These are only fragments of the fundamental transformation of the territorial organisation of society, which is ultimately empowering the autonomous and unique individual and strengthening global civil society.

This chapter is based on:
Mlinar, Z. (2000). Globalization, individualization and territorial identities. In E. Altvater et al. (Eds.), *Globalisierung* (pp. 135–149). Passagen Verlag.

Empowerment and Distinctiveness in the Process of Glocalisation

This article sets out some theoretical orientation for the social research of local–global relations, particularly in terms of two central preoccupations:

— how a local unit's transnational opening up changes the power of local people and local authorities — the core of the debate on democracy in the context of globalisation; and

— whether territorial diversity and local distinctiveness are disappearing, giving way to greater uniformity, or are perhaps actually increasing in complement to it.

General conceptual and theoretical issues are discussed in the light of the available empirical evidence and, in particular, of research carried out in the coastal municipality of Koper/Capodistria in Slovenian Istria, near the border with Italy (Trieste).

The General Theoretical Frameworks

Beyond the Logic of Zero-Sum and Back Again

In searching for the general theoretical frameworks of our topic, the assumption of zero-sum game logic — which needs to be disclosed — must first be addressed.

Although most often only implicit in the discourse, this logic actually represents the predominant assumption in the studies of our subject, both in terms of "horizontal" relations between territorial units or actors and in terms of "vertical" relations between levels of territorial organisation. It is increasingly being challenged, however, both in the studies showing the role of partnerships and multi-level power-sharing (dehierarchisation), and in those showing hybridisation, creolisation, and the "pooling of sovereignties" as in the EU. Even authors who more frequently conclude that the global is not necessarily an alternative to the local do not generally see this as part of the overall paradigmatic transformation of society.

The shift from zero-sum to variable-sum logic applies differently in the information sphere compared with the physical dimensions of space. Since information is not consumed like physical goods, it can be used by some without excluding others. Informatisation of society thus contributes most to the transformation that leads beyond the logic of zero-sum.

At the same time, there is a rising awareness of the physical limits of the world — both globally and locally — which is changing the relationships between actors in space. These changes involve the intensification of conflicts between groups and individuals, which are increasingly present as substantive issues of civic involvement and decision-making at all levels.

On (Mis-)understanding Glocalisation

Robertson (1994, p. 38) explains: "I attempt … to show that globalisation has involved the reconstruction, in a sense the production, of 'home,' 'community,' and 'locality'. To that extent locality is not best seen, at least as an analytic premise, as a counterpoint to the global. Indeed, it can be regarded, subject to some qualifications, as an aspect of globalisation."

He goes on to note that the notion of "glocalisation" is very close to his earlier description of globalisation and explains: "From my standpoint the concept of globalisation has involved the simultaneity and the interpenetration of what are conventionally called the global and the local, or — in more general terms — the universal and the particular … it may even become necessary for me (others) to substitute occasionally the term 'glocalisation' for the contested term 'globalisation'" (pp. 38–39).

Just as Robertson criticises others (Giddens, 1991; Barber, 1992) for positing overly mutually exclusive and clashing trends, the same appears to happen to him in reverse. He actually eliminates the contradiction by merging the two poles, which brings him into inconsistency with his own intention in introducing the concept of glocalisation — namely, to draw attention to the two-sidedness of the process.[34]

In conclusion, Robertson attempts to explain the local–global relationship as follows: "Without denying that the world-as-a-whole has some systemic properties beyond those of the 'units' within it, it must be emphasised, on the other hand, that such units themselves are to a large degree constructed in extra-unit processes and actions, and in terms of increasingly global dynamics" (p. 42).

This formulation is also internally incoherent. Separating out "extra-unit processes and actions" is appropriate for the territorial organisation of a pre- or early industrial age — a "space of places" — rather than for the "space of flows" and networks through which the globalisation process unfolds. In an empirically emerging context of flows, the distinction between territorial internal and external loses all meaning.

[34] Otherwise one can agree with Robertson when he writes: "I maintain also that it makes no good sense to define the global as if the global excludes the local. In somewhat technical terms, defining the global in such a way suggests that the global lies beyond all localities as having systemic properties over and beyond the attributes of units within a global system" (Robertson, 1994, p. 42).

Despite these deficiencies, Robertson has come closest to the central issue in our topic at the theoretical level — which is why he has been discussed at some length here.

Local–Global Convergence

One of the central issues concerning local–global convergence is the declining exclusiveness of "local democracy." With the transition from areal to network organisation, made possible by extended accessibility, "local" participation tends to be substantively enriched with global issues (see the several contributions by Chadwick Alger).

This can be interpreted theoretically in terms of the changing relationship between the parts and the whole: the "parts" increasingly assume the role of the part insofar as they assume the responsibility and deal with the issues of the whole (world); and the whole (world) is increasingly performing its role insofar as it becomes more sensitive to the problems of its parts.

This depends on: (a) the increasing representativeness of representation at higher levels; and (b) the opening of possibilities of direct participation without any mediation, which makes the issue of representation increasingly irrelevant.

Local–global convergence is not only based on higher accessibility resulting from the telecommunications revolution but also takes place through the actual physical congregation that recurrently occurs at different sites — world congresses of sociology in Montreal, Bielefeld, Madrid, New Delhi, Mexico City, Uppsala, Toronto, Varna, and elsewhere — for a limited period. Such congregations embody a local–global blend that can be understood in the sense of "glocalisation" and "time–space compression": providing direct, if temporary, face-to-face communication of participants from (possibly) the whole world at various places — which thereby become locales of the world. The main condition for a place to qualify as such is accessibility.

National Integrity and Sub-National Autonomisation

The centres of political power in today's states seek to preserve their status and the greatest possible control over their territory. Tensions and conflicts are thus appearing: (1) due to the trend towards empowerment of sub-national or regional and local units; (2) due to the aspirations of neighbouring countries to expand their influence (in place of territorial expansion); and (3) due to the emergence of supra-national formations like the EU.

The first trend is evident as hesitant acceptance — or even restraint — on tendencies towards decentralisation, through the state centre's retention of its role as representative of all sub-national units at the international level, even when it becomes clear that it can no longer handle the growing complexity of the activities of emancipating actors. Resistance to decentralisation delays or prevents sub-national actors from directly entering the world stage. It implicitly

or explicitly rests on the notion that the central government will lose control inside state borders — and this impinges on the related matter of territorial integrity, since peripheral units could come under the influence and control of a neighbouring state, or even secede.

This is seen in particular in small and new states with larger neighbours — as in the case of Istria in western Slovenia and Croatia, where there are tensions over local and regional autonomy.

Such concerns are reflected, for example, in the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia (1992, Article 140), which limited local self-government to purely local affairs related to everyday life in small local units. Instead of empowering local actors for involvement in national and global issues, a dividing line was drawn between the two levels of affairs — contrary to the general orientation in the EU towards strengthening partnership relations and multi-level co-participation in decision-making.[35] The paradoxical situation resulted in which the central government, in the name of preserving territorial integrity, actually weakened sub-national actors and boosted centrifugal forces.[36]

Parallel with the inertia of the classical pattern of hierarchical territorial relations between the centre and the local unit, more and more numerous network-based projects are being launched in Europe that encourage the equal participation of local actors in partnership and multi-level power-sharing. Two very disparate orders thus coexist within a single country.

Connectedness, Autonomy, and Independence

With increasing openness of local units we observe the shift from areal to network organisation of social life. This involves — something little understood — both *increasing autonomy*, i.e. a wider range of choice of partners at both collective and individual levels, and *declining independence* (what dependistas and others pretended to achieve through de-coupling and de-linking). The condition for increasing autonomy is giving up the pretension for territorial independence — the exclusion of others.

(Re)definition of old and new localism

ANALYTIC DIM.	OLD LOCALISM	NEW LOCALISM
CONNECTEDNESS	"AUTONOMY" AS INDEPENDENCE	AUTONOMY AS CHOICE (SELECTIVITY)
ATRIBUTES	DISTINCTIVENESS BY EXCLUSION	DISTINCTIVENESS BY INCLUSION

35 Under the title *Glocalisation or Ghettoisation of Local Democracy*, the author published a critical evaluation of the implicit justification and negative implications of such a provision (Mlinar, 2000).

36 Insistence on breaking up large municipalities like the Koper Municipality was seen by the locals as a case of *divide et impera*.

The above implies once again that increasing autonomy is possible only with the declining possibility of frontal exclusion. Universalisation is increasingly limiting the contents of discretionary decision-making — in terms of technical standards, human rights, and non-discrimination on the basis of provenance. Multi-level composition of actors — as in the EU's Phare programme — is a form of such power-sharing.

Empowerment and Disempowerment of Local Actors in the Context of Global Connectedness

Whether we proceed from general sociological theory (Simmel) or from prevalent practice in the developed world, in both cases we arrive at the conclusion that sub-national actors — including sub-local and individual actors — are being empowered as they expand the range of their transnational links. Because new technologies enable linkages over great distances, dependence on nearby territorial units and on the first higher level within the territorial hierarchy is diminishing (Mlinar & Trček, 1998). As Simmel observed, actors become dependent on a growing number of others, so their dependence on any single one of them declines. And as Hirschman noted: as an actor's "exit" options increase, the "voice" of the individual actor becomes more effective — because belonging is no longer automatic and certain.

In a summarising way: the expansion of accessibility brings empowerment because:

1. dependence declines owing to the expansion of the range of choice of links with others in solving problems;
2. the possibility of direct access to pertinent actors and sources increases, and hence the role of mediators and representatives diminishes;
3. the expansion of alternatives enhances the "voice" of the individual person or unit, no longer bound to just one location;
4. the burden of establishing a particular claim is lessened because solutions already proven elsewhere provide important support and shorten decision time;
5. there is greater scope for the formation and strengthening of opposition groups, sub-groups, and minorities, particularly through tangential links in relation to the national centre;
6. civil society groups are strengthened in relation to corporate power;
7. the scope increases for the formation and empowerment of such groups in relation to expert institutions, which despite their nominal impartiality are often closer to corporate interests;
8. expanding access to international financial means implies the overcoming of the powerlessness of both individuals and local authorities in facing projects of long-term, multigenerational importance;

9. instead of traditional self-sufficiency and predetermination of linkages primarily on the basis of proximity, wider openness represents a challenge for relational, comparative thinking — the basis for continual self-examination and redefining of one's identity in regard to disclosed similarities and differences with other localities and actors of the world.

At the same time, however, disempowerment of local and sub-local actors can also occur:

1. The spread of mutual dependencies across local and national confines means that more and more problems of everyday life cannot be resolved without linking up with other actors over a wide space;
2. Along with standardisation and universalisation, local as well as national actors are losing their discretionary power;
3. Local authorities are increasingly unable to treat residents differently according to territorial provenance — due to objective flows of people, and to the normative elimination of distinctions (non-discrimination) within the EU;
4. An increasingly important source of lost discretionary power is universal human rights — the rights of children, women, and ethnic minorities;
5. While they support subsidiarity, supra-national levels also represent a new concentration of power and a deficit of democracy;
6. Increasing spatial mobility leads to the fluidity of people flows beyond local and national limits, challenging the traditional governability of stationary populations and the assumptions of direct civic participation.[37]

Territorial Diversity and Local Distinctiveness

Is territorial diversity and local distinctiveness disappearing? Some authors argue yes, some no — and the puzzle is that empirical evidence can be found in support of both interpretations. The proposed resolution involves two distinctions.

The first is the distinction between *elements* and their *combinations*. While elements tend to be increasingly standardised and spread world-wide, their local combinations tend to be unique. Thus each locality shares an increasing number of similarities with others and at the same time — as a combination of elements — becomes more distinct from others.

The second distinction is between:

[37] The use of the internet, for example between Canberra, Australia, and Koper/Capodistria, Slovenia, indicates the potential for re-establishing intercontinental links between local actors that were severed at a lower level of technology. The regional newspaper *Primorske novice*, issued in Koper, can be simultaneously read in Australia — which is an example of a new understanding of direct democracy, no longer limited to the local but capable of direct involvement in solving "glocal" issues.

(a) local distinctiveness resulting from a period of isolation or separation from others; and
(b) local distinctiveness created on the basis of openness — a unique combination of human and/or material sources from across the world (the Sydney Opera House, the Bilbao Guggenheim).

We can thus observe in the same place both a declining and an augmenting element of local distinctiveness.

"DEATH OF (TERRITORIAL) DIVERSITY"
(Luard, 1979)

THE PROPOSED INTERPRETATION
(Z. M.):

The likelihood for a territorial unit to preserve its distinctiveness on the basis of **frontal separation** will tend to decrease.

But the probability of identities to be formed as a **unique combination** (crossroads) in the flow of people, goods and ideas will increase.

The future of territorial distinctiveness is. not in frontal separation, like in the past but rather intensified selective association.

"Homogenisation" of the world is generally valued negatively, without a clear understanding of what it is that creates the conditions for more diversity. The literature shows that there is little understanding of the possibility that local units may be unique and at the same time share many similarities.

Touraine (1988, p. 443) is concerned with how to combine cultural diversity with the unifying effects of instrumental rationality — identity with instrumentality, unity with diversity. He counterposes: (1) the ruthlessly universalist view that there exists a unique, or at least a central, model of development towards which different territorial units progress at different rates; and (2) the completely particularist view that is bound to be confined to the assertion of what is specific to each territorial culture — excessive emphasis on which can only lead to intercultural conflicts. According to this interpretation, the solution lies in limiting each of the two tendencies. However, this implies a more mechanical than dialectical understanding of the unity of opposites and of the question of how we can live together with our differences.

Local distinctiveness may involve: (1) various aspects of the natural living and non-living environment; (2) the built environment, which fits more or less harmoniously into the natural environment; and (3) the mode or style of life. Each of these can be studied either separately or in their interrelationships.

It is assumed here that the intensification of globalisation currents does not necessarily negate local distinctiveness: it may erase it, or highlight and develop it, depending on the circumstances. The future of territorial distinctiveness is not in frontal separation, as in the past, but rather in intensified selective association.

Creating and Erasing Territorial Differences

The hardest thing to explain is the fact that there are two simultaneous, conflicting trends. One tends towards preserving local and territorial differences based on the natural and cultural heritage, and builds on it — as in the "Marketing of Identity" in international tourism. The other erects a new principle of territorial non-discrimination: as a criterion of distinction between native and non-native, and the exclusion or discrimination of "others," territoriality is generally being rejected in national normative orders.[38]

Along with the valuing of territorial diversity and local distinctiveness, a new principle is emerging that most actors have not yet fully recognised. The spatial limits of territorial non-discrimination may be seen to be shifting to the borders of the EU at a minimum. As a consequence, the municipality — like the state — is losing the power to treat its residents differently on grounds of territorial provenance.[39]

In the sphere of international tourism, the simultaneous trends towards uniform standards and towards local distinctiveness especially need explanation. Usually the two are treated separately; when taken together, their opposition is not resolved. The value placed on personal security in everyday life stands out as the primary rationale for standardisation. Security is followed by other values — eliminating various incompatibilities that hamper the transition from a "space of places" to a "space of flows." This is generally acceptable with technical standards but becomes unacceptable when this rationalisation impinges on territorial cultural identity.[40]

A complementary relationship between universalising standards and local distinctiveness is illustrated by the case of Hosteling International, the brand name of the International Youth Hostel Federation. Its mandate includes "expanding the network to new areas, establishing the same practices and high standards everywhere," yet its specific standards — welcome, comfort, cleanliness, security, and privacy — are universally acceptable and quite complementary with various local features such as aesthetic order, cuisine, and leisure activities. Its environmental recommendations — locally grown food, appropriate building materials, recycled paper, minimal use of chemical cleaning agents — themselves reinforce local distinctiveness rather than undermining it.

[38] The Constitutional Court of Slovenia recently prohibited a port services tariff in Piran and Portorož because it set a 2.5 times lower subscription price for locals than for others.

[39] There were many cases in the past of differential treatment of "nationals and non-nationals" — in concert tickets, road tolls, and the like. The residents of some municipalities still demand privileges for locals, such as free access to beaches, evidently not yet having come to terms with the illegitimacy of territorial discrimination.

[40] Still unresolved is the question of whether, how much, and how the disappearance of local features — for example, dialects through the spread of a standard literary language — will be repeated at the global social scale.



Perverting the Perspective: Toward a Closed System

The call for reducing energy use and related transport of people and goods, as well as the promotion of local production of food for one's own needs — typically from an environmental standpoint — requires a radical shift in the interpretation of local–global relations. This is a call for a return to self-provision and, in a sense, to self-sufficiency and restriction of movement. Global awareness of the finiteness of this world, with present-day technology, is redirecting our attempts to understand local–global relations and the redistribution of power, as well as territorial diversity.

The questions of freedom and control, conflicts of interest and their resolution within local democracy, and conflicts and cooperation among territorial units on environmental matters, all have to be posed in the context of the limits to growth — which are the limits to freedom. This implies greater control in the social sphere, as well as barriers and constraints in physical space, and demands for the strengthening of collectivism, out of necessity rather than free choice — resembling the life of traditional communities. Unexpectedly, the familiar zero-sum game returns in a certain sense. Many questions remain open regarding the emancipatory prospects for groups and individuals, and the territorial diversification of the world.

This chapter is based on:
Mlinar, Z. (2001, June 21–23). *Empowerment and distinctiveness in the process of glocalization* [Paper presentation]. International Sociological Association, Thematic Group 06, Workshop on Sociology of Local-Global Relations, Ljubljana, Slovenia.

IV.

TERRITORIAL DIMENSION OF GLOBALISATION AND INDIVIDUALISATION

Cultural Identity, Deterritorialisation and Globalisation

From Coexistence to Confrontation

With the growth in technological capabilities for broadening access to the wealth of diversity,[41] there is also a rapprochement of different cultures and nations that previously only cohabited in space. Today, temporal and spatial distance have virtually ceased to mediate contacts with other cultures. Different cultures are coming into direct confrontation, as evident in the clash between Western liberalism and Islamic fundamentalism. Flows that escape all ties to place or time are coming to the fore and displacing fixed givens and insularity. Expressed in terms of ideal type, it may be said that all the world's cultures are becoming accessible and even converging in every place, in every location, at every point in space.[42]

Instead of the former pattern of small and tightly insulated territorial cultural systems cohabiting alongside each other, the increasingly marked mutual interlinking is bringing greater differentiation of the respective positions or roles of these cultures at the world metropolitan core, the semi-periphery, or the world periphery. Thus, what we have is not simply all-round mutual rapprochement on a world scale, for it is becoming increasingly clear that:

1. uni-directional communications strongly predominate;
2. the roles of different cultures are unequal, with some dominant and others subordinate;
3. the degree and dynamics of cultural interlinking no longer depend primarily on spatial proximity or distance (the adjacency principle), but are determined more by location and access to the world metropolitan core;

41 For example: direct intercontinental phone calls, various kinds of satellite communications and cable television, satellite transmission of entire daily newspapers printed simultaneously in different places, the expansion of the telefax, international computer networks and data banks, and the rising flow of data across state borders.

42 In the empirical sense, many concrete instances may be cited to illustrate these shifts, although there are at the same time great differences according to location in the "world system." Although we may in general speak about regional cultures drawing together and about the growing diversity of elements of material and spiritual culture accessible to people in their everyday milieu, this is not some frontal, equal rapprochement and enhancement of the heterogeneity of cultures.

4. there is a gradual rapprochement between the metropolitan core and the periphery, but through subordination to the core's predominant influence and the inclusion, absorption, and a kind of appropriation of elements of the periphery into the core itself.

In all this, one of the particulars may of course come to predominate or at least aspire to attain attributes of universality. Thus, the Anglo-Saxon metropolitan core is in direct confrontation with other cultures, being the most predominant — although it is relatively more open (radially). However, while radial communications are strengthening between the core and the periphery, reinforced by the expanding use of new information and communication technologies, there is — at least at the present level of development — a stagnation in interlinking and even a decline in the intensity of tangential interlinking between peripheral cultural systems.[43]

Radial and Tangential Interlinking: The Case of English

Direct links are thus strengthening between the world core — acting as representative of the global or universal — and the semi-peripheral and peripheral territorial cultural systems. What is currently being asserted as global or universal derives mostly from one of the particulars and, in the historical course of events, is increasingly prevailing over the others (see also Strassoldo, 1992). It is less a case of the concordant, collective formation of a new identity. This is illustrated by the fact that a kind of common language — a *lingua franca* — is rapidly being established. But it is not Esperanto; it is English.

One possible reaction to the predominance of a centre is the formation of tangential coalitions (Mlinar, 1986). This involves the intensified interlinking of peripheral units to combat the *divide et impera* tactic and the domination of the centre. On the international plane, moreover, after critical assessments of "cultural imperialism," the Third World (nonaligned) countries launched a joint action to establish a new international information order.

Despite some success with this kind of sporadic action, particularly through UNESCO, the fundamental question still remains whether radial or tangential information flows are established faster within a given temporal framework. Under the conditions of mass society the former have tended to predominate over the latter more and more. In other words, as links to the predominant

43 A series of questions arise for further, more detailed study of the phenomenal forms and causes of different dynamics of radial and tangential communications. A focus on the world core has completely predominated in the mass media (television, radio, newspapers); the share of American films shown on television is rising; the films of nations that are geographically, linguistically, and culturally closer are shown relatively rarely. The apparent choice from an increasing number of TV stations in Europe is actually devolving into a sweeping prevalence of American programmes.

culture of the world core grow closer, direct links between particular national and regional cultures are being increasingly marginalised on a world scale.

This is confirmed by various analyses showing characteristic changes in the teaching and use of foreign languages, particularly English. These changes became more pronounced with the onset of the age of satellite communications, particularly satellite television (DeStefano, 1989). Linguistic barriers in Europe are still strong; nevertheless, the smaller nations are unquestionably lowering their barriers, particularly with regard to English. The question is only how far and how fast Anglo-American influence will continue to grow (Findahl, 1989; Domenach, 1991; Fishman et al., 1977). Its influence is evident both in the various issue areas in communications and in the dynamic spread of the use of English in recent decades.

More or less parallel with the emergence of this "world language" — which rests on an infrastructure of radial communications on a world scale — connections between nations based on adjacency or the kinship principle are weakening as a result of the focus on the world core. The adjacency principle refers here to links arising from spatial proximity and crossing a mutual (ethnic or state) border. The kinship principle concerns links based on the degree of similarity of language and culture deriving from a common ancestry.

English is increasingly becoming the main or even sole foreign language taught in primary and secondary schools. English phrases are characteristically penetrating various technical fields as universal labels in all countries. Specialists in most European countries, for example in computer sciences, can no longer easily translate new technical terms from English and seem to be yielding to the English "flood." Technical journals in Germany, France, the Netherlands, Scandinavia, and elsewhere are more and more often publishing articles — and even their entire contents — in English.

Similarly, the influence of television broadcasts in English, available on all continents, indicates that the use of this language will continue to escalate. While the older generations still feel strong inhibitions about watching satellite television, the younger generations accept English with increasing self-confidence. Some young people even feel English is no longer a foreign language (Findahl, 1989). This tacit penetration — to use the term analogously to Susič (1983), who wrote of the "tacit assimilation" of the Slovene minority in Italy — can easily advance to the point where English completely overwhelms and supplants the native language and culture, or reach a stage where thought turns to the threats to a particular cultural identity and the threatened react. In such "counter-attacks," the sense of belonging to a specific territorial identity is reinforced and lays a foundation for the formation of ethno-regional movements (Williams & Kofman, 1989).

The focus on communicating with the metropolitan core — the external expression of which is the increasing spread of the "metropolitan language" — necessarily leads to a restructuring of basic information flows. As already

indicated, this relates mainly to the declining role of the adjacency and kinship principles. Information about events in the world core becomes more easily accessible through the radial communication infrastructure to all nations (regional cultures) than information about events in nearby, neighbouring nations. It may also be anticipated that linguistic kinship will have less and less influence on the probability and frequency of interactions, at least relatively — that is, in proportion to radial communications with the world core. An extreme example of this is the division of the "Serbo-Croatian" language.

In Finland, for example, the former tendency of young Finns to choose Swedish as a second language in school is waning; Swedish is being undermined by English, notwithstanding government efforts to preserve its position. Studies of foreign TV programme viewing in Sweden have shown that Swedes accept programmes in English more readily than in Danish; significantly, the older generations generally follow Norwegian programmes more easily while the younger show a reorientation towards English. Similarly, there are symptomatic changes in Belgium: in the 1980s, Flemish-speakers were shifting from German programmes to the BBC, expressing a general reorientation in knowledge of foreign languages; the younger generations know English better than German (De Bens, 1986).

The foregoing suggests that, from the linguistic standpoint at least, global communications are strengthening at the expense of tangential or lateral interlinking — even if not in the strict sense of a zero-sum game.

Reverse Invasion

A significant restructuring is therefore underway that is (relatively or absolutely) diminishing the strength of lateral or tangential communications between territorial cultural systems. This weakening may be transitional and dependent on the dynamics of the integration of peripheral and semi-peripheral systems into the global culture of the world system. At the same time, however, this is not solely a matter of the unilateral domination of the metropolitan core. The core itself is changing in this process. As the dominant culture on a world scale, it appears to be the most autonomous and the least susceptible to penetration by other cultures. However, just as in the economy, the developed world is realising in the cultural sphere that it has underestimated a kind of "reverse" invasion as the rim, the periphery, infiltrates the metropolitan core. The developed world — Western Europe and the USA — is undergoing a change in its own identity as it broadly absorbs the world's wealth of cultural diversity. In this sense, Kevin Robins evaluates the present situation in England and finds that "in a country that is now a container of African and Asian cultures, what is English can no longer be established with the former assurance and certainty" (Robins, 1989b).

From this standpoint there is an interesting dialectic: the broadening of the area of domination is accompanied by greater inclusiveness with respect to the cultural diversity of this growing area, which in turn leads to the transformation of the source itself. Thus a widened framework of integration of diversity would at the same time mean that the process of globalisation is grounded less and less on the assertion of the dominance of one of the particulars, and moves closer and closer to a representative pattern of the diversity of local, regional, and national cultures.

However, many issues remain unresolved and more empirical research is needed to reach a firmer conclusion. For the next few decades, at least some of the problems of the transitional period will be greatly exacerbated. The danger is especially increasing that the inclusion of specific regional and national cultures will proceed more slowly than the spread of the metropolitan core's domination, thus displacing the present cultural diversity on the periphery and even leading to its extinction.

Spatial Mobility and Cultural Standardisation

With the increasing spatial mobility of people, goods, capital, and information, and the more or less parallel process of dynamising mobility in social space, there is a tendency towards destructuring, flexibility, and even fluidity, with the melding of even the underpinnings of former collective and especially territorial identities.

The question arises of the extent to which there are distinctive features at different levels of socio-territorial organisation, and whether there is a general trend so that in the course of time these distinctive features follow a sequence of levels. Earlier there was a melding of particular local and regional cultural identities — the dying out of dialects and regional architecture; today the question of national identities is foremost. In regard to the former, two things are significant: on the one hand, this is taking place everywhere; on the other, the disappearance and erasure of the distinctive features of small units is proceeding unnoticed, or at least is not producing the same strong reactions as changes at the national level.

The increased mobility of people over a broader space has, in several respects, undermined the foundations of distinctive local and regional identities. It has involved a one-way flow of migration and a kind of paralysis of rural-farm communities. The prospect of increased spatial mobility has also induced a tendency towards cultural standardisation, which has been promoted most strongly by national education systems. Had schools taught and trained their pupils for work on the farm in the home village, they would have become a major factor in the preservation of local distinctiveness and identity. Since fewer and fewer pupils remained in the village, there was all the more reason for the introduction of a universal programme as a preparatory step

and springboard to work or further education in urban areas. The prospect of this leap then gave legitimacy to the trend towards standardisation, even as it amounted indirectly to the negation of local or regional cultural identity. In the former "socialist" countries, this legitimacy also rested on a view of progress as a move away from the peculiarities and restrictedness of (private) farming in general.

Nigel Grant (1984) similarly points to this problem in presenting the consequences of migration from the marginal and hill regions of Scotland, Wales, and Ireland to central industrial and urban areas. Schools assumed the task of preparing young people for emigration, which led to the disparagement of the local culture. The paradox was that the "success" of the school system actually contributed to the decline of the peripheral rural areas.

The history of France over the past two hundred years is often cited as a highly illustrative case of how a diversity of local and regional cultures melted into a uniform national space. The consolidation of the national culture has in many respects meant the restriction and elimination of territorial and social pluralism. Since the French Revolution, a policy of cultural and linguistic standardisation has prevailed. Weber (1976) describes the process of the modernisation of the French countryside and the turning of "peasants into Frenchmen" (the title of his work). Up to the first decade of the Third Republic (1870–1914), the French national space was made up of separate, often isolated communities, each with its own variety of French; at the same time there were also regional languages such as Breton, Corsican, Flemish, and others.

Retrospectively, then, we discover a transition from localism to provincialism and then to state nationalism. In the process, uniformity burgeoned throughout the national space, greatly supported by the diffusion of the press, compulsory schooling, military service, and so on. Local societies thus came into contact with the increasingly dominant national culture, whose source was the culture of the middle-class strata of the urban population. Compulsory schooling, furthermore, placed great emphasis on geography and history concentrated on the national level; local patois and dialects were banished from the schools, and there were even penalties for children caught using them (Williams & Kofman, 1989).

Homogenisation and a Plea for Dissociation

The threat to territorial (cultural) identity is not restricted to the level of individual districts, regions, national minorities, or small nations. It is also evident in one way or another at the level of the greatest and even the dominant nation states.

For example, the movement for "official English" — which sought the adoption of a restrictive national language policy — began in the USA in 1983. Within a few years it had grown from small groups of conservative activists into

a wide, financially well-backed and relatively effective movement that enjoyed support irrespective of party, class, or race. It thus represented an effort to legislate the predominance of English and enforce its exclusive use in public life (Tarver, 1989; Fishman, 1988). To this end a special organisation was formed called US English.

This movement took shape in response to the perceived threat to English and the appearance of other languages in public life in America. The aim was to stop the spread of foreign languages in official, public activities. Ultimately, as Tarver notes, there was a deeply embedded fear regarding the future of white America, which was seen as being displaced by other "foreign" languages and cultures (Tarver, 1989). In recent years, a number of American states have passed laws that in one way or another establish "official English." All this unquestionably shows that any kind of bilingual education or administrative use of several languages is being prevented by recourse to legal statutes. In this way — along with a restrictive immigration policy and growing antipathy towards foreigners — the "movement for Americanisation" attempted to affirm the acculturation of all immigrants in the name of national unity.

All this expresses a view that the greatest possible internal homogeneity has to be achieved in order to establish national unity. Tarver categorises this kind of thinking as the conservative view of American identity, taking the English language as its core. But there is an alternative concept of national identity, emphasising cultural pluralism instead of homogeneity and giving precedence to individual freedom over tradition. This is the liberal conception of American national identity. It recognises cultural heterogeneity as a national treasure built from the various traditions of the immigrants, while the USA has had the advantage of a common language linking the various nations and establishing harmony amongst people.

Numerous communication studies and other investigations have warned of a one-way flow of information between the world core and the periphery and the tendency towards "cultural imperialism." Advocates of dependency theory start precisely from the fact that the linking up of formerly autonomous territorial communities — which were viable — to the developed world has put them in a subordinate position and exacerbated the problem of their under-development. Keith Griffin writes that Europe did not "discover" the undeveloped countries; rather, it created them. These countries were quite often developed, enculturated, and rich in their own ways.

Following this line of reasoning, the world's great cultural diversity is an expression of the different ways in which people have historically adapted to their particular and sometimes quite unique environments. However, the exceptional diversity of the world's cultural systems is disappearing because of unprecedented cultural synchronisation. Hamelink (1983 and 1993) warns that the survival of autonomous cultural systems, particularly in Third World countries, has come into question because of ever-stronger inundation by the

culture of the industrially developed world. There are more and more instances of cultural survival merely at the level of folklore. Today's technology does allow mutual cultural exchanges, but the facts show that centrally controlled technology has become a tool for the destruction of this diversity and its substitution with a single global culture.[44]

This goes to the heart of the problem but as a partial description no longer fits the latest trend and development strategy of the big transnational corporations. These are still seeking to expand on the world market, but with increasing sensitivity and adaptation to different national and regional markets. Hamelink does not entirely overlook this: "What complicates the matter even further is that the transnational corporations do not necessarily erase national cultural characteristics; on the contrary, in some cases these corporations exploit the local culture to promote the sale of their products."

Although Hamelink cites this as an example of the metropole's (capital's) adjusting its efforts to continue to prevail over the periphery, it is also possible to see in this the elements of a potential transformation of the classic imperialistic pattern of relations.

If the threat to autonomy and the lags in development have come about through closer interlinking on a world scale and with the metropole in particular — as proponents of the theory of the dependency of the world system and cultural synchronisation argue — then a logical conclusion about what needs to be done to avoid this follows. Like solutions proposed in the economic domain, Hamelink presents a plea for dissociation with respect to cultural autonomy.[45]

If dissociation means "disengagement" and withdrawal from international relations that restrict autonomous development, this would ultimately amount to a break from all international relations. It has to be borne in mind that every link in a sense also constitutes a limitation of autonomy. Authors using the concept of dissociation stress that it must not be equated with complete autarky. Nevertheless, it is still assumed that linking with and thus dependency on the metropole can be reduced together with a reorientation towards self-reliance on local resources. The concept of dissociation thus stands as the opposite of integration. But greater self-reliance and a more autonomous role in discovering and activating domestic development potentials do not necessarily imply that they can be more easily attained by fewer links to the outside world. Whether

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44 "Advertisements for the products of big consumer goods manufacturers in the USA are helping to determine basic needs in the Third World countries. The products are not adapted to local needs, but local needs, under the sway of the advertisements, are adapting to the products."

45 Like economic dissociation, cultural dissociation posits autonomous development through self-reliance. It would ensure the necessary conditions for each country to identify by itself its developmental potentials, which would not be subordinated in the first place to the needs of the metropole. Practical application of the concept of dissociation would vary according to the type of relations between the metropole and the periphery.

it is a matter of preparing or implementing a programme for greater autonomy, in both cases needs for links with the outside may actually increase. Especially in the long-term view, greater autonomy may best be achieved through greater interlinking. This may widen the "room for manoeuvre" and enable more selective interlinking on the basis of one's own criteria, instead of completely open reception of random impulses or those based on the interests of other partners in the broad environment.[46]

National Openness and the Threat of Uniformity

"Cultural imperialism" theory assumes that one-way information flows from the West or North to the non-West or South are endangering the cultural identities of non-Western or Southern nations. But as Ito (1988) argues, the case of Japan cannot be explained by this theory. From his description of this "case," we may identify three general factors determining the degree to which greater openness represents a threat to a given cultural identity.

Cultural similarity or difference between territorial units

On the basis of Japanese experience, Ito (1988) concludes that "between culturally different countries, excessive influence of foreign cultures will not be a serious problem. However, between culturally similar countries such as between the US and Canada, the US and Europe, Japan and Korea, and Japan and Taiwan, this can be a serious problem." Thus, according to him, East Asia will be able to develop economically and technologically while maintaining a strong sense of cultural identity. However, this "factor" cannot by itself explain why even the most different indigenous cultural (territorial) identities dissolved under the impact of the West.

One-way or two-way influence

"If Nation A always influences Nation B and Nation B never influences Nation A … people in Nation B will begin to feel that their culture is inferior; their cultural identity may be endangered … In the extreme case, Nation B loses cultural integrity, imagination, creativity and energy and is eventually led to a complete cultural and social collapse. On the other hand, if Nation A and Nation B influence each other and learn from each other, the cultures of both nations will be enhanced" (Ito, 1988). Thus, Ito reduces the problem only to cases of unequal, uni-directional flows and influences. Some authors argue that even one-way flows (like watching "wall to wall" Dallas) do not necessarily imply suppression of diversity; one has to consider that the same programme is differently received in different contexts and by different individuals. In addition, however, not even balanced, two-way influences guarantee the survival of distinct territorial identities. With an increasing proportion of global flows and the expansion of "decontextualised culture," the model of exchange between particular units becomes less applicable. Globalisation involves a shift in emphasis from bilateral interactions to transactions — but the problem of threatened identities may even intensify.

Duration of exposure (involvement)

A third factor concerns the duration of exposure to foreign influence or involvement in trans-border linkages. There is a common fear that imported television programmes will in the course of time drastically change the traditional way of life and endanger the cultural identity of the nation. In terms of the Japanese experience, however, Ito argues that such a drastic change in cultural identity does not occur within 10 or 20 years; but it may do so over a period of 100 years or more. For Japan, this was in any case only a transitional experience, because it soon developed its own television production: "domestic programmes began to achieve higher ratings than foreign shows and foreign programmes gradually disappeared from Japanese networks without any government intervention" (Ito, 1988). But many small or less developed countries cannot realistically count on such a prospect.

In addition to the above, differential responses to the threat of uniformity may be interpreted, at least hypothetically, in terms of the following explanatory factors.

Physical distance, geographical location. The perception of a threat depends on the proximity or distance of the dominant and the threatened country. The greater the distance, the less the perception of threat, other things being equal. Territorial discontinuity also matters: if the two countries are not adjacent but have a buffer zone between them, actual domination (via mass media and cross-border data flow) will be perceived as less threatening. Transnational flows within "electronic space," even if predominantly uni-directional, are not considered as threatening as the more tangible "geographical" mobility of people and goods.

Competitive position. The more competitive the two countries, the more each will tend to be self-assertive and exclusivistic. Smaller nations tend to be readier to accept Anglo-American cultural dominance because they cannot compete. While English, French, and to a lesser extent Spanish are still competing for the role of *lingua franca*, Danish, Portuguese, Czech, and Slovene are not. This may be important in explaining differences in acceptance of English in cross-cultural communication.

[46] A broad review is needed of different concrete forms of response, by particular countries or other protagonists, which fall under the category of cultural dissociation. An analysis of their effects under specific circumstances would be an important supplement to these general considerations. In Canada, regulations have been passed to reduce the impact of US mass media and the flood of one-way cross-border information flows — an attempt at defence against "cultural pollution" believed to be threatening Canadian identity.

Intensity of actual exposure. Response to "global" (American) influence will depend on the intensity of the actual exposure of the threatened nation. In some situations, as in Eastern Europe, earlier restrictions on "alien influences" gave way to a policy of widely opening borders and welcoming the intensified inflow of information. Previous inaccessibility created an idealised image of the outside (Western, American) world which, at least temporarily, led to a swing to the opposite extreme (for Hungary, see Szekfü, 1989).

Institutional structure, independent state. The presence or absence of an institutional framework for territorial identity seems to be another explanatory factor, as seen in the differences between nations organised in nation states and stateless nations. Ethno-regional movements in Europe striving for political independence are to a large extent motivated by the expectation that statehood will provide an important mechanism for asserting their identity — in spite of current debate about how the nation state is obsolete and withering away in the context of the emerging global civilisation.

Concluding Remarks

The growing use of new information, communication, and transportation technologies is radically altering the meaning of space and spatial distance. As a rule, the decline in the role of space as a barrier to connectedness is what attracts attention. Less often is it observed that space's protective function is also weakening, and that this unleashes the mobility of people, goods, and ideas and threatens the survival of specific territorial (cultural) identities.

In social development, then, it is not simply that the territorial framework of social life is widening. Rather, a contradictory process is involved, which includes a tendency towards internationalisation and globalisation together with the strengthening of the autonomy and distinctiveness of small social groups and individuals. However, both of these undermine the particular territorial cultural identities we have known to date, which in turn triggers important self-defensive mechanisms. Such reactions act within the system as pressures towards homogenisation, and in relation to the outside world as a tendency towards dissociation. The latter is expressed in heightened intolerance towards the different or, in extreme forms, in equating the different and the hostile. Dissociation points to a search for a solution in the sense of affirming "identity as an island" rather than "identity as a crossroads." But decades of experience with the former socialist states, which avoided "foreign influence," show that in fact they went into stagnation and today are themselves endeavouring to attract as much foreign know-how, culture, and capital as possible.

The simultaneity of the processes of homogenisation and diversification — which perplexes many writers — may be clarified by the conclusion that what we are dealing with are different levels of territorial organisation: at the level of the hitherto existing territorial communities, it may be said that they

are becoming increasingly similar. Within them, however, there is emerging and increasing diversity, which will be all the more important for shaping the unique identities of individuals and (sub)groups.

Although it might seem that homogenisation would, in global terms, eradicate the differences between territorial units (Boulding, 1985), a more thorough analysis yields a different conclusion. Diversification in space is likely even to increase, although on a different basis. While in the past, territorial characteristics (identities) were shaped because of limited accessibility, in the future they will be more and more determined by increased (non-limited) accessibility, which will allow for the unique combination of people, goods, and ideas in specific locations in space.

It may therefore be expected that the future socio-spatial restructuring process will lead to deterritorialisation — reduction of the differences between "inherited" territorial identities — and also to the re-territorialisation (creation) of new identities in specific locations in space.

This chapter is based on:
Mlinar, Z. (1994). Deterritorialization and re-territorialization of cultural identities. *Družboslovne razprave*, *10*(15/16), 140–153.

Deterritorialisation and Re-Territorialisation of Cultural Identities

Increasing accessibility in space is manifested in a shift from cohabitation to confrontation and interpenetration of (territorial) cultural identities. The simultaneous processes of homogenisation and diversification are best understood as occurring at different levels of territorial organisation. While traditional cultural identities (communities) are becoming increasingly similar, the diversity of their subgroups (subcultures) and of individuals is tending to increase. In the past, cultural identities were largely shaped by limited accessibility and discontinuities in communication. Current trends suggest that the intensification of selective communication will instead foster increasing cultural diversification, based on unique combinations of people, goods, and ideas in particular locations. This implies both the deterritorialisation and the re-territorialisation of cultural identities.

This chapter addresses the transformation of the territorial organisation of society in the context of an emerging global civilisation. Its central concern is how widening accessibility affects existing territorial cultural identities: does it strengthen opportunities for their self-assertion, lead to their reconstruction, or ultimately contribute to their disintegration?

Nation-state policies often rest on simplified assumptions—for example, that existing cultural identities in Europe will remain unchanged despite advancing integration. The analysis challenges two widespread assumptions: first, that participation in integration can proceed without increasing internal differentiation and diversity; and second, that the openness of territorial units can be determined largely through discretionary political decisions. Both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence suggest a different conclusion: integration and differentiation are mutually reinforcing rather than contradictory processes.

Likewise, theories of cultural imperialism often overemphasise external domination and cultural homogenisation while giving insufficient attention to local responses to global influences. The preceding chapter has shown that the actual processes are considerably more complex, involving simultaneous tendencies towards both convergence and diversification.

Because these analytical arguments have already been presented in detail in the previous chapter, *Cultural Identity, Deterritorialisation and Globalisation*, they are not repeated here. Instead, the present chapter builds on that discussion by highlighting the broader conceptual significance of deterritorialisation and re-territorialisation within a comparative research framework.

It may therefore be expected that future socio-spatial restructuring will simultaneously reduce differences between inherited territorial identities (deterritorialisation) and generate new forms of territorial identity through the emergence of distinctive local combinations of people, activities, and ideas (re-territorialisation). This proposition constitutes the principal contribution of the present chapter, extending the preceding analysis towards a broader theoretical understanding of cultural transformation in an increasingly interconnected world.

This chapter is based on:
Mlinar, Z. (1994). Deterritorialization and re-territorialization of cultural identities. Družboslovne razprave, 10(15/16), 140–153.

Expanding Territories, Flattening Hierarchies: Four Models of Territorial Dehierarchisation in Europe

Introduction

Here we attempt to take a step beyond the current predominance of atheoretical, descriptive, fragmentary, and idiosyncratic treatments of socio-spatial restructuring at the end of the twentieth century. The aim is not to join the mainstream of the current literature and offer yet another description of the formal institutional changes concerning the European Union (or EFTA or NAFTA). These changes are considered only insofar as they are theoretically relevant to the broader context of long-term development processes.

The unity of opposites of two such processes is taken as the basic theoretical framework for interpreting changes in the present hierarchical territorial organisation, both within national societies and in the global context. One process is manifested as the autonomisation of sub-systems and individuals — as increasing diversity of territorial and non-territorial actors. The other concerns the integration of these actors within expanding territorial frameworks, with a tendency towards the globalisation of their networks (Mlinar, 1992b).

Both processes are eroding the traditional "cumulative communities" (Sorokin et al., 1930), including national societies as relatively closed systems, as well as their hierarchical order. They are giving way to far more flexible "overlapping, intersecting and crosscutting networks of social interaction that do not (necessarily) form a totality and whose socio-spatial dimensions are not (necessarily) territorially fixed through nation-state boundaries" (Axtmann, 1993).

This approach provides a basis for an integrated understanding of the changing role of all levels of territorial organisation. Territorial extension of integration seems to imply extension of the range of hierarchical levels — for example, by adding a supra-national, European level. However, the two processes, particularly due to post-industrial technologies, simultaneously lead towards more direct (less mediated) local–global linkages and thus to micro–macro convergence — which implies a flattening of the hierarchy of territorial organisation.

Instead of dealing with crude dichotomies like centre and periphery, domination and subordination, or general designations like hegemony on the one hand and "acentric society" on the other, the focus here is on the continuous vertical axis of hierarchical levels of territorial social organisation.

This is a precondition for discerning regularities in the process of territorial dehierarchisation.[47]

In a broader context, the preoccupation of this paper relates to what Helmut Willke (1989, p. 46) described as "the gradual and now already irreversible change of the social structure *from hierarchical to network configurations* of self-referential social sub-systems" (emphasis added; see also Luhmann, 1984). He argues that the morphogenesis of modern societies into non-hierarchical networks of partially autonomous and at the same time interdependent actors requires a shift from a command structure to mechanisms of social discourse. Thus the achieved level of development requires a shift from the primacy of authoritative politics to that of mutual reconciliation by autonomous actors through rational discourse.[48] Willke indicates, in short, that hierarchy as the principle of order in developed Western societies is becoming exhausted — that what is coming is the end of hierarchy.

Drawing on Willke, Hueglin (1986, p. 455) — discussing regionalism in Western Europe — suggested that complex systems could be regulated successfully by replacing hierarchical organisation with non-hierarchical, interdependent, and "reticular" forms of interaction among horizontally associated sub-systems. The role of the state would thus be reduced to one sub-system among several. This is the idea of Luhmann's "acentric society": there is no longer any central point from which society as a whole can be governed, directed, or described.

With increasing openness of territorial communities, the basic principle of any hierarchical order — that each level of hierarchy directs the activities of those below it — becomes questionable. Empowerment of sub-systems and individuals in the context of time–space compression increases the accessibility (range) of alternatives and thus leads to a declining dependence and vulnerability within the previous hierarchical structure.

However, since the opening of territorial systems does not take place at the same time for all social strata, a differential rate of extended cross-border mobility and connectedness may become a new basis for domination and

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[47] Some general notions about changes in traditional hierarchical structure apply to all levels of territorial organisation (e.g. from command to cooperation between levels). But there are also questions concerning the differences in interactions between particular levels. The new technologies have far-reaching implications because they allow users to skip the next superordinate level and link up directly with higher levels.

[48] According to Willke, in modern Western democracies changes cannot simply be ordered; rather they must assume the form of incentive and motivation for self-change. This became clearer with the concept of self-organising systems and particularly the self-reference and operative closure of social systems. The implication is that, in the international system of developed societies, earlier hegemony or primacy of one hierarchical peak is giving way to an order based on self-limitation.

subordination.[49] But this involves a potential tendency towards the incremental diminishing of differences cross-nationally, in the world context.

The old, well-established territorial hierarchies are less and less strictly observed by the previously subordinated territorial and non-territorial actors who are empowered technologically (by new communication and information means), economically (by higher income), and politically (individual or ethnic rights). This empowerment is the basis for extended accessibility — not only horizontally in terms of geographical distance but also vertically, through the hierarchical levels of territorial organisation.[50] Thus we can argue against the traditional view of hierarchical territorial organisation as a zero-sum game. Instead, we see the prospects of "a pooling of sovereignties" as an outgrowth of the increasing openness and interpenetration of nation states.

A historical retrospective shows how empires founded on more or less forced integration — and thus domination over an ethnically heterogeneous population — ultimately broke up: the Austro-Habsburg, Russo-Romanov, and Turkish-Ottoman empires after the First World War; the British, French, Dutch, Belgian, and Portuguese empires in the succeeding period; and finally the Soviet, Yugoslav, and Czechoslovak federations. The subordinated position of individual ethno-nations, and the limited means for asserting their particular interests and identities, spurred them to independence even when this meant secession from the dominant state.

Just as hierarchical subordination had in the past represented the most characteristic way of assuring unity within the borders of state territory, so today it spurs the tendency towards secession or dissociation.

Experience from former Yugoslavia shows, however, that even decentralisation or increased autonomy of sub-national units (republics, in that case) does not of itself assure greater cohesiveness or integration of the state as a whole. The question here is: when does a heightened degree of sub-system autonomy lead to "pacification" and greater acceptability of membership in a state entity;

[49] The following quotation from research in Detroit illustrates the point: "Capital experiences renewed rigour of competition from firms originally based in other nation states — capital searches for new levers of exploitation which involve the threat and reality of capital mobility from highly organised workers to those less well organised; and capital finds that it no longer needs to tolerate the political and social wage demands of workers, for it is liberated from any unique dependence on a given locality or a given community of labourers" (Ross & Trachte, 1985, p. 213).

[50] In terms of the political changes accompanying the process of European integration, K.O. Nass (1989, pp. 180–181) noted: "After all, the federal government continues to work with the EC Council of Ministers on matters for which it used to be solely responsible, and to do so with the added range of action beyond German national borders extending into all EC member states. The loss of sole responsibility for decision-making is therefore accompanied by a geographical and political expansion of the federal government's influence."

and when does heightened autonomy represent merely a springboard that actually strengthens centrifugal tendencies?[51]

It may be observed on a broader, global scale that integration proceeds on two different bases: the first is the logic of particularistic domination, which is realised insofar as the identities and autonomy of smaller territorial units are subordinated (in the sense of a zero-sum game); and the other involves integration (globalisation) on the basis of the inclusion of narrower parts and their co-operation and consensus.

In a sense, then, it is a matter of the transformation of territorial social organisation from unity achieved on the basis of domination (hierarchy) towards unity based on concurrence and co-operation. This is also evidenced in the transition — generally not well understood — from the hierarchical organisation of relatively closed territorial systems of nation states towards a deterritorialised transnational network. Goldmann and Sjöstedt (1979, p. 153) warned that state-centric models, the hierarchic model, and the centre-periphery model of the international system are increasingly inappropriate and have to be replaced by the analogue of a cobweb of interwoven sets of transnational systems.

I focus here on four models of the process of dehierarchisation, based on a generalisation of both contemporary and historical experience, particularly from South-East Europe.

1. Cross-level power-sharing
2. By-passing the intermediaries
3. Tangential coalition
4. Exit from the periphery: dissociation

Dehierarchisation as Power-Sharing

Instead of alternatives such as centralisation and decentralisation — which would represent an alternative distribution of political power at different levels in the zero-sum sense — the present-day situation may better be understood with the help of new concepts such as "power-sharing" or "pooling sovereignty." This means that greater power at one level does not automatically imply less power at another. Greater interconnectedness and the dynamics of interaction and decision-making, on the basis of new communication and information

[51] Decentralisation of decision-making in the former Yugoslav federation (1974) did not bring a decrease in the centrifugal tendencies of some republics, especially Slovenia and Croatia. A special survey conducted in all the republics (1972) showed that autonomy tendencies were strongest in the relatively most developed parts of the country (Slovenia, Croatia, the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina), while the least economically developed parts (Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Autonomous Province of Kosovo) most strongly supported a more powerful role of the central (federal) state organs.

technology, provides an objective basis for this "sharing." It is only one of the forms of the general rapprochement of levels — micro–macro convergence.

In the past, hierarchy was one of the main ways of achieving unity (order) both nationally and internationally. The recent collapse of the communist system shows most dramatically that it has become one of the main causes of disintegration (of heterogeneous "nation states").

Research into the trends towards centralisation and decentralisation does not give a clear and simple answer as to which is predominating — simultaneous trends towards both can be identified.[52] Rousseau and Zarisky (1987) concluded that no simple generalisation can be made regarding the changing relationship between the centre and local or regional units.

There are powerful forces pulling in the direction of both centralisation and decentralisation, and they somehow coexist. There is no unilinear evolutionary model. Due to various political and structural forces — which tend towards the perpetuation of central state authority as well as, simultaneously, the assertion of local and regional identity and power-sharing — the authors reached the conclusion that it is a matter of some dialectical relationship between central action and regional reaction. Central action elicits response at the level of the regional elite and authority, which in turn incites further central responses, and so the dialectics of this process continue.

This description looks like a rather mechanical zero-sum game, unless a third consideration is accounted for which seems — from the standpoint of long-term sociological interpretation — crucial: namely, that the very distinction between levels becomes harder and harder to maintain.

As regards a rapprochement between the levels of decision-making, the writers observe — on the basis of research in Italy and France — that regional decision-making is increasingly taking place within the broader framework of the policies of the central government (similar trends may be ascertained in Spain).[53] The centre's constant influence on regional programmes indicates that regional devolution may best be understood as an attempt to afford local and especially regional governments an opportunity to take part in exercising political authority, rather than as an attempt to relinquish precisely determined domains to regional governments as their exclusive spheres. Local and regional authorities are thus given an opportunity for greater inputs into central decisions.

[52] Goldsmith (1993) observes above all, with the exception of Great Britain, a "trend towards decentralisation of activity away from the central level of the state towards lower levels." Studies of changes in the structure of decision-making in organisations must also distinguish between significant and routine decisions: the former are centralising while the latter are decentralising (Forsström & Lorentzon, 1991).

[53] Relevant here too is the amendment to Article 10 of the Austrian Constitution, which now requires consultations with the *Länder* before the federal government can sign international treaties that may affect regional jurisdictions.

Indicated here, then, instead of alternative roles at particular levels, is a growing rapprochement of those levels and a process of cooperation and competition between actors at the central, regional, and local levels — and their power-sharing. This suggests an exceptionally important long-term trend towards convergence in decision-making at different levels of territorial organisation, which at the same time considerably diminishes the significance of normative and structural distinctions between unitary, federal, and regional evolutionary systems.

In his study of the Europeanisation of local government, Mike Goldsmith (1993) shows the strengthening above all of direct connections with Brussels, but at the same time warns of the danger of over-emphasising Brussels as a centre of decision-making and thus neglecting the continuing significance of relations between governments within the nation state. Particular regions may gain certain benefits by direct negotiations with Brussels; but they are just as likely to get them if they approach the Community in concert either with local governments from other countries or with their own national government or responsible ministry (Goldsmith, 1993, p. 698).

Thus, the nascent European union "will neither be an old-style national state at a higher level, nor will the old nation states recover their sovereignty. Instead, multi-level hierarchies of competence in decision-making will develop in the framework of which decisions are agreed by the co-operation of sub-national, national and supra-national or transnational actors in various configurations" (Elsenhans, 1992, p. 126). To this I would add one clause: it is not only the state that is undergoing transformation — the "multi-level hierarchies" themselves are also losing the character of a hierarchy.

Dehierarchisation as By-passing Intermediary Levels

Political and technological dimension

In the preceding section I showed how there is a rapprochement between several levels of socio-territorial organisation in which joint participation in decision-making processes is supplanting hierarchical supra- and subordination. This is simultaneously blurring the differences between small and large territorial units. In this sense, the size of a unit is losing its significance. Considering the increasing interconnectedness and time–space compression, it is no longer possible to clearly distinguish which problems specifically concern only a given decision-making level.

The experience of the past few decades indicates another form of dehierarchisation and rapprochement between levels: the tendency to establish shortcuts between particular decision-making levels by bypassing or circumventing intermediate "stops." This is a tendency towards the most direct possible assertion of authentic needs or interests of groups and individuals, by eliminating intervening "noise" and speeding up the decision process. Two main dimensions are relevant: the political and the technological.

Political dimension. In the former "socialist" Yugoslavia, in times of advancement of democratisation, there were increasingly frequent deviations from the hierarchical order of territorial organisation. Individuals no longer approached their local institutions to influence decisions at a higher level through them, but went directly to the central organs or to individuals who actually had the greatest influence on a particular decision. Although various criticisms, petitions, complaints, and "open letters" began to appear frequently in the public at the national level (Puhar, 1985), this practice was officially condemned as unacceptable.[54]

The tendency of sub-national units to link up directly to the supra-national decision-making level is particularly significant from the standpoint of our topic. As Chadwick Alger pointed out, the national-state level is an intervening level of political decision-making that is at the same time the most entrenched barrier to flows of information between levels. For Alger, it is a matter of the arbitrary separation of the local and the international, which "tragically prevented people from knowing anything about a great deal of things that constituted part of their local everyday living and led them to renounce control over many aspects of their day-to-day life, relinquishing them to remote elites" (Alger, 1977, p. 309).

The most challenging recent experience pertinent to this mode of dehierarchisation involves changes in the patterns of communication following the break-up of former Yugoslavia. The motto of the Slovene national movement was "Slovenia straight to Brussels, not via Belgrade!" Analogous tendencies for more direct linkages have been manifested in Wales, Scotland, Slovakia, and elsewhere, even where the nation-state framework stays unchanged.

Technological dimension. This concerns primarily the role of information and telecommunication technology, which affects modes of communication and interaction between levels of territorial organisation. The most characteristic example is satellite communication, which is expanding in the name of the "doctrine of free information flows" (particularly in the view of advocates in the USA). This trend — for example, the introduction of satellite television — was opposed particularly by East European and developing countries, and smaller countries in general, which thus began to lose control over "global intrusions." On the one hand this was resistance to a new form of "cultural imperialism"; on the other there was also fear of the direct broadcasting of satellite programmes and loss of the information monopoly inside national borders. It was

[54] Besides these bypasses, the empowerment of the individual seems equally important when the individual gains the possibility of asserting rights above the level of the nation state. Citizens of Slovenia, for example, gained the right of appeal to the European Court. Burley & Mattli (1993) analysed the role of the European Court of Justice from the point of view of European (legal) integration and showed how the Court "created a pro-community constituency of private individuals by giving them a direct stake in the promulgation and implementation of community goals."

understandable, then, that satellite television was at least initially welcomed in the East European states.[55]

We could similarly present a series of other innovations in telecommunications that erode the previously entrenched state territorial organisation. "Remote sensing," which enables the earth's surface to be examined by satellite, gives those using the new technology direct access to information.[56] The expansion of electronic mail and online communications, and other forms of trans-border computer-mediated data flows in general, escape the control of the nation state as well as other intermediaries.[57] In this sense this is a form of deterritorialisation that takes place through the strengthening of direct linkages between actors in transnational networks.

Harold Innis's studies of improving long-distance communications in the United States during the third quarter of the twentieth century showed "a progressive shift from local and regional units to national and international ones … Individuals were linked into larger units of social organisation without the necessity of appealing to them through local and proximate structures. Communication within these local units became less critical for the operation of society and less relevant to the solution of personal problems" (Carey, 1989, p. 156). This comes close to the meaning of Giddens's concept of "disembedding."

Territorially organised control cannot keep up with the increasing dynamics and flexibility of transnational information flows. Hamelink (1993) observes: "The concentration of data-processing facilities in only a few countries, the export of data relevant to resources allocation, and foreign control over data storage were seen as contributory to a serious diminishing of sovereignty in essential processes of national decision-making. … If a foreign entity possesses the data and the resulting information/knowledge, decision-making capacity is extra-territorially located and national sovereignty subverted."

New technology expands access to information for certain actors. Usually in the initial stage this implies the domination of some actors over others who do not yet have the technology; later this changes and the increased spread of technological innovations contributes to democratisation. Technology thus constitutes empowerment on the one hand, enabling the individual subject to "escape" or cross beyond the borders of a territorially closed system. On the other, this same (or another) technology enables intrusions — "interference in

[55] It was significant in Slovenia that no political or professional institutions took any interest in or supported the introduction of satellite programme reception. The initiative came directly from members of the public — a typical "grass roots initiative."

[56] It must also be noted that certain general standards are being established through the UN, including programmes like the FAO in Rome which serves a broad circle of users.

[57] "Some communication systems (e.g. audio and videotaping, copying, radio broadcasting) have become cheap and so simple that the rationale for regulating and controlling them centrally, as well as the ability to do so, is no longer relevant" (Servaes, 1993, p. 156).

internal affairs" — which is a threat to national sovereignty and the autonomy of smaller territorial units,[58] even if it may be in the interest of private individuals.

By-Passing the Middle Level



Source: Forsström and Lorentzon, 1991

Illustration of how the use of IT is assisting the decentralization and delegation of decisions from the highest to the lowest level of organizations and the shape of new nets of contact. At the same time important decisions move upward in the hierarchy while the middle level is weakened.

Localities, Regions, and the EC

As Duchacek (1984, p. 19) pointed out, "the contemporary nation state speaks to the external world with more than one voice. The various noncentral voices and the central voice of the nation-state may be sharply dissonant and, therefore, confusing or even unintelligible to foreign ears." Instead of the image of a nation state speaking abroad with "a single legitimate voice," he argues for "a concept of a multivocal (polyphonic) state actor."[59]

The basis for this is the realisation that territorial components of federal and decentralised unitary systems have been increasingly asserting their international competence. These concerns involve various issues such as foreign investments, trade promotion, environmental problems, cultural exchanges, human and labour rights, and tourism. To describe "the concept and practice of

[58] There has been a great deal of discussion of this in the UN and elsewhere, dealing with the legal, political, and technical aspects of (non-)interference.

[59] This study of "the international dimension of sub-national self-government" touches — also sociologically — the core dynamics of the long-term transformation of territorial social organisation; his interpretation of the empirical evidence stays within a much more limited horizon. Thus he states: "Neither a blessing nor a curse, sub-national presence on the international scene has become a fact of life in an interdependent world" (Duchacek, 1984, p. 5).

such international ramifications of autonomous territorial politics," Duchacek introduced the term "global micro-diplomacy." It involves such actors as the *Länder* in Germany and Austria, cantons in Switzerland, autonomous republics in the former Yugoslavia, and self-governing units within unitary systems such as regions or major cities.[60]

Mike Goldsmith (1993, p. 683) concluded that "changes at the supra-national level, and especially at the EC level, are bringing and will continue to bring about an increasing focus by sub-national governments on Brussels. Additionally, these changes are leading local governments to form partnerships with their counterparts in other EC countries, creating an increasing number of general and specific networks able to lobby Brussels directly, leading their members to by-pass national governments." Goldsmith's observation has far-reaching theoretical implications for the interpretation of territorial dehierarchisation: what is involved here is not only bypassing the national level government but also the creation of new lateral, transnational linkages (networks) to increase clout at higher levels.

Regional and local units thus practise three modes of autonomisation: (a) they avoid linkages with their immediate superordinate authority; (b) they selectively intensify their transnational partnerships; and (c) they influence the decision-making process directly at the supra-national level jointly with their partners. The last mode is a form of tangential coalition (Mlinar, 1986), a mechanism used by lower-level units to transcend their subordinate position — as an antidote to the principle of *divide et impera*. By pooling their human resources they strengthen their cause and increase the possibility of direct access to the highest (European) level of decision-making.[61]

In spite of the many gaps and inconsistencies in the regulation of the transnational activities of regions and other sub-national units, the general trend towards their more autonomous role seems firmly substantiated. This trend is only segmentally encompassed in the slogan "Europe of Regions." The regions are only a step or a link in the process of autonomisation of (territorial) groups and individuals.[62]

[60] Another, not well-defined, term "low politics" has been used to designate various economic, social, and cultural exchanges among such actors, in order to differentiate this sphere from "high politics," which involves traditional foreign policy.

[61] According to the EUROLOG survey, "the majority of British local governments still regard central government as one of the barriers in their dealings with Europe, though the same is not true of other countries. Brussels was generally interested in securing better information (not biased by the special interests of the national governments) and secondly in securing cooperation in the implementation of its policies" (Goldsmith 1993, p. 698).

[62] The aid provided by the more-developed to the less-developed republics of the former Yugoslavia (Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo) was determined by the federal authorities and mediated by a central fund and the political leadership and state bureaucracies of the beneficiary federal units. It was extremely wasteful, inefficient,

Tangential Coalition

The third mode of territorial dehierarchisation is conceptualised here as tangential coalition. It is based on the distinction between radial and tangential (lateral) communications. The former radiate from the core towards the peripheries and are thus typical of the hierarchical organisation within and between nation states. The domination of the centre is facilitated by the separation of the peripheral units, which results either from objective conditions (topography, transportation routes, stage of technology diffusion)[63] or is purposely arranged by the centre pursuing the principle of *divide et impera*. When peripheral units purposely intensify their lateral interlinkages in order to overcome their subordinate position in relation to the centre, they form tangential coalitions.

I. Radial Communication **II. Tangential Communication**



This may be done either within the boundaries of the territory dominated by the monopolistic centre, or across them. In the latter case, the tangential coalition may be a selective association of peripheral, smaller units seeking to strengthen their cause and gain empowerment to approach higher decision-making levels (e.g. Brussels). Even when intensified cooperation among peripheral units is

and attended by many "political factories" which later were closed down. This became an important factor in deepening strife between the north-western part of the country (particularly Slovenia and Croatia) and the rest. The contributors of this aid pressed for direct relationships — for example between enterprises — sharing experiences, protecting the interests of both sides, and longer-term prospects of cooperation in the context of market economy. But the response was very slow and limited.

63 Ned Thomas (1993), reflecting on experiences in Wales, pointed out how it became more difficult for regions to establish multilateral cultural contact during the period of the construction of great nation states. "Lines of communication whether roads and railways or newspapers, radio and TV, radiated from the capital, and with them patronage and a particular pattern of perceptions as between centre and periphery."

more banal in nature and carries no oppositional connotation in relation to higher levels of government, it does imply a certain redistribution of power.[64]

European integration itself is a form of tangential coalition — fragmented Europe's response to "global intrusions," particularly from the USA (and latterly Japan and others).[65] Criticisms of unbalanced information flows — cultural, media, and linguistic "imperialism" — regularly end in calls for European nation states to join forces and organise joint programmes (Domenach, 1990; Tomlinson, 1991; Becker et al., 1986).[66]

Generally, states and other actors placed in a subordinate position either form a coalition (a) to jointly launch an alternative, affirmative programme of their own (e.g. space industries, project Concorde), or (b) to jointly establish barriers against undesired intrusions.

A historical retrospective shows that the most easterly German *Land*, Austria, organised the defence of Central Europe against the Turks in the form of a tangential coalition. Hungarians, Czechs, Croats, and others accepted the Habsburg monarchy (Ferdinand, 1526) when threatened by the Turks, in spite of the subservience this implied for Austria's "partners."

The Slovenes were scattered in six administrative units in Austria, in part of Hungary (in the east), and Italy (in the west). Thus the "United Slovenia" programme was synonymous with both the full assertion of Slovene identity and autonomy.

In spite of their cultural attachment to Central Europe, both Slovenes and Croats accepted a "tangential coalition" with Serbia ("Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes" — later Yugoslavia) in response to the threat from the north-west. But their expectations of autonomy and integration were not fulfilled — territorial identities of Slovenia and Croatia were not even recognised for some time.

Even collaborationism during the Second World War may be interpreted in terms of a tangential coalition. Its occurrence in Croatia (the quisling "independent state"), Slovakia, Ukraine, and Finland indicates that it was characteristic of mostly smaller states or ethno-nations subordinated to an adjacent bigger power.

64 These questions need to be further specified in order to clarify in what circumstances such associating actually provides more power to the underprivileged and when it simply represents an aggregation of their weaknesses.

65 Here we may roughly distinguish intrusions by the "world core," consisting mostly of information and products, from those by less-developed areas, particularly in the form of immigration. Several surveys in Slovenia show that Slovenes tend to be more open to the influx of products, capital, and ideas and less open to the immigration of foreigners.

66 Domenach approves of "the initiative of five European publishers (among them, Seuil from Paris) who have undertaken to regularly publish the master works of the common heritage in all major European languages." This may be an important antidote to unbalanced flows of information, but it provides no solution for small European nations, which are even explicitly excluded from this arrangement.

In terms of more recent events, Thomas (1993) — like some other authors from Wales — rejects the concept of distinct cultures as unique cultural islands (isolated and residual) in favour of unique cultural crossroads. He suggests that Welsh-language culture has points of contact with: (a) other Celtic countries; (b) other minority-language situations; (c) other small language groups; (d) countries and regions in bilingual situations; and (e) countries and regions in Europe rather than elsewhere. This illustrates a tangential pattern of response to present English dominance.[67]

Exit from the Periphery: Dissociation

The fourth mode of dehierarchisation may be conceptualised as a reinterpretation of Hirschman's (1970) model of "exit, voice, and loyalty." Although conceived by an economist dealing with consumer choices in the marketplace, an attempt is made here to apply it to the present changes in territorial social organisation in Europe and particularly in the former Yugoslavia.

According to Hirschman, the greater the possibility for exit (availability of other alternatives), the lower the probability of voice (involvement, protest) — which however has higher efficiency. Hueglin (1989, p. 217) indicated their potential use in understanding regional aspirations to gain greater control over resources and indigenous development. The exit option "covers a wide range of possible actions: from a refusal to meet the centrally imposed conditions for certain types of grants, to opting out strategies with regard to entire policy fields, and finally to passive and/or active strategies of resistance — including the promotion of outright separatism as the most drastic step."

His conclusion is that peripheral regions "no longer aim at (re)integration, but instead at autonomisation. However, given the paucity of peripheral opportunity structures, they too steer a shrewd course between exit (autonomisation from) and voice (participation in nation-state politics)" (Hueglin, 1989, p. 209).

Here "exit" is focused on as escape, dissociation, or secession — escape from a subordinate, peripheral position, from the restrictions of central government, which enables fuller assertion of the sub-system's identity and elevates its representatives to an international role. Thus, the process of dehierarchisation generates an increasing number of small states as international actors.

Recasting the genesis of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia shows the complicated dynamics of divergence between commitment to a "strategy of voice" or a "strategy of exit." For several decades this was practically a non-existent choice.[68] Conflict centred on the level of the autonomy of the republics

[67] The general question remains open: under what conditions does tangential coalition represent empowerment, and when does it increase the powerlessness of peripheries through the cumulation of their problems?

[68] The formation of the quisling Independent State of Croatia during the Second World War was the last case of an alternative "solution."

and autonomous provinces, but not on their secession. Kosovo was the only case where "exit" — although not formally manifested — was latently present as a potential danger for the integrity of the Yugoslav federation. Serbia responded by repression and reducing the autonomy of both Kosovo and Vojvodina,[69] thereby only deepening existing cleavages and heightening the prospects of further coercive measures. Solidarity with the Albanians in Kosovo was *ipso facto* interpreted as hostility towards the Serbs in Belgrade, which reacted with an economic and cultural embargo against Slovenia, confiscation of Slovenian property in Serbia, and so on.

Slovenia's shift from "voice" to "exit" was determined in great part by the realisation that it was trapped in a "permanent minority" position. Various Slovene initiatives for market reform, the dynamisation of democratisation, and intensified changes leading towards integration into Europe were rejected or accepted with great delay. The federal government pursued a "convoy policy": "slowing down the fast ships and speeding up the laggers, because this is the only way a convoy can act as a system" (Adam, 1990, p. 435).

Here is a paradox: dissociation ("separatism") was a form of exit which Slovenia was the first to use; but Slovenia had been the strongest advocate of free market flows within the federal state, more open borders, and more intensive participation in European integration. As even politically proclaimed by the new Slovene leadership, dissociation was undertaken to actually speed up not only autonomy but also integration (in the wider context). It was a corrective mechanism for socio-economic restructuring and the elimination of the anomalies of state-centric organisation, rather than a final goal in itself.

Comparison with the situation before the First World War may help in understanding Slovenia's "exit" in 1991. Up to 1918, Slovene territories (though fragmented and under foreign rule) represented peripheries of a state with its capital city (Vienna) at the Central European core. Within Yugoslavia, although more established as a special identity in the form of a republic, Slovenia was the periphery of a less-developed European periphery — in the position of a dual periphery (in addition to its position as a "permanent minority") — which Slovenes were not prepared to accept. The relatively high ethnic homogeneity facilitated the exit; and this is the difference from Croatia, which was still enmeshed in war.

[69] This triggered widespread solidarity with Kosovo in Slovenia and Croatia as well as internationally. Although Albanians are ethnically and culturally much further from Slovenes and Croats than Serbs, the crude repression created immediate solidarity with the oppressed.

Concluding Note

Autonomisation and integration (globalisation) lead to the erosion of territorial hierarchies within and beyond nation-state borders. The increasing number of small nation states and the self-assertiveness of regional and local identities can to a large extent be explained as a manifestation of the process of dehierarchisation. Four modes of dehierarchisation are conceptualised: (1) cross-level power-sharing, (2) by-passing intermediaries, (3) tangential coalition, and (4) exit from the periphery. Each contributes to an understanding of socio-spatial restructuring in the transition from "interaction" to "transaction systems." They are applied to both West European integration and changes in the Balkans (the former Yugoslavia).

Increasing flexibility — as one of the main features of post-modernity — implies high variability of size and structure of human aggregations in time and space. Instead of well-defined territorial communities we will have many "overlapping, intersecting and crosscutting networks of social interactions." In such a context there will be a tendency towards the erosion of hierarchically organised territorial systems (nation states) both within and among themselves. Increasing accessibility across borders mitigates frontal exclusivity and territorial domination and subordination.

The expansion of the area of accessibility and interconnectedness tends to flatten hierarchies. Two countervailing processes are underway: the increasing remoteness of important decision-making in distant centres, often beyond national borders, on the one hand; and a general rapprochement between the sub-national, national, and supra-national levels in the context of local–global (micro–macro) convergence, on the other. While the ladder of the levels of territorial organisation tends to be lengthening, we can at the same time expect their hierarchical roles to transform into points of coordination.

However, since direct local (individual)–global linkages will become more and more feasible, the need for mediation and representation will become redundant — and considering the increasing diversity, impossible. State governments will increasingly lose control over and representation of the growing diversity of autonomous actors and their transnational networks.

This chapter is based on:
Mlinar, Z. (1994, July 18–23). *Expanding territories, flattening hierarchies: Four models of territorial dehierarchization in Europe* [Paper presentation]. 13th World Congress of Sociology, Bielefeld, Germany.

Managing the Openness of Border Regions in the Context of European Integration

Here the future of border regions is analysed in terms of the general long-term regularities of socio-spatial restructuring and in terms of the involvement of regional actors. Two dimensions of restructuring are elaborated: first, the shift from contiguous, areal connectedness to network linkages; and second, the extension from a region as a single unit to multi-level power-sharing. The legacy of the zero-sum game — in terms of shifting rather than opening borders — influences the strategy of opening border regions from the point of view of distrust and confidence-building. Non-parity roles represent another limiting factor. Both are exemplified in the experience gained in the Croatian, Slovenian, and Italian parts of Istria, and additionally in Euregions on the Czech–German border. In spite of the centralism of the newly formed states, local and/or regional authorities have a wide range of options for directly or indirectly influencing the intensity of cross-border flows.

Introduction

Discussions about border regions are usually concerned with the issue of how their role changes as state borders open up or are dismantled and various forms of cross-border cooperation expand. It can however easily be overlooked that this is only one of the ways that border regions integrate into Europe — namely, the interlinking of national peripheries on the basis of spatial contiguity and proximity.

Long-term regularities cannot be explained within a fixed territorial framework. Criticism of the "billiard ball" model of states can also be applied to regions. As differentiation penetrates into the sub-structures of states (Blau, 1977) and sub-systems autonomise, the framework of their integration widens beyond the border regions. Mainstream thinking seems to assume that connectedness between border regions will simply grow; but as the framework expands, connectedness based on vicinity can also decline. The interlinking of peripheries on the basis of contiguity has to be examined together with changes in their relationships to the state centres and the interlinking of centres on a European scale. If the dynamics of regional cross-border interlinking overtake the interlinking of national centres, this is usually perceived as a threat to national unity and territorial integrity. If it just follows decisions made at the centre — like a policy of complete opening of the borders — it is unlikely that the region will activate its specific human and material resources optimally.

Thus, discovering the objective regularities in long-term changes does not narrow the scope for devising an autonomous and active role for particular regions — rather the contrary. In the present analysis an attempt is made to identify some of the objective and subjective dimensions of variation between regions in Europe. Although opening, removing, or even erecting borders is primarily in the hands of central authorities, there is still a great range of short and even long-term measures available for the deliberate management of regional openness.

It is precisely the pre-determination of border regions — in the restrictive and affirmative senses — that is relaxed most by the state as borders open. At the same time, because of their previous constraints, border regions face the great challenge of innovatively creating new cross-border combinations of resources and thereby ways of joining European integration processes (Mlinar, 1992a). No general European pattern can automatically be followed by all regions; this would have unintended consequences and even be counterproductive. Certain features, whether singly or cumulatively, call for distinctive strategies for regional opening: historical burdens of hostility and conflict relations between adjacent countries; unequal size of countries or regional centres, implying non-parity roles;[70] differences in economic development; pretensions by one side to cultural superiority; differences in political system, or the effects of earlier differences such as those between West and East European states.

Particular attention is paid in this chapter to experiences in the regions lying along the Italian–Slovenian–Croatian borders — especially Istria — and additionally to Euregions and cross-border cooperation along the Czech–German and Czech–Austrian borders.

Border Regions in the Shift from Areal to Network Linkages

From predetermination and external determination to autonomous innovative programmes

To glimpse the future of border regions, their role has to be examined in relation to one of the fundamental socio-spatial transformations of the present day: the shift from regional linkages based on the contiguity of relatively closed "territorial communities" to selective and dispersed interlinking of growing numbers of relatively autonomous actors to form transnational networks. This process involves a transition from the situation in which the territorial framework was predetermined and accepted by the actors as self-evident, to a new situation in which technologically and politically increased accessibility allows the creation of an individual frame of reference within a broader area with greater selectivity.

[70] Italy's population of 57 million is almost 30 times greater than neighbouring Slovenia's of just under 2 million; Trieste, the centre of the Friuli-Venezia Giulia region, has a population of 272,230, whereas Koper, the regional centre of Slovenian Istria, has 25,000.

The transition from the one to the other situation is the most radical precisely for border regions. With closed state borders, which lead to "billiard ball" type relations, these regions are primarily determined from above, through decisions made at the centre. The centre imposes the border regime and thereby various restrictive measures governing movement and activity in the border region — including the assistance received by the Friuli-Venezia Giulia region, and especially Trieste and Gorizia, to compensate for the loss of their former hinterlands and to consolidate the border.

The easing of political tensions between East and West after 1991 brought a resurgence of initiatives for various cross-border linking projects, the formation of cross-border regions and working groups, and so on. With regard to spatial expansion in the sense of contiguity, the following developments can be identified:

— Initiatives to create the cross-border region of Istria, according to a general Euregion model, to institutionalise links and the autonomy of parts of Croatia, Slovenia, and (symbolically) Italy (Malabotta Richter, 1995). There are other similar proposals for all-embracing interlinking in the northern Adriatic, which have various motives, though all seek to transcend the more or less pronounced peripherality of the border regions of these three states.

— Greater experience has been gained with the Alp-Adria Working Group. This now involves more than just border-region cooperation in the narrow sense, but it is still a case of a contiguous area (the first instance of interlinking through the Iron Curtain) that transcends the state-centric model of spatial organisation.

This brings us to the second fundamental form: network interlinking of territorial and non-territorial actors.[71] In principle there is no predetermination of links on this model. Selective establishment of specific links and networks of actors for various purposes is of decisive importance here — whether the representatives of regions as a whole, towns, districts, economic organisations, educational institutions, professional associations, or even informal groups and individuals take the initiative to set up transnational networks. In view of the process of autonomisation (diversification), it may be anticipated that this will render conceptions of cross-border cooperation — which to date have arisen primarily in the framework of regional interlinking on the basis of proximity or adjacency — too narrow.

Today there are already instances of linking such as between Croatian Istria and the Italian regions of Toscana and Veneto. At the town level there is a network of towns in the Alpine arc with its headquarters in Trento, which is a kind of intermediate category of areal and network linking. An instance of a

[71] Cook (1995, p. 19) indicates "a new approach to regional development, based on the central idea of the networked regional innovation architecture." According to him, networking involves reciprocity, trust, learning, partnership, and empowerment.

transnational town network is the "walled cities of Europe" network, to which Slovenia's Piran belongs. There are many more ramified and spatially wider networks of various economic, educational, and cultural organisations, groups, and individuals.

The transition from areal to network interlinking — which entails increasing dispersion in space — implies the gradual loss of those features of border regions and their cooperation which previously stemmed from the break in linkages and separation in space. Features that express the intensification of unique combinations and links between people and resources in space will be strengthened. And with respect to the simplified expectations of a universal rise in cross-border cooperation, it must be noted: that cross-border interlinking will actually intensify in the period of the opening of state borders, and that in the long term there will be a relative decline in the significance of this process and border locations in general.

From State Periphery to Trans-National Network

In the past the state either neglected its periphery or treated it as "sensitive" for territorial and state integrity. Italy, for example, gave considerable economic aid to its border regions and towns when they began to stagnate. Several international scientific research institutions and university faculties have been located on both the Italian and the Slovenian side of the border — in Gorizia and Nova Gorica, in Trieste, Koper, Portorož, and elsewhere. In some cases the motives are pragmatic economic interests or ecological concerns; in others, the need for national consolidation along the border is accentuated.

Various programmes and initiatives for "transnational inter-university cooperation" are also proliferating. These have either been introduced by the EU (Tempus, Copernicus, etc.) or by others such as Austria, which initiated CEEPUS — the Central European Exchange Programme for University Studies. This programme promotes the mobility of students and professors and extends cooperation from that typical of bilateral inter-governmental agreements to a multilateral transnational network of cooperating university units from a large number of countries, which diminishes the likelihood of non-parity roles. With the exception of administrative coordination located in Vienna, the centre consists of the proposers of concrete programmes — so that the sites of the centre and the periphery are not pre-determined.

The location depends on the origin of the initiative or the activity, and of course on objective conditions as these vary from one place or region to another. This interlinking model points to new possibilities for the de-peripheralisation of today's border regions. The new mode of activity also implies that the border region will have to count less and less on the state's classical role and more and more on its own inventive combining of different situational advantages and human resources to produce innovative developmental programmes that can be offered more widely in Europe.

From the Region as an Individual Actor to Multi-Level Power-Sharing

Another general aspect of socio-spatial restructuring concerns the changes in the relevance, roles, and interrelations of the different levels of territorial organisation. Through some inertia, the error is constantly made in the social-science literature of dealing with only one or some of these levels — in this case, the regional level. With integration in Europe the range of levels involved in resolving a particular problem is broadened.[72] Although the range of levels is widened, relations between them are dehierarchised, and various shortcuts between the highest and lowest levels are built (Mlinar, 1995b).

The autonomy of regions cannot increase in the long term if relations between the higher and lower levels of decision-making are seen as functioning like a zero-sum game. After all, the goal is not decentralisation as an alternative to centralisation, but the intensification of inter-level linkages and power-sharing to allow the zero-sum logic to be transcended. A win–win logic is in prospect instead of win–lose.

Experience with one programme related to the formation of a new university in Slovenia — the "Third" or "Primorska University" — in the region along the Italian border is illustrative. Underlying the success of implementing this programme was precisely the combining of numerous and complementary actors from several relevant levels, with a major role for individuals as initiators, engagement of private commercial companies from the tourism sector, the municipality, inter-municipal cooperation, the role of the Slovenian centre, and support from European-level programmes (Tempus). In a sense the role of the region — and of the state — was put in perspective in this case because it was only one of several levels and actors.

Instead of frontal clashes with the state centre, the region can pursue its particular interests through affirmative programmes of a multilevel nature. Programmes like Phare and Interreg are aimed at promoting inter-regional and cross-border cooperation together with the states to which these regions belong, rather than by bypassing them. In the future both regional and local representatives will increasingly take part in interstate negotiations. Representatives of border areas already occasionally participate in interstate meetings, and representatives of Istrian municipalities in Slovenia and Croatia have even intervened in the settlement of interstate disputes over demarcation of the border and the border regime.

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[72] Barry Jones states in summary of several studies that the EC's "ability and willingness to deal with all levels of Belgian society — national, regional, local and private — could very well point to a future pattern of increasingly decentralist, self-organising, and porous societies with policy networks at a variety of levels" (Jones, 1995, p. 293).

Legacy of the Zero-Sum Game: Distrust and Real or Perceived Threat

In many parts of Europe, opening borders and expanding cross-border cooperation are hampered by the historical legacy of conduct that amounts to a zero-sum game: as much as one party gains is lost by the other. This refers above all to territorial expansionism and the moving of borders rather than their opening and cross-border cooperation. This conduct came to an end in Europe in great measure with the end of the Second World War, although in the Balkans it was only just coming to an end in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moving borders leaves behind lasting memories when it is a matter of judging intentions on the other side. This is the legacy of centuries of frontal territorial expansionism and hostility, when every movement on one side of the border aroused fear that it was directed against the neighbouring country.

The Istria region has experienced dramatic shifts in both directions in the past century. The conflict between the Venetian Republic and the Austro-Hungarian Empire was followed by great population movements — immigration into the region from the Italian side and the emigration of Slovenes and Croats — and subsequently a reverse flow: the withdrawal to Italy of about 250,000 exiles and "opters" for Italian citizenship and domicile, later followed by immigration from other parts of the former Yugoslavia.

Historical memory may persist as a residual category in the form of a feeling of threat from a bigger country or a sense of violation of "historical rights" to a particular territory. The main point is that in such situations it becomes very difficult to distinguish well-intentioned initiatives for cross-border cooperation from old one-sided expansionist pretensions in new clothes. At each step there is the question of trust or distrust, and doubts about ulterior motives. This distrust and feeling of threat is present primarily on the "weaker" side (Slovenia, Croatia), but it is notable that there is also a certain feeling of threat on the Italian side, particularly in border areas and in the city of Trieste.

In recent years there have been several clashes or adverse reactions in the border regions of Slovenia and Croatia (Istria) because of the ambiguity of particular steps taken by the Italian side. These include: Italy's granting of dual citizenship irrespective of actual national origin; the award of Italian pensions to Slovenian citizens who worked for a prescribed period of time on the one-time territory of the Italian state; the opening of Italian educational institutions to young people from the other side of the border; assistance to individual members of the Italian minority; a language policy which incorporates a one-way approach; and the convening of the "Istrians World Congress" in Pula at which an Italian orientation predominated.

One-way information flows — given Italy's technological and economic advantage, ignorance of neighbouring languages, and feelings of cultural superiority — are slowing cross-border cooperation with Slovenia and Croatia at the formal, institutional level (Cappellin & Batey, 1993). Under such circumstances, intensifying certain forms of cross-border cooperation tends to

increase distrust and trigger defensive reactions in the face of hypothetical intrusions from the other side of the border.

The issue of distrust also came into play when the loyalty of border-region residents who accepted the Italian offer of dual citizenship was questioned. Doubts and warnings of disloyalty were voiced most strongly in central Slovenia, which in turn provoked a general adverse reaction amongst the Primorska population. This was not just a classic centre-periphery clash: it sharpened differences and demarcated a particular socio-cultural identity — one that characteristically appears within the cross-border region and differs culturally from the central part of the country.[73]

How Confidence Can and Cannot Be Built

Building mutual confidence obviously depends on how much domination tendencies, and especially the vestiges of previous aspirations to territorial expansion, are excluded from mutual relations. In the case of the regionalist movement in Croatian Istria, what came about was a rise in distrust, open conflicts, and estrangement between the national and regional authorities, as well as between the neighbouring countries. The lag in Istria's development into a Euregion may be attributed to the following circumstances:

The programme for the formation of the new cross-border region was not a gradual but a radical one, and moreover came at a time when the question of the final constituting of the state and its territorial integrity was at the forefront in Croatia. The pretentious programme was devised with too little regard for the factual situation and actors. In view of the foregoing, a cross-border territorial construct emerged that was more like the traditional pattern of areal organisation of society than a new network pattern — and thus raised a threat to national sovereignty because of the aspiration for immediate territorial institutionalisation in a cross-border framework. Had there been a greater variety of specific and concrete cross-border cooperation programmes and actors, there would have been less of a clash with the striving to preserve national sovereignty or, more simply, with centralised control of the whole territory.

James Wesley Scott (1989), like many others, reports persistent tensions between regionalism and national sovereignty in Europe generally. He notes that if cooperative programmes prove useful in the economic sphere it is easier to institutionalise cross-border cooperation over a broad field of political activity.

The prospects for joining a broad common political structure like the European Union fundamentally alters the way opening borders and cross-border cooperation are viewed. Not all that surpasses the borders of one's country, at a time when communications are not automatically severed at the border, is

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[73] For analogous tendencies by the Northern League in Italy, but in the direction of the North, see Cento Bull (1994, p. 81).

necessarily lost. The proposal to establish Istria as a Euregion, however, came at a time when Italy was a member of the EU, Slovenia only later became an associate member, and Croatia had not even been accepted as a member of the Council of Europe. All the more reason, then, why gradual intensification and diversification of forms of cooperation were so important.

Non-Parity Roles and Seeping Sovereignty

The experiences described by Frantisek Zich (1993) in the first sociological study of Euregions along the Czech–German and Czech–Austrian borders confirm our conclusions on Istrian cross-border cooperation to a great extent.[74] In the Czech Republic, cross-border cooperation also involves partners of marked non-parity. Given the historical-political circumstances, the partners on the German side of the border are more influential than those on the Czech side — moreover, the initiative came from the German side, and interest on the Czech side was tied to expectations of additional resources from the central government for regional development.

These activities overreached their competencies arising from international agreements, so that in time they began to function like independent international subjects. "The foreign — and primarily German — influence was strongly felt in the activities of regional associations and raised questions within the executive power about the purpose and mission of Euroregions" (Zich, 1993, p. 9). Arguments began between the ministries and the representatives of the newly established Euregions regarding their role and authority. The Czech premier expressed a critical view:

"The hidden meaning of Euro-regions is different. We must carefully monitor and distinguish between friendship, partnership, co-operation, trans-frontier projects, and attempts to erode the identity of our state … We want to go to Europe as the Czech Republic. I do not presume we want to go to Europe as Euregio Nisa, Labe (the Elbe) or Shumawa … Some mayors believe they can be in Europe earlier in this way. I do not. I see it as jeopardy to state identity" (Klaus, as cited in Zich, 1993).

The central issue is the autonomy of the cross-border region and the extent to which it conflicts with the preservation of national sovereignty. The threat is all the greater the greater the openness of the borders and the possibility: (a) that the border region will intensify tangential cross-border links and thus evade traditional hierarchical control within national borders; and (b) that it will become subordinated to centres on the other side of the border. It may be

[74] A more general formulation of the problem stated in the LACE Guide (Association of European Border Regions [AEBR], 1995) is: "In Central and Eastern Europe, approaches to cross-border co-operation have understandably emerged rather hesitantly since these borders were firmly closed. Major disparities and historic factors mean that policy needs to be very carefully and thoughtfully prepared … Those border areas with minorities will require a particularly careful approach."

concluded from various failed attempts to form Euregions on borders where differences on major criteria have accumulated that these attempts were premature, as Zich observes (1993, p. 17).

"Any establishment of regional bodies in order to coordinate, activate and encourage cross-border activities appears to be an end in itself under the circumstances where direct human, economic, and other contacts are yet to be established. There is a risk that the whole process will come to a sticky end of organisational formalism. Direct human, communities', institutions' etc. contacts seem to be more effective than joint bodies. Joint projects solving specific regional problems also seem to lead directly to the end." (Zich, 1993, p. 17.)

This experience confirms our initial statement that a uniform application of particular concepts such as the Euregion under different concrete circumstances could bring integration processes in Europe to a halt. Uniformity may be indicative of the absence of an individual region's active and autonomous role, giving rise to the prevalence of a general model at the expense of expression and respect for specific distinguishing features. Emphasising territorial organisational change more than concrete programmes — and more than diversified links between different actors on both sides of the border — will provoke a negative reaction by the central state agencies that are losing control. The provocativeness of this approach comes from its frontal, general redistribution of political power. This is not the case when cross-border links are intensified on the basis of individual projects and between concrete actors — or at least it is less evident and provocative, and does not amount to such a clear zero-sum option for the two countries.[75]

Dimensions of the Region's Active Role

Regardless of the different legal status of regions in different states, there is a theoretical and empirical basis for identifying some of the dimensions of the strategy of opening up border regions and incorporating them in European integration processes. In spite of their subordination to the central authorities, the opening or dismantling of borders gives border regions greater scope for directly or indirectly influencing these changes. The first condition is awareness of these possibilities and the dilemmas set out below.

Direct or indirect involvement of the regional or local authorities? The region can exert influence on the openness of the border directly or indirectly. In the former case it can be at least one of the participants in decisions at the national level — as with the initiative of municipalities in Croatian and Slovenian Istria for "open borders." There is even greater scope for indirect influence through various development programmes — such as restructuring the workforce by expanding tertiary education and scientific research — which have an indirect

[75] This is of course highly reminiscent of the dialogue and disputes between the Istrian representatives and the central government in Zagreb.

and affirmative effect on the growth of spatial mobility of labour across borders and on transnational communications.

Territorial opening and/or functional interlinking? Experience has shown that tendencies towards greater openness may favour the territorial aspect (overall reorganisation and institutionalisation of a new cross-border unit like a Euregion) or concrete projects to deal with specific problems. There is greater chance for success when concrete cooperation programmes are implemented first — the functional approach — and territorial reorganisation is complementary, rather than the reverse.

Bilateral and/or multilateral cross-border linking? Bilateral cross-border cooperation is most expedient and characteristic for contacts with the physically closest partners, but it is substantively limiting. Non-parity relations between the partners come most easily to the fore in this form, whether economic, political, or linguistic. This unevenness may be mitigated by including the partners in multilateral programmes such as EU programmes, which are based on general norms and a higher level of internationalisation that averts particular relations of domination and subordination.

Mobilising historical memory and/or accentuating common European perspectives? As a rule, because it is a national periphery, the border region has not had a suitable opportunity to express its identity, which frequently includes elements of cultural similarity with neighbouring peoples. New aspirations to reconstruct this identity can, on the one hand, lead to strengthening cross-border links; on the other, harking back to history can also be a form of entrenching the demand for compensation for historical wrongs. Stressing common perspectives inherently broadens understanding for overcoming the mutual exclusiveness that was part of the logic of the zero-sum game played in the past.

Bastion of national integrity and/or an international hub? The central role of the state is weakening in the context of European integration processes, and the border and the "hostile encirclement" of the past are also fading. As the state withdraws, a vacuum emerges which challenges the border region to construct development programmes more independently on a cross-border, international scale. Its comparative advantages give it a more congenial position in the broad European space to assert itself in particular fields of activity as a new hub.

Gaining and losing comparative advantages? A European perspective for the border region means both the loss of certain functions and the acquisition of new ones. Instead of relying on "geographic rent" as preordained, the border region will find itself having to define its own development programme — as a response to the changes already underway or in anticipation of them. Activities concerning or associated with border control — such as jobs in the customs service and forwarding agencies — will end, and there will have to be a reorientation towards other fields.

Integration with spatial concentration or a redistribution of functions? Opening to the broader space comes to a halt when it entails increasingly the asymmetry

of roles and a concentration of functions — and hence domination by a bigger centre. The regions and their municipalities will have more success if they attract and establish completely new and distinctive programmes or functions — such as new institutions and tertiary education programmes — than by achieving a redistribution of the existing ones. To overcome the lag in intra- and interregional cooperation, the typical approach must be abandoned: (a) the preservation of autonomy even by means of autarky, and (b) achieving integration even with concentration — that is, domination. The key is finding suitable locations for specific functions of regional, national, or European significance along the periphery as well, and thereby promoting polycentrism and diminishing the significance of the differentiation into centre and periphery in general.

Opening as increasing access to and for others? Opening up regions on a European scale — politically as well as in terms of transport and communications — entails greater accessibility to others as well as for others. Nevertheless, this implies a loss of control over flows of people, goods, and information, as well as an insurgence of influences from elsewhere. These uncontrolled flows and the increased vulnerability of the region to socially, physically, and ecologically harmful intrusions from outside are a strategic issue in further development.

Theoretical notions about postmodern society and visions of the "New Europe" include a trend towards heterogenisation of the population — different from the simple replacement of a hitherto relatively homogeneous group with another. Precisely the possibility of influxes of relatively homogeneous populations from elsewhere, and particularly in concentrated form, has generally triggered the strongest rejection by local residents. In the long term, the "danger" of intrusions by such homogeneous populations will be diminished by the growing diversification of the workforce. Consequently, in the future mass immigrations (or migrations) need not be expected within the EU; rather the pattern will be of individualised and dispersed spatial mobility. The loss of control in the sense of the possibility of frontal territorial exclusion of "foreigners" will shift attention towards the regions' greater involvement in the formulation of non-territorial mechanisms of regulation — particularly general European restrictive norms and affirmative programmes.

Conclusions

The theoretical findings and their possible action implications, presented above, may be understood as challenges and orientations for future research into their operationalisation and embedding in the "grand theories" of social development. In the context of postmodernity even the notion of development is being questioned. Evolutionary notions of predetermined, lawful socio-spatial processes are being countered by arguments in favour of "open-ended transformation" and the unpredictability of change.

The study of regional development is only a particular case in point which can benefit from, and contribute to, the clarification of this epistemological context. The empirical evidence does not support the "end of regularity and predictability" thesis — so far. The process of supra-national, European integration and parallel sub-national (regional) autonomisation are clearly demonstrated even though their interdependence may not be so apparent. Cases of deviation do not necessarily negate the regularity; they may merely prove the rule and should be a reason for more elaborate research design.

The failure of the initiative from Croatian Istria to establish the Istria Euregion, while several Euregions are already functioning, calls for further examination of the dynamics of the relationships between central and regional level government in the broader context of national-state formation, assertion of national identity, and protection of national integrity. "Historical memory" of conflictual relationships between neighbours, and differences in the size and power of countries and actors on both sides of the border — non-parity roles — are some of the factors affecting the management of openness. Openness does not simply increase linearly, nor does the autonomy of regions (states) in determining the degree of openness.

The outlook for regional development will therefore involve declining independence as a condition for rising autonomy. Exclusion and discrimination on the basis of territorial provenance have become unacceptable at least within the European Union. Frontal territorial exclusiveness is unfeasible as a mode of border management. The region will have to play an active role in selectively combining the material and human resources of both the border area and the expanded area of connectedness.

Future research should unravel the *prima facie* paradox of long-term regularity and predictability on one side, and autonomy of action and choice of border management options or scenarios on the other.

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V.

DEVELOPMENT AND PARTICIPATION IN MULTILEVEL CONTEXT

Development and Participation

Henry Teune, Zdravko Mlinar

An Introductory Overview

Development has precipitated a participation crisis. The fundamental question is age-old: how can individuals meaningfully participate in systems of ever-increasing size and scale? Conversely, how can systems of large size respond to each and every individual? With increasing size and complexity, the individual becomes submerged in numbers and confusion. Reducing the scale of the system by creating small autonomous local political units reduces the issues of participation to triviality.

To remedy the paradoxical implications of scale and participation, a variety of institutional changes have been proposed: creating city-states; institutionalising technological methods of individual–system interaction; extending participation to previously non-participatory institutions such as factories; expanding the scope of participatory issues by making institutions responsible for more activities touching the individual (decentralisation). There are also recommendations to prepare people for more effective participation under the general rubric of education.

The fact remains — and will become more apparent — that as systems increase in scale, that is, develop, the institutional linkages of individuals to the system will become more tenuous; in the extreme case, as Dahl notes, being reduced to casting a ballot.[76] At the other extreme, meaningful participation in small units will pale in comparison to the benefits of large-scale complexity.

The thesis of this paper is that development determines the modes of participation — the structures of the system and the way in which individuals relate to them. From a macro-historical perspective, the relationship between development and institutional structures is the source of a participation crisis, and no amount of wise restructuring of those institutions will transform each individual into an effective legislator for a complex system. Indeed, at a certain point the scale of a system will be so great that the individual–institutional–system linkages will break and recede into ritual remnants. These changes will be accompanied by more and more direct individual participation in the system. Just as the emergence of indirect, representative participatory institutions required a certain scale and complexity, and as systems became more complex greater institutional differentiation became possible, so development

[76] Dahl, R. A. (1967). The city in the future of democracy. *The American Political Science Review*, *61*(4), 955.

will destroy those institutions, making possible a new mode of participation. Indeed, no amount of creative institutional innovations, short of stopping development, will be able to avoid this developmental change.

Because this developmental process is already underway, it is possible to predict and observe it with contemporary data and, in part, to confirm whether, where, and under what conditions changes in participation are taking place. Further, the specific shape of these changes — derived from a partially constructed developmental theory — can be clearly expressed, modified, and explicated with research. With such knowledge, mankind ought to be able to control the directions of these changes, minimise some of the inevitable costs of change, and make it possible for people to deal with these changes rather than, as has almost always been the case, to be victimised by them.

A Macro-Developmental Perspective on Participation

A macro-developmental conception of participation involves the following: (1) a component–system relationship, which in this case will be the individual and the system; (2) a long historical perspective in which changes in participation can be interpreted in the context of developmental dynamics; and (3) an explication of development and its processes.

The first of these defines participation in its broadest possible sense: any behaviour that is linked to a system, and thus to other components of the system. In this sense, any element of human behaviour — any basic movement of the individual — can be participation if it either changes the system or averts other changes. Participation thus becomes the linkage between the individual and the system: the interdependence between individual and system behaviour.

The historical dimension requires viewing participation in a context of system change, or absence of it. These changes, both because they tend to be slower and are often not easily perceptible, must be assessed in the long run — centuries rather than decades. Specifically, participation results in changes, among them developmental changes, and these changes in turn produce changes in the nature of participation. To observe this process, it is necessary to take a long-term view.

Development provides the context that defines participation. Comparative research on participation has shown the importance of knowing the specific institutional context of the "participatory act" — which in the contemporary world means the national political system. Without such knowledge, it is impossible, for example, to know the meaning of the vote. A developmental view, however, puts these national political and other institutions into a more general framework; it explains why these institutions rather than others. In this sense development provides a comprehensive perspective on participation.

This approach to participation can be contrasted with existing discussion and research. Much of the research takes the individual as the point of

departure and sees participation as an individual choice in a given situation, rather than asking why the individual is in such a situation and why there are choices.[77] At the macro-level, participation is either taken as a critical component of political development — linking the individual to broader social and political systems — or as an independent and sometimes detrimental factor in development.

The theoretical premises of this paper include the fact that in small-scale systems the concept of participation is hardly applicable. The key organisational principle is that of membership in the social system, based on similarity. With increases in the scale of the system, the principle of similarity no longer suffices for participation. There are too many differences. These differences create a historical crisis, resulting in either strong central authority to keep the differences from threatening the collectivity with anarchy, or the growth of representative institutions for participation that recognise differences in class, religion, and other interests. Over time, these differences are responded to either by suppression or by creating differentiated institutions to absorb increasing diversity.

This second historical phase — dominated by what will be called institutional participation — is over for highly developed systems, just as differentiated, representative institutions are being established in developing countries. Diversity is too great to reduce and contain in particular institutions. For developed countries, popular institutional participation has perhaps never been as inclusive or as "participatory" as it is today, but clearly the institutions are inadequate in the eyes of most participants.

The Theoretical Framework

The concept of a system

A social system is the unit of which development is a characteristic. A system is a logical idea referring to: (1) at least two elements, which may be defined; (2) at least one rule of interdependence, such that a change in one element leads to a change in another; and (3) at least two points in time.[78]

Development

Development refers to the scale of social systems. Scale refers to the interdependence and complexity of the system's components. Two synonymous definitions of scale are "organised complexity" and "integrated diversity."[79] By definition, the level of development of a system is its scale at any point in time;

[77] This has been the basis of some criticisms of studies of voting using survey analysis.

[78] This is only one use of a system paradigm. There are others, such as a logic for simulation or a "structure" for a theory.

[79] These terms are, of course, not original, although the latter is not popular. For such a view of political systems, see Brunner, R. D., & Brewer, G. D. (1971). *Organized complexity: Empirical theories of political development*. Free Press.

and developmental change is any increase in a system's scale over two or more points in time.

These two components — integration and diversity — are equally weighted in any assessment of a system's development. It is possible to have systems of high integration and low complexity, or high complexity and low integration. The degree to which any social system is integrated is based on three specific dimensions: (1) the strength of interdependence — the probability that a change in one component leads to a change in the state of the system or other components; (2) the extensiveness — how many domains of the components' characteristics are interdependent; and (3) the inclusiveness — the extent to which each component has an equal probability of being changed as a result of a change in another component.[80]

A basic law of developmental dynamics is that any increase in the number of properties of any component increases the probability of that component having a property similar to that of other components, and simultaneously increases the probability of that component as a whole being different from every other component. The first probability increases arithmetically, the second exponentially. The scale of a system thus decisively depends on the number of properties of its components.

There are two ways in which one component can affect or change another. The first is interaction, in which one component directly affects another (in some cases in a one-way direction). In social systems, interaction is often defined in terms of face-to-face relationships. A second kind of interdependence is indirect, in which the behaviour of a component contributes to changing the state of the system as a whole, and thus indirectly other components. The first of these is personal, often unequal, and sometimes coercive or authoritative. The second is impersonal, indirect, and general.

Whereas the size of any unit may increase arithmetically, the scale of the system will always, after a certain point, increase exponentially. This fact renders per capita measures — which express size rather than scale — more and more meaningless as development proceeds. If size is not distinguished from scale, then any individual's participatory contribution is diminished as a function of the size of the system; if scale is considered, then the importance of participation increases more rapidly than size.

Participation

Participation refers to a broad class of systemic phenomena: the behaviour of the components of a social system that results in changes in other components, the state of the system, or both. Thus participation is system-specific. The

[80] For elaboration in the context of political systems, see Teune, H. (1971). *The integration of political systems* [Paper presentation]. International Studies Association, San Juan, Puerto Rico.

general thesis of this paper is that development determines the nature of participation. There are three qualitatively different structures of participation, which emerge as development (a quantitatively defined concept) increases: symbolic, institutional, and systemic participation. These modes of participation are present in all social systems, but one or another is the dominant mode.

Three Modes of Participation

Participation under conditions of low development: symbolic participation
As the scale of the system is low, there is little diversity and low interdependence. The primary principle of the social system is similarity. Participation is the repetitive reaffirmation of those few similarities that exist. Individual differentiation is limited, by definition — low diversity — and the idea of autonomous individual impact on the system is meaningless. There is little system change, which again renders participation in terms of change meaningless. Decisions can be expressed in terms of a spokesman because there is little difference; when decisions are made collectively, the emphasis will be on unanimity.

Participation under conditions of some development: institutional participation
With differentiation, symbolic participation gives way to the growth of a few institutions that reflect dominant patterns of diversity. The individual is partially linked to institutions, and the institutions in turn affect the system. As individual differentiation is limited, those differences that exist can be grouped into classes, parties, and other such segments.[81] The function of the institutions is to represent the existing diversity; their legitimacy is determined by how well they reflect the existing diversity. Participation is indirect; the relationship among individuals is often one-way rather than reciprocal or equal.

Participation under conditions of high development: systemic participation
Systemic participation is the direct linkage of the individual to the system. The participatory act is based on autonomous individuals who act consciously to change the state of the system directly rather than through others. Diversity and interdependence make it likely that every act of the individual will have system-level consequences. Rather than segmented, free-time, specialised activities, every act and every type of behaviour becomes relevant for the system — and thus politicised, from purchasing consumer goods to performing a job. There is no distinct set of participatory behaviour reduced in its diversity and channelled through institutions. The individual under conditions of maximal development becomes directly enmeshed with the system. There is no behaviour which is non-systemic — non-participation.

[81] Literature on political development speaks of the development of differentiated political institutions. See Almond, G., & Powell, G. (1966). *Comparative politics: A developmental approach*. Little, Brown.

The Dynamics of Developmental Change and Shifts in the Modes of Participation

Developmental change has been defined as increases in the diversity and the integration of the components of a system. The core component of developmental change that affects the structure of systemic participation more than any other is structural change.

Structural change is of two related general types. The first refers to changes in the nature and properties of the structure of interdependence — such as whether there are feedback loops and how inclusive those feedback loops are. The second refers to properties of the components, compared to the properties of other components. The former involves the behaviour of components and of the system; the latter, the structural potential for linking components to the system.



The key to the relationship between development and shifts in the structure of participation has been partially presented in the discussion on the relationship between complexity and integration. The general proposition is that the greater both the similarity and diversity among the components of the system, the greater their interdependence (other things being held constant). For individuals, the greater their similarities and differences, the greater their integration into the system, and thus their participation in the system.[82]

What must be demonstrated to explain and predict the shifts in the modes of participation that emanate from development are: (1) that as the total number and variety of a system's properties increase, they will be distributed more and more equally among individuals; and (2) that as the number and variety of individual properties increase, individuals will shift to or be absorbed by levels in the system of greater and greater complexity, to a point where the individual will be directly involved with the system as a whole.

[82] Education, depending on some contextual factors, is one of the best indicators of an individual's variety.

The need to reallocate properties either to individuals within the system or to others outside can be interpreted as the inclusion process. Individuals with education, housing, and so on become producers; when they become producers, they take part — participate — in other system structures with increasing frequency. This inclusion enhances both the complexity of the system, taking advantage of the combinatorial possibilities, and the level of system integration, which in turn accelerates the rate of increase in variety and thus the level of participation.

The second major consequence of development for participation is a shift of the individual's activity from systems of less complexity to systems of greater complexity. From symbolic participation to institutional participation, there is a shift from the level of the system as a whole to institutions of greater diversity and specificity. From institutional participation to systemic participation, the individual shifts away from those institutions that do not express or incorporate his increased complexity to systems that do — to higher and higher levels of system aggregation, each with greater variety.

The law of variety states that any sub-system has less variety than the system of which it is a part. For systems with a number of levels — institutions, local political units, and so on — with the development of the system and the consequent increase in the variety and complexity of individuals, there will be a slow, but sometimes rapid, shift of individual activity to units of greater complexity. This explains, at least in part, why some local "elites" circulate at the national level, and why national elites become international elites — a process that is one contributing factor to the integration of political systems.[83]

Consciousness and Participation

In symbolic participation, there is little consciousness of any participatory act. In institutional participation, consciousness of participation is limited to a few acts. Indeed, participation is segregated into specific spheres of activity. In systemic participation, however, the individual must be conscious of the outcome of his activity on the system as a whole; he can act to make the state of the system conform to his preferences or morality.

Whereas in institutional participation there is a clear distinction between political and non-political behaviour, in systemic participation there is no such distinction. Every act of the individual, because it takes place in a context of high interdependence, becomes politicised. The importance of individual acts for the system follows from the sensitivity of the system to small shifts — a consequence of development.

Consciousness will be based on a relatively high level of knowledge about the system and how it operates. Not only will immediate consequences be considered but also long-term consequences. The distinction between public and

[83] Ashby, W. R. (1956) is credited with this in his *Introduction to cybernetics*. Wiley.

private will disappear. If every act is politicised, if every choice is considered in terms of its implications, and if the individual in his complexity will be dealing more and more with complex rather than simple sub-systems, then little, if anything, will be private.

In systemic participation, the system becomes more and more self-regulating — regulated by direct, conscious acts of individuals rather than by power, sanctions, and authority. For a variety of reasons, governments as a separate set of governing and controlling institutions will recede in importance as they cannot cope with the size and scale of the system. And because when they do act, they detract from the value of variety in favour of similarity and uniformity.

The nature of conflicts will change with development. In symbolic participation, conflicts cannot be tolerated: they are few in number but intense when they occur. In institutional participation, conflicts are frequent but become progressively less intense. In systemic participation, there are always alternatives for the individual. There is enough complexity to satisfy any individual somewhere in the system. In any conflict, the individual always has the option of withdrawal; thus the intensity of any conflict is mitigated.

An Empirical Interpretation of the Theory in the Context of Local Political Units

The theory of development could be applied to almost any set of specific social institutions or systems. One fruitful area of application is local political units. They are more or less firmly fixed in systems of greater complexity, they are more or less universal for national political systems, they are for most countries a focal point of participation, and they vary both within and across systems in their level and rate of developmental change.

Macro-system developmental changes. At low levels of development, there are no or few differentiated levels of systems within the system. With some development there is more and more differentiation among levels. As institutional participation peaks, giving way to systemic participation, there is a continual upward shift to levels of greater complexity. What will remain local will be geographical points distributing the population in such a way that physical space and system linkages are facilitated. People will remain "local"; social, political, and economic behaviour will be absorbed into other systems.

One implication of this general prediction is that the most appropriate systems for the study of behaviour in a local context are developing systems — systems moving to the maturity of institutional participation — rather than systems of either low or high development.

Micro-implications. With increases in development at the local level there is increased variety. This variety increases the combinatorial possibilities for diversity. With increased diversity, there are more alternatives for the individual

to choose from. When there are more alternatives and a greater probability of satisfying any preference, the incentives to participate increase.

With increases in alternatives and thus individual freedom of choice, the intensity of particular conflicts will diminish. An individual's freedom of choice — a function of his variety — improves his mobility: physically, socially, and psychologically. As the weight of probable negative consequences of participation are reduced, individuals are more willing to "risk" participation. Thus greater alternatives, individual choice, and mobility lead to greater and greater inclusion of individuals in the institutions within the local unit.

Further, with increases in individual variety and the prospects for mobility, those with the most variety will tend to gravitate to systems of greater complexity. With the development of the local unit, individuals with relatively greater variety will leave (or want to leave), and their participation will be increasingly oriented to systems of greater complexity (cosmopolitanisation).

With a shift from institutional participation to systemic participation, local units will gradually become points of physical aggregation of individuals for the delivery and dispersion of goods and services generated by the macro-system. Local problems will be seen as those of efficiency of delivery. Political leaders will become symbolic residuals of a previously prevailing order of development and participation.

Appendix: An Illustration of a Comparative Research Design for Testing a Theory at the Local Level

The fragments of a theory presented above are at least an illustration of a social research foundation to structure a broad range of evidence from a variety of contexts, to test, modify, and elaborate the theory.

The first requirement is the translation of a theory into: (1) general predictions that should be true if the theory is true — for example, with development, the number of conflicts increases and the intensity of conflicts decreases; (2) an interpretation of the general propositions in terms of local political units — in the US, this general proposition would be interpreted as: the number of organised group protests should increase but compromise among the groups would be increasingly easy; (3) a statement of the measurement operations required and used in the specific contexts — in Yugoslavia, conflicts are measured by (along with some evaluation of measurement results); and (4) a presentation of the evidence in the research context in which it was gathered — in Slovenian communes, 1961–1964.

The evidence would be of several kinds. First, co-variance evidence, stating that units that are higher on X are higher on Y. Secondly, over-time or cross-time data, demonstrating for example that those units that developed most rapidly from T_0, T_1,… T_n also showed the highest increase in certain participatory indicators. The data would be further distinguished according to whether it was taken at a single level or at several levels.

An illustration of the process by which this theory might be broken down into empirical contexts is as follows:

1. *General Proposition:* Development reduces the influence of formal leadership (emergence of institutional participation prior to a major shift to systemic participation).
2. *Justification from Theory:* Formal local leadership is diffused, expressing similarities; with development, these similarities break down and give way to associational participation that is reflective of greater diversity.
3. *A Co-variance Formulation:* The higher the level of development of a system (at a specified point in time), the less influence of formal leadership, and the higher individual activity in associations and institutions of greater diversity.
4. *A Cross-time Formulation:* The greater the rate of developmental change, the greater the reduction in formal leadership influence.
5. *A Cross-level Formulation:* The higher the level of development of a subsystem, the greater the probability that associational participation will be focused on a system of aggregation (variety) greater than that sub-system.
6. *An Interpretation in the Local Political Context:* The higher the level of development of Yugoslav communes, the less the formal participatory activity and the less the activity of local political leadership, and the higher the associational membership.

In the Values study, the correlation between attendance at voters' meetings and development was negative. In the same study, development showed a positive relationship to membership in the Socialist Alliance. In a Slovenian study over time (62 communes), participation in adult educational institutions increased more rapidly with relatively larger changes in development. In a cross-level study, regions in Slovenia showed greater predictive strength (size of correlations) among developmental indicators than did the communes.

This chapter is based on:
Teune, H., & Mlinar, Z. (1974). Development and participation.
In F. C. Bruhns, F. Cazzola, & J. Wiatr (Eds.), *Local politics, development, and participation* (pp. 136–159). University Center for International Studies.

Sociological Perspectives on Local and Regional Development

Introduction

Most contemporary sociological research on local and regional development could be characterised as a piecemeal confrontation with small segments of rapidly expanding and changing complexities of territorial social systems. The conceptual and methodological tools seem too crude to encompass the quantitative as well as qualitative changes taking place.

Researchers are still heavily influenced by traditional understandings of social phenomena as timeless absolutes that exist in their own right without much reference to the rest of the world. The subject of investigation tends to be narrowly interpreted — in time and space — without clear awareness of changes not only in the given subject but also in its context.

The aim of this paper is to contribute to a broader understanding of the interdependencies in the course of development, within and beyond the boundaries of communities and regions.

Cross-Section vs. Cross-Time Analysis

Urban and regional studies seem to share the common feature of social research: they are mostly limited to cross-sectional analysis at a given point in time. Such an approach essentially restricts the possibilities of full understanding and of correct interpretation of developmental processes within territorial units.[84] Restriction in time frame necessarily defines other characteristics of the context (local or regional unit). Social science data and analysis are often based on such a short time span of observation that relationships between and among variables appear stable and the "open" nature of a given system is not detectable (Baumgartner et al., 1976).

The problem is not only the limitation to one-point-in-time studies, but also to short time periods which do not provide a satisfactory time series to reveal the course of development in the given context.

[84] "A historical research methodologies must be recognised for what they can and cannot accomplish: they provide snapshots but, like looking at the separate frames of a film, they fail to give us the movie. Clearly, it is essential for the researcher to be fully aware of the limitations of such models, to use them diagnostically, and to investigate the system under different conditions or at different times to get at the problems of system stability and change" (Baumgartner et al., 1976, p. 30).

The problem can be partly avoided if development of local and regional units at different levels of development is assessed and compared at a given point in time. The units at the lower levels of development can — for some purposes — be treated as representatives of earlier points in time.[85]

In general, several factors condition the predominantly static, cross-sectional approach: (a) regardless of individual dispositions, analysis at one point in time represents an easier solution and does not confront as many theoretical and methodological complications as analysis across time; (b) a lack of information on processes of developmental change across time is the most common issue; and (c) territorial changes of administrative-political units, at least in some countries, represent an obstacle for analysis across time which can be overcome only with additional effort when the original data can be recomputed for the new units.

"Closed Concepts" and Open Systems

Closely related to the cross-sectional approach is the assumption and understanding of territorial (local, regional) units as closed systems for which causal relationships, general principles, and "laws" are constant over time and across situations. The shorter the time span considered in research, the more the territorial unit appears to be a constant and closed system; the "open" nature of the unit is not detectable, and relationships between and among variables appear stable (Baumgartner et al., 1976).

Researchers have to deal with local communities and regions as open social systems.[86] If such a character of these units is ignored, the measurement operations may be inadequately designed. This can be illustrated in terms of the measurement of the level of development within a given territorial boundary.

The tendency to assess the level of development only in terms of phenomena located in an a priori defined territorial unit is widely practised, although in most cases completely inappropriate. The geographic, territorial criterion — implicitly or explicitly — becomes a basis for the measurement procedure, with the assumption of a closed system. While this problem may not appear at the global (national) level to any great extent, it is more critical in the case of lower levels of territorial systems. The lower the level — roughly speaking, the smaller the unit of analysis — the wider the discrepancy between what is located within the area of a territorial unit and what is accessible and used whenever needed, regardless of location in physical space.

Indicators of the level of development of a region or local community — such as the number of books in libraries per capita, hospital beds per 1,000

[85] Sicherl, P. (1973). Time-distance as a dynamic measure of disparities in social and economic development. *Kyklos*, *26*(3), 559–575.

[86] Teune, H., & Mlinar, Z. (1973). Development and openness of systems. In R. Strassoldo (Ed.), *Confini e regioni* (pp. 265–283). Istituto di Sociologia Internazionale; Edizioni LINT.

inhabitants, physicians per 1,000 inhabitants, school space in m^2 per capita, cinema seats per capita — can illustrate the problem. The pattern of spatial distribution of the items which serve as indicators of development clearly does not coincide with the catchment area of those items. The centres perform certain functions for the hinterland, which often extends beyond geographic or administrative boundaries. This wider relevance or distribution of services is usually not reflected in the data used as indicators of local or regional development, thereby artificially creating or augmenting differences in the level of development between territorial units.

This issue cannot be dismissed as a minor, technical problem. It is related to the central question: to what extent is the measurement and research of development at the sub-national levels theoretically justified at all? To what extent can sub-systems be treated as relatively autonomous and closed units?

From Cumulative Communities to Aggregates Divided on Functional Associations

In the terminology of Pitirim Sorokin and others, we are facing the transformation of one type of grouping into another: from cumulative communities to aggregates divided on functional associations.[87]

The prototype for the cumulative community was the traditional, undifferentiated rural community, where members were connected by many binding ties within the same, clearly defined boundaries. Territorial proximity, self-sufficiency in terms of basic needs, and isolation from others indicate that the "cumulative community" is a typical closed system. The members are closely tied to it more than to the rest of the world; solidarity between inhabitants is localised and limited within territorially defined boundaries.

The improvement of transport and communications ended the period of isolated cumulative communities. The transition from common to privately owned land broke common economic ties. Cumulative communities underwent the process of differentiation, disintegration, and atomisation.

What we find as a result are only "special interest groups" related to some institutions and centres. It is now hard to determine the location of the community or the dividing line between communities. Spatial proximity becomes too weak a tie to determine the boundaries of the community. This is why the authors speak of aggregates of territorial neighbours articulated by different "functional associations."

Sorokin's conception of "cumulative communities" and "aggregates divided on functional associations," more clearly than other classical dichotomies (*Gemeinschaft–Gesellschaft*, mechanical–organic solidarity, etc.), indicates the coming crisis of the territorial principle of social organisation. Differentiation within a given territorial unit and the extension of the linkages of increasingly autonomous components beyond the inherited territorial boundaries do not allow a comfortable use of well-established concepts in the "closed system" understanding.

[87] Sorokin, P. A., Zimmerman, C. C., & Galpin, C. J. (Eds.). (1930). *A systematic source book in rural sociology* (Vol. 1). University of Minnesota Press.

A Sketch of a Long-Term Developmental Perspective

With development, differences between territorial units tend to increase for some time. Some units become the focal points of dynamic economic growth while others confirm their marginality and stagnation. This provides the basis for conflicting interests which tend to be mutually incompatible: if one gets more, the other will get less. A side effect will be high coercive governmental intervention and the strengthening of political power at the centre.

In a situation where equality is more or less generally accepted as a value orientation of a given political system, the less developed regions will seek support from higher levels of government; on the other hand, the most developed regions will try to expand the area of their own autonomy (Mlinar et al., 1973).

In the long-term perspective, however, the system as a whole cannot develop beyond a certain level without a wider redistribution of the existing variety across territorial units. The dialectics of development seem to be manifested in two simultaneous, opposing directions, both weakening the intermediary levels of territorial social organisation:

— on the one hand, the processes of generalisation and standardisation, increasing similarity across territorial units within the global society; local and regional particularities (e.g. dialects) become part of the folklore;
— on the other hand, a continuous tendency towards internal differentiation of the sub-units of a given region (community), with the prospect of "individualisation" of all of the members of these groupings.

The general, long-term perspective then indicates a curvilinear relationship between the level of development and the explanatory power of intermediary (sub-national) levels of territorial social organisation. Whereas at the very low level of development the smaller groupings (extended family, village) may matter the most, at some level of development the intermediary levels, like the region, explain the important differences more than lower or higher levels; finally — in the long run — all the intermediaries between the individual and the global society will tend to lose their deterministic role. There will be a tendency for each individual to develop as a unique personality, sharing with others many similar properties and being different again in terms of many others.

Growth and Structural Change

Most past empirical studies of "development" were in fact studies of growth — of the quantitative increase or decrease of a selected single phenomenon within a certain period of time. This kind of research — following the well-established tradition of demographic and geographic studies — was limited to a descriptive presentation of the trajectory of a variable without any effort to explain it within a changing context. As such it did not contribute much to the understanding of causality of developmental processes.

Rather than focusing on growth (e.g. of the total population within a given region), it is structural change which is theoretically important and relevant for public policy: the change in the relationships between variables in the course of development.

The changes in these relationships could be studied within an individual territorial unit across time, or on the basis of comparing the relationship between variables across units at different levels of development. For example, when comparing the correlations between national income per capita and the quality of health service across republics in Yugoslavia, we find that in the least developed republics income is a good predictor of health service, whereas in the most developed republic there is no significant relationship between the two.

Instead of a simple presentation of growth and decrease of a single variable, the changing explanatory power or predictive capacity — with reference to some other phenomena — can be assessed. Not only bivariate analysis but multivariate analysis as well may reveal the changing position and relationships within a cluster of variables.

In the analysis of growth there is an implicit assumption of constancy and of an equal "weight" of the variable across time. In the analysis of structural change, the opposite holds. The variable is expected to vary not only in terms of how widespread it is, but also in terms of its deterministic weight or explanatory power.

From Single to Multiple Levels

The research of developmental processes does not relate only to the changes of individual variables or to the changes of relationships between these variables, but also to the changes of the relative position and linkages of the given unit (region, community) to higher levels.

Not only do variables change; their social context is also changing at the same time. One of the basic characteristics of the changing social context is manifested in the increasingly differentiated levels of territorial social systems. While research tends to concentrate on single-level, closed systems, the actual developmental change more and more clearly indicates the multilevel character and inter-level relationships of territorial systems.

Instead of "either–or" alternatives (global or regional, local or national, etc.), the problem is rather how to take into account all the relevant levels of analysis. Apart from territorial and other social units, the characteristics of individuals should be considered as well. Without adding the individual level of analysis we would not be able to explain many "deviant cases" which do not behave according to the explanatory models based on structural characteristics of the territorial social systems.

How to Explain Different Rates of Change?

The rate of developmental change can generally be understood as a function of: the level of development at a given (starting) point in time; the institutional structure and its relationship to the socio-economic structure; the role of subjective factors; and environmental, residual influences.

The level explains the rate. The first question to be clarified is: to what extent and why does the level of development itself determine and predict further changes? If development is understood as integration of diversity (Teune & Mlinar, 1973), it follows that the higher the level of integrated diversity, the shorter the time needed to produce and integrate additional variety. The higher level will also tend to ensure a higher rate of change.

Institutional structure. The variance in rate of development across territorial units results, to some extent, from the characteristics of the institutional structure and its relationship to the socio-economic complexity of the units. The dissonance between the framework and complexity of the institutional structure of the territorial political unit, on the one hand, and the area and structure of the actually socio-economically integrated unit, on the other, affects the rate of developmental change.

Subjective factors. The varying rate of developmental change results, to some extent, from the role of "subjective factors," especially the role of political leaders. Theoretically, it should be elaborated under what kind of conditions leaders can influence the rate of development within a given type of territorial unit. Their influence will probably be rather low at the low levels of development; it will increase with some development and then, at the very high level, decrease again — competing with many other channels of communication across communities and regions.

Environmental and residual factors. Here we could consider the ecological and demographic structure as well as physical environment and location or position within the area of a higher order territorial system.

Internal or external factors of change. Finally, there is a wide range of relevant external factors affecting the rate of change from increasingly wide areas beyond the boundaries of the studied unit. Theoretically it is interesting to investigate the point of transformation when development of a unit becomes more a result of external factors than of internal conditions.

This chapter is based on:
Mlinar, Z. (1976, April 10–14). *Sociological perspectives on local and regional development: Some theoretical and research issues* [Paper presentation]. International Conference on Social Problems of Urban and Regional Development, Messina & Reggio Calabria, Italy.

Local Responses to Global Change

Introduction

The changing meaning and role of local democracy are assessed in the context of the transformation of territorial social organisation and local–global convergence. The autonomisation of regional, local, sublocal, and individual actors is dependent on simultaneous supra-national and global integration. In place of the zero-sum logic of centralisation–decentralisation, focus should be shifted to the rapprochement of the levels of decision-making and their power-sharing. Advances in global integration are not a negation of localism. They contribute to a shift to a localism that is deliberate and open to the rest of the world. Openness involves an increasing choice of alternatives and a lower probability but heightened effectiveness of participation (voice) within local institutional structures. While involvement in undifferentiated, general forms of local democracy stagnates or even declines, participation with respect to more specific and close issues tends to be stable or even to increase. There is a hybridisation of governmental and non-governmental frameworks of participation that provides prospects for a strengthening of civil society.

To go beyond the contemporary democratic preoccupation with civil participation within formal institutional frameworks, it is necessary to consider the changing meaning and role of local democracy in the broader context of the transformation of territorial social organisation and, especially, the convergence of local and global forces.

This approach requires a re-evaluation of the traditional dichotomies: small communities versus large (mass) society; local versus world system; direct versus representative democracy. The citizen's direct access to decision-making is no longer restricted to local levels. Moreover, physical distance is ceasing to be a measure of the remoteness of national and global power centres. As interconnectedness expands across space, territorial hierarchies will be seen to be flattening.[88]

The framework of local decision-making is steadily widening to encompass national and supra-national policies. Instead of the conventional focus on decentralisation — as a downward shift of decision-making powers to regional and local levels — a different perspective on long-term processes is the rapprochement between these levels in their cooperative as well as competitive sharing of powers.

[88] Mlinar, Z. (1994, July 18–23). *Expanding territories, flattening hierarchies: Four models of territorial dehierarchisation in Europe* [Paper presentation]. 13th World Congress of Sociology, Bielefeld, Germany.

At the threshold of postmodern society, local democracy cannot be adequately appraised if politics are considered a separate sector or institution of society. Contemporary developments show that political involvement is becoming inherent in all aspects of everyday life. Thus there is a unity of opposite trends: movement closer to the citizen and towards global society. Both of these basic processes are reflected in changes in local democracy.

Bifurcation at the National Level

Concurrent with the expansion of the territorial contexts of social, economic, and political integration towards supra-national and global interconnectedness, there is an opposite trend towards a new regionalism and localism. This dualism is producing a bifurcation within nation states, which is both yielding parts of national sovereignty to supra-national formations such as the European Union, and decentralising by relegating decisions to lower levels closer to the citizen.

The American political scientist Chadwick Alger has pointed out the great divide between the supra- and sub-national levels of participation in decision-making.[89] He has noted the constraints of mind-set and the inertia of established practices that prevent people in any given place from participating in the resolution of global social issues. International affairs are the sole preserve of states and their foreign ministers, and not open to sub-national actors, regions, municipalities, or individuals.

The dividing line between the supra- and sub-national levels is blurring, however. Current trends in Europe indicate a growing autonomy of regions as international actors, a "Europe of regions," although it is not recognised that this too is only another step in ongoing social and political development. Regions are indeed closer to the individual, but they are not the end station. The process of autonomisation is also occurring at the local and sublocal levels and ultimately at the level of the individual as a unique and autonomous actor entering global networks.

This process of decentralisation may be elucidated as devolution of functions as well as control over the exercise of these functions. Although the prevailing view is that decentralisation has stagnated in Western Europe, there are grounds for arguing that decision-making is not as hierarchical and centralised as generally maintained. The policy implementation analysis carried out by Hupe is one example: he found that the national government in the

[89] Alger, C. F. (1977). "Foreign" policies of U.S. publics. *International Studies Quarterly, 21*(2), 277–318.; Alger, C. F., & Mendlowitz, S. (1985). *Approaches to global issues by local activists in the United States* [Paper presentation]. Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Washington, DC, United States; Alger, C. F. (1988). Perceiving, analysing and coping with the local-global nexus. *International Social Science Journal, 40*, 321–341.

Netherlands is gradually ceasing to determine the rules of implementation and moving instead to guide local governments in the regulation of their particular areas. Even when one side appears dominant, both are dependent, and the local government emerges as a co-equal in agreements that must be concluded.

Old and New Localisms

In an era of time–space compression and transition from a space of places to a space of flows, the structural basis of local democracy is also changing. As social and political systems, local communities are opening up and restructuring internally, as Pitirim Sorokin observed. In the 1930s, he detected the transformation of traditional, closed, internally homogeneous communities — "cumulative communities" — into "aggregates divided on functional associations."[90]

Six decades later, discussions about local democracy often still presume the existence of the traditional community, even though the situation has altered substantially. Local democracy cannot be expected to take hold in traditional communities because of their internal homogeneity and consequent small differences between individuals, which allow only symbolic expressions of loyalty. Participation amounts to a reiteration of similarities, and the autonomous influence of individuals on the system remains insignificant.[91]

Calls to revive the ancient Greek model of local democracy — the *polis* — which resembled the cumulative type of community more than today's highly heterogeneous ones, are quite inappropriate.

On the threshold of a global civilisation at the turn of the twenty-first century, it is important to note that this new society will not be an alternative to or substitute for local units. On the contrary, a new localism is emerging. The Italian sociologist Raimondo Strassoldo has described the essential difference between the old and new localisms: while the old localism was "primordial" and unthinking, the new one is the outcome of free will, conscious choice; the former is "necessary and natural," the second voluntary and intentional (rational). The second difference is that the old localism tended to minimise contacts with the exterior, to maintain a strong closed boundary, while the new localism is quite aware of the rest of the world and is quite open to interactions with it.[92]

The old localism was concerned with autonomy based on separation from others — autonomy based on the autarky of local units. With the penetration

[90] Sorokin, P. A., Zimmerman, C. C., & Galpin, C. J. (Eds.). (1930). *A systematic source book in rural sociology* (Vol. 1). University of Minnesota Press.

[91] Teune, H., & Mlinar, Z. (1974). Development and participation. In F. C. Bruhns, F. Cazzola, & J. Wiatr (Eds.), *Local politics, development, and participation* (pp. 136–159). University Center for International Studies.

[92] Strassoldo, R. (1992). Globalism and localism: Theoretical reflections and some evidence. In Z. Mlinar (Ed.), *Globalization and territorial identities*. Avebury. p. 47.

of differentiation into the substructures, internal heterogenisation increases with a tendency towards autonomisation of sublocal actors and their separate inclusion in increasingly diverse supralocal and supra-national networks.[93] Participation in "functional associations" and generally in different networks of actors simultaneously represents a kind of departure from the local arena of political involvement. The individual is distanced from an immediate living space — what the renowned British sociologist Anthony Giddens labelled "disembedding." Thus, in each place, there is a certain distancing of physically proximate individuals and a certain vacuum in participation in political institutions.

Remoteness, Control, and Sensitivity to Differences

Local democracy has a positive connotation in the sense that it enables individuals to have more direct participation in and control over the events in their lived-in environments. With today's level of development and the spread of information-communication technology, however, mere geographic distance does not necessarily imply inaccessibility to political centres of decision-making.[94] There is a trend towards the empowerment of increasingly small units participating in broadening territorial contexts, just as the distant centres of decision-making are expanding their control and influence over people in places both inside and beyond the borders of today's nation states.

The feasibility of decision-making at a higher level of centralisation grows with the intensification of communications, which are increasingly insensitive to distance. Today it is easy for those taking decisions at the centre to have more complete information about specific situations in different places than those present in the locality. This undermines, if it does not entirely do away with, the argument that remote centres can no longer follow the details of local events.[95]

Local events can instantaneously become world events today, with the spread of information. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina shows that despite worldwide information about an event, the world community was not organised to take effective action in particular places and regions. Not only are the people or local government in a place powerless in the face of complex social issues, but so too are international representatives before local problems.

93 Blau, P. M. (1977). *Inequality and heterogeneity: A primitive theory of social structure*. Free Press.

94 Studies of "teledemocracy" demonstrated that wide use of communications technology facilitated the transmission of political information and opinion between citizens and their public leaders. This did not undercut the representative machinery or substitute for direct representative democracy. See Arterton, C. (1987). *Teledemocracy: Can technology protect democracy?* Sage.

95 Neuman, R. W. (1991). *The future of the mass audience*. Cambridge University Press.

Several authors have described how individuals had control over factors shaping their lives in traditional societies and how this control has been taken over by external agencies in modern society. Individual autonomy, however, was even more limited in the pre-modern local community — there was a relatively high level of predetermination of people's lives.[96] As local units have opened up and various links across local and national boundaries have multiplied, individuals have actually gained choice and reduced their confinement within previous structures of territorial hierarchies.

The international research project Democracy and Local Governance has shown two outstanding identifications of local leaders in some European states. The strongest identification was with their local community or municipality, and next strongest was with the country. This was characteristic of leaders in Sweden, Austria, Slovenia, and other countries.[97]

Differentiation and Autonomisation inside Local Units

In evaluating the current level of local democracy, one finds great variation both within and between countries. In the case of Denmark, Soren Villadsen observes signs of political apathy in the diminishing membership of political parties. Only 7–8 per cent of the adult population belongs to a party. Political apathy is also evident from the local voter turnout in elections. Although he notes stable and even growing participation on more specific and close issues — for example, on school boards, in environmental movements, and in cultural and leisure-time bodies — in these cases personal interests combined with spatial proximity create a basis for the involvement of individuals.[98]

Conversely, elections and parties are a general, non-specific form of political participation that fails to generate sufficient direct motivation. While differentiation and diversification of avenues of participation do not ensure mass involvement at the local level, they do help attract numerous small groups of participants who identify with specific issues. This indicates an increased power of local citizens and greater responsiveness of those providing various services.[99]

96 Giddens, A. (1991). *Modernity and self-identity: Self and society in the late modern age*. Polity Press.

97 Jacob, B. M., Ostrowski, K., & Teune, H. (Eds.). (1993). *Democracy and local governance: Ten empirical studies*. Matsunaga Institute for Peace, University of Hawai'i.

98 Villadsen, S. (1993). Another century for local democracy? Decentralization, deregulation and participation in Scandinavia in times of European integration. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, *17*(1), 42–55.

99 Gyford, J. (1986). Diversity, sectionalism and local democracy. In Committee of Inquiry into the Conduct of Local Authority Business, *The Widdicombe Report: Vol. 4. Research* (Cmnd 9801, pp. 106–131). Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

Providing and/or Enabling

The experience of the so-called socialist countries, which led to their collapse, and the critical responses in the West to the welfare state have more in common than generally assumed. A common denominator is the autonomy and connectedness of individuals and various groups.

The socialist states pursued a programme of nationalisation as an alternative to both the market and individual initiative. Emphasis was placed on collective consumption as the framework within which society dealt with the issues of housing, education, childcare, and other human aspirations. But recourse to the collective fulfilment of needs led to the passivisation of those concerned, so that neither the material nor human resources available were activated.

In the West over the past decade or two, the welfare state has given way to demands for privatisation so that local government no longer acts as a universal provider but promotes a diversity of options. Two characteristic approaches have thus taken shape: whereas the new Right offers the market, competition, and individual choice, the new Left offers strengthened democracy, participation, and collective control.[100] The former corresponds to Hirschman's concept of "exit" — the possibility of choice between alternatives; the latter to Hirschman's concept of "voice" — the strengthening of the democratic process to empower the individual or groups.[101]

These are two sequences of mechanisms to respond to local conditions, sequences that are not mutually exclusive. Today people can cope with problems in their everyday life and especially with unresponsive public service bureaucracies both by extending democracy and by extending the market.

Two Empowerment Strategies: Voice and Exit

As already frequently noted with regard to services such as education and health, there is often no choice whatsoever — which means there is no scope for individual autonomy at least within local borders.

The process of globalisation opens up new questions. With increased accessibility — both in the physical sense and through the expansion of telecommunication links resulting in greater access to information and services — exit options from any local unit also increase. This diminishes the likelihood, and at the same time raises the effectiveness, of participation or voice within it.

In this context, the individual ceases to be a kind of predetermined given and becomes a subject capable of appreciating the comparative advantages of particular places and expressing dissatisfaction by moving somewhere else. This choice gives individuals greater autonomy in relation to their surroundings and local government, and sets off competition between local governments

[100] Burns, D., Hambleton, R., & Hoggett, P. (1994). *The politics of decentralization: Revitalizing local democracy*. Macmillan.

[101] Hirschman, A. O. (1970). *Exit, voice, and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states*. Harvard University Press.

to attract people who will make the biggest contribution to their locality's development.

Deinstitutionalisation and Privatisation: The State in Retreat

One reason for the vacuum in the institutional framework of local democracy is the tendency towards deinstitutionalisation with the transfer of various activities from the state to the spheres of civil society. Typically, local participation becomes less visible with this transition to an emphasis on sub-groupism.

The strengthening of civil society through the exclusion of state intervention brings back some very old ideas. This is related to the increasingly marked bifurcation at the national level: the nation state is losing some of its control as autonomisation and diversification proceed within its borders and inside local communities; on the other hand, its power is diminishing because it can no longer cope with events that transcend its territory.[102]

Contemporary changes cannot be viewed simply as a shift of powers from one level of government to another. The state is also waiving certain functions in a process that has been called deregulation or privatisation. This concerns both the economic and the more inclusive political sphere, where various hybrid forms of activity by the state and civil society groups begin to appear: neighbourhood committees in England composed of municipal councillors and other local residents; consumer groups; user-led community organisations; day centres run for and by the disabled; housing cooperatives; and cultural clubs.[103] These show a growing diversification of participation that is conventionally considered to be a form of local democracy.

Zero-Sum Game and Beyond

In discussions of decentralisation and local or direct democracy, a realisation is growing that the assumed mutual exclusiveness of local levels of territorial political organisation has already been transcended. As Dahl and Tufte have pointed out, the characteristically rigid insistence in democratic theory on one level of government has to be forgone, and democracy has to be understood as spreading across numerous interrelated political systems.[104]

The first essential expansion is from one to several levels. Only gradually is it being accepted that both approaches can function simultaneously at different levels of government. The more flexible structures of non-governmental

[102] We have the paradox that, notwithstanding the failure of the self-management project and the theory of the withering away of the state as a component of the socialist movement in the former Yugoslavia, we are in a sense going back to them.

[103] Burns, D., Hambleton, R., & Hoggett, P. (1994). *The politics of decentralization: Revitalizing local democracy*. Macmillan.

[104] Dahl, R. A., & Tufte, E. R. (1973). *Size and democracy*. Stanford University Press.

political institutions adapt to the needs of specific problems. Different non-governmental institutions — political parties and interest groups — already act simultaneously at several levels of aggregation.[105]

The argument that the exclusiveness of levels is declining and their complementariness is growing is also supported by the intensive linkages and mutual dependency between levels of government described as the interdependence between shaping policy and its implementation.

Conclusion: Where Are We Going?

The perplexity over changes in local democracy is primarily due to the conflicting trends towards the autonomisation of increasingly smaller territorial units, sub-groups, and individuals on the one hand, and towards the territorial expansion of social, political, and economic integration on the other.

The tendency to make things more manageable and closer to the grass roots increases the danger of substantive impoverishment and trivialisation. Both the objective circumstances of low interconnectedness and the ruling ideology of the communist movement treated the autonomy of groups or individuals as an alternative to the system or nation state. However, accessibility is growing along with time–space compression, changing the relationship between autonomy and integration. It is becoming feasible to achieve autonomy not by means of frontal territorial separation but by selective association.

Thus, local government and local democracy are becoming complementary to, rather than an alternative to, the central, higher levels of decision-making. In place of a zero-sum logic in the redistribution of power, it is becoming more appropriate to apply a win–win logic.

Higher levels of government are tending to rely less on command and operational control and more on cooperation with local governments in their common problem-solving activities, behaving as partners rather than actors within a rigidly defined hierarchical order. Both components of local democracy — the autonomy of the individual and the autonomy of the local unit — are increasingly determined by local–global convergence. They are realised by selective choice within a broadening range of options and by expanding access beyond local and national confines.

Participation in small groups composed of members drawn from the whole world, however, breaks out of the traditional framework of local democracy. There are two reasons for this. First, the individual is escaping to levels both above and below the local level. Second, an expanded range of choice is possible only by transcending the institutional structure of government and politics

[105] Rochon, T. R. (1982). Direct democracy or organized futility? Action groups in the Netherlands. *Comparative Political Studies*, *15*(1), p. 6.

and by entering the sphere of civil society. Local democracy will increasingly have to be reconsidered in terms of a shift from a strictly delineated political sphere to one of social relations in global civil society.

This chapter is based on:
Mlinar, Z. (1995). Local responses to global change. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *540*, 145–156.

Individual Empowerment and Human Rights

Spatial Sociological Perspective on the Individual's Inclusion and Exclusion

The issue of human rights has to be placed in the broadest socio-developmental context in order to be dealt with from a sociological standpoint. Instead of the concrete positive legal regulation of particular rights, sociological analysis is primarily concerned with explaining changes in the individual's position — his empowerment or powerlessness — in the framework of the long-term transformation of the territorial organisation of society.

In their broadest sense, human rights entail changes in the relationship between the individual and society. Given the factual concentration of social power, they understandably raise the question of the individual's inclusion or exclusion in nation states. However, it will be shown that these are not natural givens and, moreover, that in the long term the individual is being empowered in the context and as a function of the globalisation of society.

Three Hundred (and Fifty) Years of the Westphalian Order

At the outset, the temporal and substantive framework of the discussion has to be widened by noting that besides the fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration of Human Rights, we have reached the 350th anniversary of a particular model of territorial organisation of society in Europe — namely, the Westphalian order. Symbolically at least, the Westphalian Peace Treaty marked the beginning of a system of sovereign and equal territorial states, which subsequently spread throughout the world as a European model.

Even though it is rather unusual in sociology to operate with anniversaries, two symbolic events within the three hundred years between 1648 and 1948 may be highlighted: one act marking the beginning of an order which relegated the individual to a subordinate role as member-citizen, and the second act elevating the individual person above the state and its sovereignty.

This historical course is unfolding in exceptionally condensed form in Slovenia. The three hundred-year period is being compressed into the independent Slovenian state's first decade, when joining the European Union is assumed to already be under way. This compression brings a distinctive paradox: the parallel construction and de-construction of the Slovenian state, which generates inconsistencies and disorientation with regard to ways to

assert national identity without encroaching on the freedom and identity of the individual. The Slovenes have attained their own state — the most outstanding historical achievement — precisely when sociologists in the developed Western world have begun labelling the nation state an anachronism.

In this expanded context, treating human rights as some kind of *a priori* and *natural given* seems disputable. The assertion of these rights involves a *new ethos* that, in the words of the great French scientist Jean Hamburger, entails repudiating the natural biological order: "In effect what is concerned is that cruelty, relentlessness, disdain for the individual, injustice, aggressiveness and the superiority of the strong over the weak reigns in nature. The very concept of human rights is directed towards reacting against such tendencies and asserting and proclaiming that these are principles that have to be respected and *do not derive* from nature but are rather directed exactly at *overcoming* natural instincts" (in Cassese, 1990, p. 157, emphasis added).

Individualism and Communitarianism: In General and in Slovenia

Sociological, politological, and philosophical discussion of individualism and communitarianism and the relationship between the individual and the community has contributed to understanding human rights. Howard and Donnelly (1986) show how typical political regimes favour the exercise or exclusion of human rights. They group the main types (6) of political regimes into two categories: individualistic and communitarian. The former includes "liberal" and "minimal state" regimes, and the latter "traditional," "communist," "corporativist," and "developmental" regimes.

Liberalism gives moral precedence to human rights by treating them as something over and above society and the state. In conflicts between the individual and the state, liberals give *prima facie* precedence to the individual. A communitarian society excludes recognition and exercise of human rights, denies the autonomy of the individual, and assumes that the individual is respected only insofar as he performs his prescribed roles as a member of society.

It appears that the cumulative residua of three types (or sources) of communitarianism — (1) traditionalist, (2) communist, and (3) nationalist — are being taken over rather unreflectively in Slovenian society. Through inertia, the sediments of all three strongly colour our life and actions as a hidden common dimension in politics (whether left or right), culture, and even narrower specialist fields.

Communitarianism persists at the national level as well. It is evident in the priority accorded homogeneity and ethnic purity, which entails marked exclusiveness towards others on the principle of *ius sanguinis* (blood relations) or *ius soli* (place of birth). The Slovenian Constitution draws a significant distinction

between the rights of native minorities and immigrant minorities, which rests on the assumption of a stationary, relatively closed society inside fixed territorial boundaries and limited personal mobility. This conflicts with the right to freedom of movement within a given country guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, not to mention the freedom of movement that is becoming a fact of life on a European scale.

Outdated communitarianism is also evidenced in mechanistic ideas about assuring national unity, such as the idea that the whole is stronger the more limited the autonomy of its parts. In place of interlinking coupled with autonomisation, we still have normative provisions grounding interlinking in subordination. What is missing is a new orientation towards territorial dehierarchisation and a shift to partner relations between individuals and all levels of territorial organisation and decision-making in Slovenia, Europe, and the world generally.

Supra-national Determination of Human Rights

The governing role of the national state, which had always been central to the theory and practice of human rights, is now receding into the background in the developed world.

Rights that had once been tied to membership in a national community have become more and more abstract and determined at the supra-national and transnational levels. Human rights are attached to the person irrespective of membership in a particular national state. Although the state is still responsible for organising their exercise, it is no longer the source of their legitimacy as a territorial unit.

Classical concepts of national citizenship are no longer appropriate for understanding the dynamics of membership and belonging in contemporary Europe. As Soysal (1994) writes, rights, participation, and representation in the political system are transcending the vocabulary of national citizenship. There is a trend towards a new model of membership anchored in deterritorialised concepts of human rights, which he designates "post-national." Rights and (territorial) identity are diverging more and more.

This divergence can be seen, for example, in: the European Court for Human Rights in Strasbourg, to which any of the 800 million inhabitants of the 40 member states of the Council of Europe may in principle appeal; the right of appeal to the UN Human Rights Committee, even in opposition to one's own country; the International Court in Nuremberg, which established the principle of individual obligation to refuse to obey state laws that conflict with international humanitarian standards; and the International Criminal Court established in Rome in 1998, which marks "the end of the culture of unaccountability" on an international scale (K. Annan).

These examples illustrate how the person as an individual is gradually becoming more important than the national state — part of the "great narrative" of the long-term interdependence of the processes of individualisation and globalisation.

From Exclusive Territorial Towards Plural Membership

With growing spatial accessibility, axiomatic exclusive membership in one territorial community is giving way to synchronous or parallel inclusion in more and more different groupings. Loyalty, or identification, is no longer absolutely and exclusively tied to a single unit; there is simultaneous loyalty to several social communities.

New concepts are beginning to emerge to deal with the dilemmas of this transition: "residential citizenship," "dual citizenship," and the like, all indicating the move away from earlier exclusiveness. The Maastricht Treaty has inaugurated European citizenship, providing for the reciprocal rights of Europeans.

The tendency towards transcending exclusive membership is doing away with stipulated renunciation of original nationality before a new one is granted. A concept of plural nationality or citizenship is evolving, implying that loyalty is no longer indivisible. Acquiring a new citizenship does not, of course, mean that a person's feeling of belonging to a particular community also changes automatically. Studies have shown that naturalised immigrants do not have less contact with their original community than those not naturalised.

Germany's definition of German nationality — restricted to Germans by birth, origin, or blood in the sense of *ius sanguinis* — means that "guest workers" and their children are included in society only as "foreigners," and even those born and living in Germany remain "foreigners" in legal terms. Thus today the word for "foreigner" does not refer to people for whom German society is foreign; rather, it means permanently settled inhabitants who are not recognised as being of German nationality and hence are in an inferior position in the legal system and society (Rittstieg, 1994, p. 112).

Submerging Differences and "the Right" to Assimilation?

The end of the real national state is also the end of attempts to uniformise national culture by means of the state. What had been amalgamated at the peak of the modern period — citizenship, nationality, and culture — is in the process of fragmentation today. This is creating leeway for recognition, expression, and valuing of diversity, and thereby according respect for personal individuality a place of its own. This entails a move away from territorially defined homogeneity and ethnic purity as established values.

In Slovenia, some authors argue in favour of the assimilation, or immersion, of immigrants. This view clashes with the basic reorientation being conducted

internationally by the Council of Europe with the motto "all different — all equal," which presumes that today we are no longer living in homogeneous but multi-cultural societies. The great challenge is finding out how to live with differences: "In multi-cultural societies we are not as happy as we could be: we should be enriched by diversity and never let it be squandered … In a society that treats differences as a failing, this is often the main cause of discrimination" (Council of Europe, 1998).

Development trends point to the emergence of an inter-cultural society in which diverse cultures, sub-cultures, and ethnic groups live together and establish open relations of all-round respect, in "active tolerance." This requires more than one-sided adaptation that leaves the majority culture unaffected by other cultures and groups.

With growing openness and mobility on a European scale, it is becoming harder to distinguish between a native population and immigrants in a particular country. There will be more and more individuals and families that cannot be dichotomised as native (domestic) or foreign. People are spending only part of their life in one place or even country. There is a discernible rising trend in the share of ethnically mixed marriages. At the same time, any discrimination on the basis of territorial origin has become unacceptable, at least within the EU. Nevertheless, the idea that "differences are a failing" is still strongly prevalent in some European countries and leads to tendencies towards exclusion and assimilation of all that is alien and different.

Closed Circle of Powerlessness: Tiananmen, Abused Women, Paedophilia

Is there a common denominator in such diverse incidents and phenomena as the student protest in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, the situation of abused women, and the frequency of paedophile cases, which have drawn public interest in the past decade? Why have we become sensitive to certain problems in precisely this period? Was there no political violence in various countries, or sexual violence in families, in the past?

Human rights discussions tend to focus on specific problems, each one separately. A sociological approach takes a broader substantive and temporal-spatial view. In examining the exercise or violation of human rights in relations of power and powerlessness, attention should not be directed solely at the actions of the state. Micro-sociological changes in various groups and everyday life have to be taken into account as well.

Contemporary information-communication technology is increasing the reach of the individual and groups in exercising human rights by enabling trans-border interconnections (e.g. faxes on the Tiananmen Square protests; protests by Amnesty International members in numerous countries regarding the status of refugees in Slovenia) and similarly across the boundaries of the

private sphere of home and family. As the scope for communication and even physical movement and alternative accommodation grows, power relations within the home are also changing and diminishing the traditional subordination and vulnerability of women and children to psychological and physical abuse.

Paradoxically, this means that only now is public awareness of these problems growing, creating the impression that circumstances are actually deteriorating. A feminist movement pointed out: "For women the most dangerous institution is marriage, the most dangerous place is the home, and the most dangerous person is the partner." In the past, the seclusion of the family prevented public knowledge of the real situation, which actually included the grossest actions against the human dignity of the physically and socially powerless.

In the long-term, developmental sense, the individual is entering society more and more directly — and conversely, so is society's access to the individual — both on the local and global level, bypassing various forms of mediation. The criticism of paternalistic views of adults who are persuaded that they act in the child's interests, insisting on new models for the child's direct involvement and participation in decisions on matters that concern him, is relevant here. The same holds, analogously, for the relationship between the citizen and the state.

The State, Groups, and the Individual in the Global Context

With globalisation, human rights can no longer be treated as exclusively national problems. Nor do the institutions of national democracy suffice any more for co-operation between people in finding solutions. More and more, the European Union is assuming the attributes of statehood. Direct links between the EU and individuals or citizens in its member states are increasing.

The United Nations has an ambiguous role in this. On the one hand it is exactly the UN that has generated the international legal groundwork for human rights and the activation of numerous non-governmental international organisations in connection with them. On the other, since it is the representative of national states, it cannot also represent the interests of sub-national units or actors whose protection could entail interfering in the internal affairs of states. The UN is receptive to the demands of individual sovereign states, but not to those of sub-units and individuals.

This gap is being filled by a growing number of NGOs promoting human rights at the level of the EU (the European Human Rights Court) and at the global level. The protection of human rights is thus taking precedence over the sovereignty of states. Although with difficulty and inconsistently, the individual is gradually becoming a subject of international law (Tomuschat, 1984). The exercise of human rights places restrictions on state power and sovereignty and in the final instance undermines the world order based on state sovereignty. In

this regard, the state is becoming a transparent glasshouse whose respect for human rights is visible to the world public.

In conclusion, another question has to be raised: does a retrospective analysis give grounds for predicting anything with regard to the changing role of the individual — his empowerment or otherwise — in the future? The theorists of postmodern society maintain that we are moving towards the end of all regularity and predictability, that there are no developmental processes any more, only an "open-ended transformation" as Martin Albrow (1996) puts it. It is correct that it is not possible to speak of any linear advance; but non-linearity still does not mean that there are no regularities. Even in instances of the greatest shifts (such as Bosnia-Herzegovina) there are signs that despite all the inconsistencies, a new world order based on universal human standards is burgeoning.

Human rights are simultaneously the starting point and the product of emancipatory social movements, whose goals become most feasible in the context of the emerging global civil society. Europe is presently taking the shape of a "fortress" that shuts out the rest of the world. Nevertheless, this fortress assures incomparably greater room for freedom than was provided for centuries by the Westphalian order described above.

This chapter is based on:
Mlinar, Z. (1998, December 10). *Individual empowerment and human rights* [Paper presentation]. Consultation on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Ljubljana, Slovenia.

Territorial Diversification and/or Homogenisation? From Identities as Islands to Identities as Crossroads

Drawing on evidence from Europe and beyond, this chapter examines one of the central paradoxes of contemporary socio-spatial development: the simultaneous tendencies towards increasing cultural homogenisation and increasing cultural diversification. Understanding this apparent contradiction requires a multilevel perspective. While traditional territorial communities and national cultures are becoming increasingly interconnected and similar, greater openness also creates conditions for growing diversity among regions, local communities, social groups, and individuals.

Historically, territorial cultural identities developed under conditions of limited accessibility and discontinuous communication. As mobility, communication, and interconnectedness expand, identities are increasingly shaped through selective combinations of people, goods, ideas, and cultural influences originating from different parts of the world. Territorial identities therefore evolve from relatively isolated "islands" into dynamic "crossroads", where local and external influences continually interact.

This perspective also qualifies simplistic interpretations of cultural convergence. Although processes commonly described as "Americanisation" have often contributed to greater uniformity within and across European societies, they should not be understood solely as expressions of cultural domination. Rather than replacing local cultures, global influences increasingly provide a common platform from which new and distinctive cultural configurations emerge. In this respect, the present interpretation extends beyond classical theories of cultural imperialism by emphasising the creative and autonomous responses of local actors to global influences.

The detailed analysis of these processes—including the transition from coexistence to confrontation, radial and tangential interlinking, the case of English, reverse invasion, spatial mobility, cultural standardisation, and the interplay between homogenisation and diversification—has already been presented in the chapter *Cultural Identity, Deterritorialisation and Globalisation*. It is therefore not repeated here. Instead, the present chapter builds on that discussion to highlight the broader implications of these processes for understanding the transformation of territorial identities in an increasingly interconnected world.

One particularly visible illustration of these broader processes is the growing influence of American popular culture on European societies. While often interpreted as evidence of cultural homogenisation, this development also reveals the more complex interaction between global influences and local responses discussed above.

"Americanisation" of European Cultures

Data on the territorial origin of films, most popular music, television programmes, and the main sources of information and their dissemination indicate a strong tendency towards the "Americanisation" of cultures in European countries.

Domenach (1991) already observed that European societies were often becoming culturally more oriented towards the United States than towards neighbouring European countries. Cinema audiences, television programming, and popular culture increasingly reflected this trend.

In the overall range offered by Slovenian cinemas, American films are predominant. Over the past eighteen years their proportion has doubled, and since 1990 it has risen to over 80 per cent. During this period — except in 1983 — the proportional share of attendances for American films was constantly higher than their ratio with regard to the overall number of films shown, reaching at its highest 90 per cent. Up until the mid-1980s, there was still a relatively high proportion of attendances for West European and Hong Kong films; from the second half of the 1980s, the number of these films drastically declined.

For a presentation of foreign musical influences over the past two decades, the most reliable source is the analysis of foreign music charts. Out of a total of 210 hits in the "Top 10" annual music charts for the period 1974–94 listed in the Slovenian TV and music magazine *STOP*, 90 (43 per cent) were British and 83 (40 per cent) were American songs. If we consider that — apart from the German and Italian songs — all others were sung in English, then English is the language which dominates absolutely amongst the most popular foreign songs (198 hits, or 94 per cent).

Conclusion

Both the technological basis of extending access and the political elimination of barriers between nation states tend to contribute to the transformation of the territorial social organisation of Europe. The emerging frontierless Europe implies a very different territorial distribution of diversity.

It is not just that the territorial framework of social life is widening. Rather, a contradictory process is involved, which includes a tendency towards internationalisation and globalisation together with the strengthening of autonomy and the distinctiveness of small social groups and individuals. However, both

of these undermine the particular territorial cultural identities we have known to date, which in turn releases important self-defensive mechanisms. Such reactions act within the system as pressures towards homogenisation, and in relation to the outside world as a tendency towards dissociation. The latter is expressed as heightened intolerance towards the different or, in extreme forms, as equating the different and the hostile. Dissociation points to a search for a solution in the sense of affirming "identity as an island" rather than "identity as a crossroads." But decades of experience with the former socialist states, which avoided "foreign influence," show that in fact they went into stagnation and today are themselves endeavouring to attract as much foreign know-how, culture, and capital as possible.

The simultaneity of the processes of homogenisation and diversification — which perplexes many writers — may be clarified by the conclusion that what we are dealing with here are different levels of territorial organisation: at the level of the hitherto existing territorial communities, it may be said that they are becoming increasingly similar. Within them, however, there is emerging and increasing diversity, which will be all the more important for shaping the unique identities of individuals and sub-groups.

Although it might seem that homogenisation would, in global terms, eradicate the differences between territorial units (Boulding, 1985), a more thorough analysis yields a different conclusion. Diversification in space is likely even to increase, although on a different basis. While in the past, territorial characteristics (identities) were shaped because of limited accessibility, in the future they will be more and more determined by increased (non-limited) accessibility, which will allow for the unique combination of people, goods, and ideas in specific locations in space.

It may therefore be expected that the future socio-spatial restructuring process will lead to deterritorialisation — reduction of the differences between "inherited" territorial identities — and also to re-territorialisation (the creation) of new identities in specific locations in space. Future socio-spatial restructuring is therefore likely to involve both deterritorialisation—the gradual reduction of inherited territorial differences—and re-territorialisation through the emergence of new identities rooted in distinctive local combinations of people, goods, and ideas. This dual process provides a broader framework for understanding both contemporary transformations and the future evolution of European societies.

This chapter is based on:
Mlinar, Z. (1997). Territorial diversification and/or homogenization?: From identities as islands to identities as crossroads. In *Cultural crossroads in Europe* (pp. 163–177). Forskningsrådsnämnden

VI.

Concluding Thoughts

Throughout this volume, globalisation and individualisation have been presented as the two principal forces reshaping contemporary society, progressively overcoming the spatial constraints that historically structured social life. Advances in communication, mobility, and technology have continually reduced the significance of time, distance, and territorial boundaries, profoundly transforming social organisation at every level.

Yet the assumption that these processes necessarily represent continuous progress has become increasingly difficult to sustain. The Club of Rome drew early attention to the simple but fundamental insight that unlimited economic growth cannot be reconciled with the finite ecological resources of the planet. Rather than questioning globalisation itself, this perspective challenges the expectation that global integration can continue indefinitely without confronting environmental, social, and economic limits.

Globalisation is therefore not disappearing but entering a new phase of transformation. Alongside continued global interconnectedness, new importance is being attached to resilience, sustainability, and greater self-sufficiency, particularly in strategic domains such as food production. These developments suggest that future socio-spatial organisation will not be characterised simply by either globalisation or deglobalisation, but by new and evolving combinations of global interdependence and locally rooted capacities. Understanding this changing balance remains one of the central challenges for future research on territorial organisation and social development.

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List of Original Publications

The chapters in this monograph are based on, or contain adapted extracts from, the following prior publications:

Mlinar, Z. (1976, April 10–14). *Sociological perspectives on local and regional development: Some theoretical and research issues* [Paper presentation]. International Conference on Social Problems of Urban and Regional Development, Messina & Reggio Calabria, Italy.

Mlinar, Z. (1984). Theoretical and methodological trends in sociological research of spatial social structure and developmental processes. In W. Mirowski & Z. Mlinar (Eds.), *Urban social processes in Poland and Yugoslavia* (pp. 15–56). Polish Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology.

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Mlinar, Z. (2001, June 21–23). *Empowerment and distinctiveness in the process of glocalization* [Paper presentation]. International Sociological Association, Thematic Group 06, Workshop on Sociology of Local-Global Relations, Ljubljana, Slovenia.

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The Club of Rome drew attention to the fact that a limited world also implies limits to production and consumption. Endless growth is not possible on a limited planet. Limitless growth is confronting limited resources and the ecological limits of the Earth. The Earth as a limited entity collides with the tendency toward unlimited population growth and the unlimited expansion of material goods.

Globalisation is not ending; it is here to stay, though not in the form we once knew. It is not dead, but rather undergoing a profound transformation. A new priority is the increasing importance of (food) self-sufficiency, which points to the revival of autarchic thinking in the emerging "deglobalising era." The main issue increasingly coming to the surface is how to achieve a higher degree of self-sufficiency at lower levels of society.

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